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ABSTRACT
Many nations worldwide have been influenced by the experience of the USA in airline 
deregulation and have begun to consider the reform of their own governmental 
regulations. However, airline deregulation has both advantages and disadvantages for 
consumers, individual airlines, shareholders, the airline industry and governments.
Western Europe has been under pressure to relax its regulations and introduce a 
liberalisation process. This pressure came partly from the outside as a result of the 
USA experience and the challenge from low cost Asian carriers. However, pressure also 
came from the inside from the European Commission and consumer organisations.
In May 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established between Saudia 
Arabia, Qatar, U.A.E., Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. One of the ways to achieve the 
GCC’s goal of confederation is through economic integration, which means the 
establishment of a Gulf Common Market.
The main objective of this thesis is to research the feasibility of airline liberalisation in 
the GCC, taking into consideration the US experience and the European expectation in 
this particular field.
To accomplish that objective, this thesis is divided into three parts. The first part 
analyses and studies the GCC air transport market, the development and impact of the 
US Airline Deregulation Act and the European liberalisation process.
The second part develops a feasibility model for air transport liberalisation in the GCC. 
This model involves modelling demand for domestic GCC scheduled air services, fleet 
planning and aircraft selection, financial analysis and the possibility of a new GCC 
network.
Finally, the third part sets out the conclusions from this theoretically based feasibility 
study of air transport liberalisation in the GCC, the main findings of the thesis and
iv
lessons that were learned from the USA and Europe.
Its principal conclusion that liberalisation is both feasible and desirable is backed up 
with an outline of a possible first step that could be adopted for introducing an airline 
liberalisation process to the GCC market. This process starts by liberating intra-GCC 
services using aircraft of less than 70 seats capacity.
On a practical level, the thesis also recommends that the Air Transport Section of the 
GCC Department of Transportation should co-ordinate changes to GCC institutions and 
infrastructure and should propose further changes to regulation as the liberalisation 
process moves ahead. It recommends that the Air Transport Section should use 




I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Mr.Andy Hofton for his 
constructive guidance, help and encouragement throughout every stage of this thesis. 
In addition, I would like to thank Professor Rigas Doganis for his useful discussions, 
suggestions and support.
My special thanks to Sheikh Hamad Bin Ali Al-Thani for the encouragement and 
guidance provided throughout this thesis.
To Mr.Abulaziz Al-Naemi my great thanks for discussions, raising important issues and 
suggestions during this work.
To Tricia Forrest-Holden my sincere thanks for typing this thesis, and to Ann Soden 
and Marie Breen for helping her.
I should also like to thank the staff and my friends in the College of Aeronautics, 
especially Ian Stockman, Pedro Pinto, Rod Fewings, Peter Morrell, Bob Golding, Peter 
Obeyesekere, Ralph Anker, Frances Creckendon, Maralyn Bryson, Sveinin 




CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 SCOPE 1
1.2 METHODOLOGY 2
1.3 THESIS OBJECTIVES 5
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTERS 5
CHAPTER TWO - THE GCC AIR TRANSPORT MARKET 9
2.1 INTRODUCTION 9
2.2 THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 9
2.2.1 The GCC Objectives 10
2.2.2 The GCC Organisations 11
2.3 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 11
2.3.1 Air Transport and the GCC Secretariat General 12
2.4 AIRPORTS 13
2.5 AIRLINES 14
2.5.1 Kuwait Airways 15
2.5.2 Saudia Airlines 15
2.5.3 Gulf Air Id
2.5.4 Emirates 17
2.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE GCC AIR LIBERALISATION 17
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 18
CHAPTER THREE -  U.S.AIRLINE DEREGULATION 32
3.1 INTRODUCTION 32
3.2 REGULATORY VIEWS 33
3 2 .1  Regulation and the Economists 33
3 2 2  Regulatory Performance 33
3.3 REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 39
3.4 COMPARISON OF AIRLINE REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION 41
3.4.1 Regulation before 1978 41
3.4.2 Regulation after 1978 42
3.5 DEREGULATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 43
3.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 46
3.7 LESSONS FOR THE GCC 47
v i i
CHAPTER FOUR - TOE IMPACT OF THE
US AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT 51
4.1 INTRODUCTION 51
4a THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION
ACT ON AIRLINES
4.2.1 H ie Airline Deregulation Act Advantages
52
for Airlines
4.2.2 H ie Airline Deregulation Act Disadvantages
52
for Airlines 54
4.3 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
CONSUMERS
4.3.1 The Advantages of the Airline Deregulation
55
Act for Consumers 
4.3.2 H ie Disadvantages of the Airline Deregulation
55
Act for Consumers 56
4.4 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
SHAREHOLDERS 56
4.5 EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
EMPLOYMENT 59
4.6 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
4.6.1 The Advantages of Deregulation for the
62
Aviation Industry 63
4.6.2 Disadvantages for the Aviation Industry 64
4.7 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
ON THE US GOVERNMENT 66
4.8 ISSUES RAISED BY US AIRLINE DEREGULATION 67
4.8.1 Hub and Spoke Networks 67
4.8.2 Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) 67
4.8.3 Frequent Flyer Programmes 69
4.8.4 Airline Consolidation 69
4.9 CONCLUSION 70
4.10 LESSONS FOR THE GCC 72
CHAPTER FIVE - THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EUROPEAN LIBERALISATION 88
5.1 INTRODUCTION 88
sa MAIN EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE CURRENT STATUS 89
5.3 TREATY OF ROME 90
5.4 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PROCESS 91
5.5 MEMORANDUM N O .l AND NO.2 92
5.6 THE 1983 INTER-REGIONAL AIR SERVICE DIRECTIVE 94
5.7 BILATERAL LIBERALISATION 95
5.8 THE 1987 PACKAGE 95
5.9 THE 1990 PACKAGE (Phase 2) 98
v i i i
5.10 THE 1991 PROPOSALS 99
5.11 ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE 100
5.12 CONCLUSIONS 101
5.13 LESSONS FOR THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL
STATES 101
CHAPTER SIX - THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN 
LIBERALISATION 111
6.1 INTRODUCTION 111
6.2 THE EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT MARKET 112
6.3 TYPES OF EUROPEAN CARRIERS 114
6.4 INFRASTRUCTURE CONGESTION 116
6.5 MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATION 117
6.6 CRS AND CODE SHARING 118
6.7 HUB CONCENTRATION 119
6.8 AIRLINE STRATEGIES 120
6.9 CONCLUSION 122
6.10 LESSONS FOR THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL
STATES 124
CHAPTER SEVEN - FORECASTING DEMAND 134
7.1 FORECASTING IN GENERAL 134
7.1.1 Forecasting Perspectives 135
7.1.2 Technological Forecasts 136
7.1.3 Transportation Forecasting 136
7.1.4 Energy Forecasting 138
7.2 OTHER ASPECTS OF FORECASTING 138
7.3 AIR TRANSPORT FORECASTING 141
7.4 FACTORS INVOLVED IN FORECASTING DEMAND 142
7.4.1 Use of Forecasting 142
7.4.2 Purpose of Forecasting 143
7.4.3 Forecast Results 144
7.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING DEMAND 145
7.5.1 Socioeconomic Factors 145
7.5.2 Transport Factors 146
7.6 FORECAST METHODOLOGY 147
7.6.1 Qualitative Methods 147
7.6.2 Time Series Forecasting 148
7.6.3 Causal Models 149
7.6.4 Simulation/System Dynamics 151
7.6.5 Scenario Approach 151
7.7 SELECTING A MODEL 151
7.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 152
ix
CHAPTER EIGHT - MODELLING AIR TRAFFIC 
DEMAND FOR DOMESTIC GCC SCHEDULED
AIR SERVICES 168
8.1 BACKGROUND 168
8.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 169
8.3 DATA COLLECTION AND CALIBRATION 169
8.4 MODEL METHODOLOGY 170
8.5 THE BASIC AIRPORT TRAFFTC-DISTANCE MODEL 170
8.5.1 Data Calibration 170
8.5.2 Model Results 171
8.6 THE BASIC AIRPORT TRAFTTC-DISTANCE MODEL
WITH DISTANCE MODIFICATIONS 172
8.6.1 Data Calibrating 172
8.6.2 Less than 400 Kms 172
8.6.3 More than 400 Kms and Less than 790 Kms 173
8.6.4 More than 790 Kms 174
8.7 REPLACEMENT OF DISTANCE WITH FARE 174
8.7.1 Data Calibration 175
8.7.2 Results Obtained 175
8.8 ESTIMATING THE DEMAND WITH QUALITY OF SERVICE
VARIABLE 175
8.8.1 Data Calibrating 176
8.8.2 Method of Calculations 176
8.9 MODELLING SAUDIA ARABIA DOMESTIC MARKET 177
8.10 MODELLING ALL THE GCC TRAFFIC 178
8.11 OTHER ATTEMPTS TO FORECAST ALL GCC TRAFFIC 178
8.12 SELECTION OF THE FINAL MODEL 180
8.13 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 181
CHAPTER NINE - FLEET PLANNING AND AIRCRAFT 
SELECTION 200
9.1 INTRODUCTION 200
9.2 AIRCRAFT SELECTION 201
9.2.1 Re-equipment Factors 201
9.2.2 Pre-Purchasing Considerations 203
9.3 THE GENERAL FLEET PLANNING PROCESS 203
9.3.1 Fleet Planning Process 204
9.4 THE CORPORATE PLANNING PROCESS 206
9.4.1 Corporate Planning Audits 208
9.5 AIRCRAFT SELECTION PROCESS IN DETAIL 209
9.5.1 Corporate Objectives 210
9.5.2 Selection Criteria 210
9.5.3 Current Resources 210
9.5.4 Aircraft Selection 211
9.5.5 Aircraft Configuration 211
X
9.5.6 Traffic, Operational, Costs, Revenues Models 212
9.5.7 Ranking Candidates 213
9.5.8 Risk Sensitivity Tests 213
9.5.9 Negotiation 214
9.5.10 Final Decision 214
9.6 AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRCRAFT PURCHASING PROCESS 214
9.7 MANUFACTURERS’ PROSPECHVES 218
9.7.1 Aircraft Production Considerations 220
9.7.2 Political Considerations involving Manufacturers
and Airlines 221
9.8 ANALYSIS OF TOTAL AIRCRAFT OPERATING COSTS 222
9.8.1 Data Obtaining 224
9.8.2 Process of the Analysis 224
9.9 FIRST STAGE IN DIRECT OPERATING COSTS 224
9.9.1 Basic Price 224
9.9.2 Number of Seats 224
9.9.3 Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) 224
9.9.4 Block Fuel 225
9.9.5 Block Time 225
9.9.6 Annual Aircraft Utilisation 225
9.10 SECOND STAGE IN DIRECT OPERATING COST 226
9.10.1 Depreciation 226
9.10.2 Interest 226
9.10.3 Aircraft Insurance 227
9.10.4 Fuel Costs 228
9.10.5 Cockpit and Cabin Crew 228
9.10.6 User Charges 228
9.10.7 Aircraft Maintenance Costs 229
9.11 INDIRECT COST PER SECTOR 229
9.12 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 230
CHAPTER TEN - ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND 
REVENUES OF NEW ROUTES 255
10.1 INTRODUCTION 255
10.2 ROUTE PLANNING PROCESS 256
10.2.1 Political, Economic and Strategic Scenarios 257
1 0 2 2  Marketing 257
10.2.3 Forecasting 259
10.2.4 Finance 259
10.2.5 Risk and Sensitivity Considerations 260
10.2.6 Committee Meeting, Evaluation and Final Decision 260
10.3 THE REGULATORY ASPECTS OF AIRLINE ROUTE
DEVELOPMENT 260
10.4 IDENTIFYING FEASIBLE NEW ROUTES IN THE GCC 262
10.5 COSTS AND REVENUES OF THE NEW ROUTES 263
10.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 265
x i
CHAPTER ELEVEN - SCHEDULING ON A POSSIBLE 
NEW GCC NETWORK 297
11.1 INTRODUCTION 297
11.2 DETERMINANTS OF PASSENGERS’ CHOICE TO TRAVEL 298
11.3 AIRLINE SCHEDULING METHODOLOGY 299
11.3.1 Methods of Airline Scheduling 299
11.3.2 Approaches to Airline Schedule Design 299
11.3.3 Types of Airline Schedules 300
11.4 PRODUCT PLANNING 301
11.5 PRINCIPLES OF PROFITABILITY BASED ON THE
SCHEDULE 304
11.6 THE SCHEDULING PROCESS 305
11.6.1 Corporate Strategy 305
11.6.2 Marketing Planning 306
11.6.3 Fleet Planning 307
11.6.4 External Factors 307
11.6.5 Internal Factors 308
11.6.6 Computer Model 310
11.6.7 Objective 310
11.6.8 Committee Meeting 310
11.6.9 Scheduling Outputs 310
11.7 A POSSIBLE NEW GCC NETWORK 311
11.8 FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE NEW NETWORK 312
11.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 314










2.1 Selected Economic Indicators for the GCC States 20
2.2 Air Transport Traffic between the GCC Airports 21
2.3 Comparison between the estimated airport building capacity
and the number of passengers traffic for 1986 22
2.4 Traffic Forecast and Estimated Saturation. 23
2.5 H ie GCC Airlines Fleets 24
2.6 The GCC Airlines Operations 25
2.7 The GCC Airlines Net Profits (or losses) 27
2.8 Cost Comparison of Gulf Air versus AEA and OAA 28
4.1 A comparison between new entrants and already established
airlines 74
4.2 Airlines providing inter-state jet sendee during the
deregulation era —  75
4.3 Proliferation of USA Domestic Hubs 76
4.4 The M^jor US Hubs in 1988 77
4.5 CRS Market Share in 1985 77
4.6 Comparison between the GCC and USA Markets 78
5.1 Aviation Objectives of European Governments 103
5.2 Traditional and new-style European air services agreements 104
5.3 Liberalised UK Bilateral Agreements with other European
Countries 105
5.4 Second Phase of Euroliberalisation Compared with First Phase 106
x i i i
6.1 Comparison between the European and USA Markets 126
6.2 The Ownership of M^jor European Communities Airlines in 1988 127
6.3 Euro-m^jor Intra-European Market Rankings 128
7.1 Statistical Methods vresus Judgemental Forecasts 155
7.2 The Do and Do Not of Forecasting 156
7.3 Areas and Aspects that can and cannot be forecast and
implications involved. 157
7.4 Common Biases in Judgemental Forecasting and Proposed Ways
of Reducing their Negative Impact 161
7.5 Types of Forecasts 162
7.6 Comparisons of Different Methods of Forecasting 163
7.7 M^jor Empirical Evidence and its Implications 165
8.1 Actual and Fitted Traffic for the Basic Gravity Model for the
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports 193
8.2 Calibrated Data for the Basic Gravity Model with Distance
Modification (400 Kms <  Distance <  790 Kms) for the GCC 
Domestic Traffic between the International Airports 194
8.3 Calibrated Data for the Basic Gravity Model with Distance 
Modification (Distance >  790 Kms) for the GCC Domestic
Traffic between the International Airports 195
8.4 The Relationship between Fares and Distances for the GCC
Traffic Routes 196
8.5 Actual and Fitted Traffic for the Basic Fare Model for the
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports 197
8.6 Actual and Fitted Traffic for the Quality of Service and
Fare Model for the GCC Domestic Traffic for the International 
Airports 198
x iv
9.1 ATR-42 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 238
9.2 ATR-72 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 239
9.3 ATP Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 240
9.4 F-50 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 241
9.5 Dash-8-3 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 242
9.6 Dash-8-4 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 243
9.7 Saab-2000 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 244
9.8 DO-328 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 245
9.9 Canadair RJ Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 246
9.10 EMB-145 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 247
9.11 146-100 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 248
9.12 146-200 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 249
9.13 F-100 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 250
9.14 B737-300 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 251
9.15 B737-500 Operating Costs in the GCC Environment 252
10.1 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Abu-Dhabi-Abha Sector 269
10.2 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Abu-Dhabai-Medinah Sector 270
10.3 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Bahrain-Abha Sector 271
10.4 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Bahrain-Alqassaim Sector 272
10.5 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Bahrain-Gizan Sector 273
10.6 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Bahrain-Medinah Sector 274
10.7 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Bahrain-Tabuk Sector 275
10.8 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Bahrain-Taif Sector 276
10.9 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Doha-Abha Sector 277
XV
10.10 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Doha-Medinah Sector 278
10.11 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Dubai-Abha Sector 279
10.12 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Dubai-Alqassiam Sector 280
10.13 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Dubai-Gizan Sector 281
10.14 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Dubai-Medinah Sector 282
10.15 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Dubai-Tabuk Sector 283
10.16 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Dubai-Taif Sector 284
10.17 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Kuwait-Abha Sector 285
10.18 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Kuwait-Alqassiam Sector 286
10.19 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Kuwait-Gizan Sector 287
10.20 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Kuwait-Medinah Sector 288
10.21 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Kuwait-Tabuk Sector 289
10.22 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Kuwait-Taif Sector 290
10.23 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Muscat-Abha Sector 291
10.24 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Muscat-Medinah Sector 292
10.25 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Shaij ah-Dharan Sector 293
10.26 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Shaijah-Jeddah Sector 294
10.27 Costs, Revenues and Profitability of Shaijah-Riyadh Sector 295
11.1 Basic Factors Influencing Business Passenger’s Choice of an
Airline on North Atlantic Routes 319
11.2 The Survey Results of 25,000 Respondents on the Importance
of Product Features in Airline Choice 320
11.3 The New Routes of the Proposed Network 321
11.4 Comparative Utilizations and Load Factors 322







The Total Costs of the New Network
Revenues of the New Network. Revenues generated from 
passengers only.
Revenues of the New Network. Revenues generated from 
passengers, excess baggage and mall
Revenues of the New Network. Revenues generated from 
passengers, freight, excess baggage and mail







x v i i
LIST OF FIGURES
No Page
1.1 Thesis Structure 4
2.1 H ie GCC International and Domestic Airports 29
4.1 Profitability of USA Scheduled Airline Industry 79
4.2 Rate of Return on Investment of USA Scheduled Airline Industry 80
4.3 USA Domestic Airline Yields 81
4.4 Worker Productivity of USA Scheduled Airline Industry 82
4.5 Employment of USA Scheduled Airline Industry 83
4.6 Consolidation of USA Airline Industry 84
5.1 EC Legislation from Start to Finish 107
5.2 Community Actions 108
6.1 LT.Charters in Europe 129
7.1 Fixing the Future for a Road Building Programme 153
8.1 The Process of Building-Up and the Formulation Alternatives 183
8.2 Actual Route Traffic versus Predicted (A1*A2/D^0) for the 
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports 184
8.3 Actual Route Traffic versus Predicted (A1*A2/D^0.5) for the 
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports 185
8.4 Actual Route Traffic versus Predicted (A1*A2/D'T).5) for the 
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports.
Distance Modification (400 Kms <  Distance <  790 Kms) 186
x v i i i
8.5 Actual Route Traffic versus Predicted (A1 *A2/D*2) for the 
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports.
(Distance >  790 Kms) 187
8.6 Fare versus Distance for the GCC Domestic Traffic between
the International Airports 188
8.7 Actual Route Traffic versus Predicted (A1*A2/F*0) for the
GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports. 189
8.8 Actual Route Traffic versus Predicted (A1*A2*Q*2/F*D.4) for
the GCC Domestic Traffic between the International Airports. 190
8.9 Actual versus Predicted (A1*A2/D^0.5) for Saudia Arabia
Domestic Traffic 191
8.10 Actual Route Traffic versus (A1*A2/D^0.4) for all GCC Traffic
(Domestic and International Airports) 192
9.1 General Framework of Fleet Planning Models 232
9.2 Fleet-Assignment Modelling Process 233
9.3 General Corporate Planning Process Model 234
9.4 Genera] Aircraft Selection Process Model 235
9.5 Boeing’s Methodology to Determine Required Aircraft 237
10.1 General Framework of New Route Planning Process 267
11.1 General Process of Airline Scheduling






The framework for the regulation of domestic air transport varies from one country to 
another depending on many contributing factors such as political ideology, economic 
strategy and commercial philosophy.
The US Airline Deregulation Act which was passed in 1978 has changed airline strategies 
and has had an impact on efficiency, structure and services. This initial movement 
towards airline reform has encouraged many regions to adopt new philosophies 
including the European Community, Canada and Australia.
In 15)86, the European Community agreed to move towards the creation of a single 
European market by adapting the Single European Act. The single market was defined 
as "an area without internal frontiers in which the freedom of movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured".1
The aim of establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is to create a 
confederation. It is recognised that one way to achieve that aim is by economic 
integration which means the establishment of a Gulf Common Market which includes 
"the right of nationals to move freely with the same duties and privileges as those 
provided to nationals of the receiving Member State. Economic integration also means 
the removal of barriers, custom tariffs and the emergence of one unified tariff on 
imported commodities".2
1.1 SCOPE
This thesis sets out to research and analyse the GCC air transport market and the 
experience of the USA and Europe in deregulation and liberalisation. In addition, it 
proposes a feasibility model that examines the possibility of liberalisation in the GCC. 
However, this thesis will also attempt to answer the following questions:
1. What Is the current GCC air transport market in relation to GCC concepts, 
airline operations and ownership, airports and regulatoiy environment? In 
addition, what are the objectives of the GCC airline liberalisation plan?
2. What can be learned for the GCC liberalisation plan from the development and 
Impact of both the USA and European liberalisation processes?
3. By developing a feasibility model for air transport liberalisation in the GCC it 
attempts to examine and answer the following questions:
■ Is the domestic passenger demand large enough for a liberalised market?
■ Which types of aircraft could serve the GCC market taking account of
total costs and quality of service?
■ Are there new potential routes?
■ Are the new routes commercially attractive to new carriers to operate
them?
■ What is the form of an operational network?
4. If the model establishes that liberalisation in the GCC is feasible, then what plan 
could be adopted to provide for an airline liberalisation process in the GCC?
1.2 METHODOLOGY
The objectives of this thesis are accomplished through analysis and research. Data were 
gathered and collected from different books, journals, theses, reports, papers, 
discussions and interviews. However, some data relating to GCC air transport, 
especially airlines and airport activities, were hard or impossible to obtain because they 
are unavailable or unclassified as to whether the data is confidential, restricted or for 
the general public.
This thesis discusses and analyses the feasibility of airline liberalisation in the GCC, 
taking into account the USA and European experiences and expectations in that specific 
field.
It is for the purpose of this thesis that a feasibility model is developed which is based
on a fundamental theory, justifiable assumptions and is statistically valid. In addition, 
to accomplish the objectives of the thesis, this study is divided into three parts as 
illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The first part of this study covers the background and the experiences of other nations 
of deregulation and liberalisation. This part provides a review of the current GCC air 
transport industry, and it discusses and analyses die development and impact of US 
deregulation and European liberalisation. Such an analysis raises many policy questions 
and lessons for the GCC. This part consists of five chapters, and it starts with Chapter 
Two.
The second part is the feasibility model of air transport liberalisation in the GCC. This 
part models and researches the GCC domestic market through traffic demand, new 
routes, fleet planning and aircraft selection, financial analysis and scheduling on a 
possible new network. This part provides the main answer to the question of the 
feasibility of liberalisation in the GCC from an airline operation perspective. It consists 
of five chapters which start with Chapter Seven.
The third part is the conclusion (Chapter Twelve). This part provides a dear answer 
about the possibility and feasibility of air transport liberalisation in the GCC. It 
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H ie objective of this thesis is to develop a feasibility model that can examine the 
possibility of successful liberalisation in the GCC. This air transport feasibility model 
should be capable of simulating the prospects for carriers’ operations as in a real 
situation. In addition, this quantitative feasibility model should as noted above be based 
on a fundamental theoiy, justifiable assumptions and be statistical validity.
Studying and analysing the development and impact of the US deregulation and 
European liberalisation allows lessons to be drawn from these experiences and 
expectations. This should avoid their mistakes. It allows the thesis to propose a 
liberalisation plan for the GCC.
Finally, the thesis can draw conclusions about whether liberalisation is feasible or not 
in the GCC.
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTERS
CHAPTER TWO - The GCC Air Transport Market
The main objective of this chapter is to study the GCC air transport market through 
the GCC’s concepts, objectives and structure. In addition, it analyses the international 
and domestic airports, airline operations and ownership, and the regulatory 
environment in the GCC. Finally, the objectives of liberalisation in the GCC are 
covered in this chapter.
CHAPTER THREE - US Airline Deregulation.
The objective of this chapter is to review the history of regulation and deregulation. It 
discusses and analyses the development of the US Airline Deregulation Act, and finally 
draws lessons for the GCC.
CHAPTER FOUR - The Impact of the US Airline Deregulation Act.
This chapter’s objective is to study the impact of the US Airline Deregulation Act on the 
airlines, consumers, shareholders, aviation industry and governments. In addition, this 
study of the USA’s experience of deregulation leads to a discussion of what might form
6
the basis for a liberalisation policy that would be applied in the GCC.
CHAPTER FIVE - H ie Development of European liberalisation.
H ie objective of this chapter is to review the development of liberalisation within the 
European Community air transport market and draw lessons for the GCC market.
CHAPTER SIX - H ie Impact of European Liberalisation
H ie objective of this chapter is to study the EC air transport market, types of European 
carriers, infrastructure, congestion, mergers and consolidation, CRS and code sharing, 
hub concentration and airline strategies.
CHAPTER SEVEN - Forecasting Demand
H ie objective of this chapter is to explain the main problems of forecasting in a real 
situation and identifies those techniques most appropriate for use in examining traffic 
flows in the GCC. In addition, it gives the basis for selecting a forecasting model that 
could be used to predict and forecast passenger demand on domestic GCC routes.
CHAPTER FIGHT - Modelling Air Traffic Demand for Domestic GCC Scheduled Air 
Services.
A gravity model was selected in the previous chapter to examine traffic demand in the 
GCC. However, the objective of this chapter is to model the scheduled air traffic 
demand in the GCC especially for new routes taking into consideration distance, fares 
and quality of service.
CHAPTER NINE - Fleet Planning and Aircraft Selection.
H ie main objective of this chapter is to review and study different aircraft for domestic 
air service. H ie candidate aircraft should be commercially attractive with regard to the 
assessment of operating costs and quality of service. To accomplish this objective, fleet 
planning and aircraft selection are studied and analysed in detail.
CHAPTER TEN - Estimating the Costs and Revenues of New Routes.
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the level of profitability of new routes
operated by candidate aircraft. Therefore, this chapter complements the theory and 
results outlined in the preceding chapters and explains in more detail the concept of 
route planning.
CHAPTER ELEVEN - Scheduling on a Possible New GCC Network 
Using all the data from the previous chapters, the objective of this chapter is to propose 
a possible new network in the GCC. However, an analysis and discussion of airline 
scheduling such as its concepts, methodology and profitability are part of the process 
of exploring new opportunities in the GCC.
CHAPTER TWELVE - Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to conclude whether air transport liberalisation is 
feasible or not in the GCC. It proposes a plan for liberalisation in the GCC with 
recommendations for its implementation. It also proposes further developments of the 
model.
REFERENCES
1. Stephen Wheatcroft and Geoffrey Lipman, European liberalisation and World 
Air Transport (England: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990) p.4.
2. Facts and Figures (Riyadh: H ie GCC) p.14.
CHAPTER TWO
THE GCC AIR TRANSPORT MARKET
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Tbe main objective of this chapter is to study the GCC air transport market through 
the GCC’s concepts, objectives and structure. In addition, it analyses the status of 
international and domestic airports, airline operations and ownership, and the 
regulatory environment in the GCC. Finally, the objectives of liberalisation in the GCC 
will be covered in this chapter.
Air transportation has contributed to the development and advancement of the economic 
prosperity and social life of all countries worldwide. The GCC countries have benefited 
from their strategic geographical location where they are in the main air transit routes 
from Asia to Europe, Africa and the Pacific. Large numbers of transit passengers stop 
in many of its airports, especially in UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. However, a decrease 
in this type of transit passenger is possible due to advanced technology aircraft allowing 
direct flights to be flown from the West to the East, and vice versa, without stopping.
Since the GCC countries are very rich in oil, it is now a focal point for business. 
Moreover, although the GCC population is eighteen million, which is relatively small 
compared to the worid’s population, the average GNP per head of the GCC countries 
is one of the highest in the world. Table 2.1 illustrates selected economic indicators for 
the GCC states which were published by ICAO Bulletin in 1989.1 In addition, the 
distance travelled by GCC passengers and cargo per flight is similar to those of 
Europeans and higher than the worid’s average.2
2.2 THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
Tbe concept for the creation of the GCC was initiated in 1979 during a Summit 
Conference held in Amman, Jordan when H .H . the Amire of Kuwait contacted the 
Majesties and Highnesses of the GCC countries and briefed them on the philosophy of 
establishing unity between the six Gulf states which include Saudia Arabia, Qatar,
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UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. However, in 1980, an official debate took place in 
Riyadh between the leaders of the GCC countries.3
In February 15181, the Foreign Ministers met in Riyadh. In April of the same year they 
met again in Muscat, Oman and proposed a paper which forms the basis of the Charter. 
Finally, the Gulf State leaders met officially in Abu-Dhabi on May 25,1981 and signed 
the basic Charter for the creation and establishment of the GCC.4
The goal of the GCC is confederation, however the following are steps on the way to 
achieving this goal:5
1. Political coordination
2. Economic integration (Gulf Common Market).
3. Defence cooperation
4. Security complementarity
5. Social, cultural and educational approximation.
2.2.1 The GCC Objectives
The basic objectives of the GCC as indicated in Article Four are as follows:
"1. To effect coordination, integration and interconnection between Member States 
in all fields in order to achieve unity between them.
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of cooperation now 
prevailing between their peoples in various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
a. Economic and financial affairs.
b. Commerce, customs and communications.
c. Education and culture.
d. Social and health affairs.
e. Information and tourism.
f. Legislative and administrative affairs.
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry,
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mining, agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific research; 
to establish joint ventures and encourage cooperation by the private sector for 
the good of their peoples."6
2.2.2 The GCC Organisations
The main organisations of the GCC are as follows:7
1. The Supreme Council which is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council 
and formed of Heads of member states. The Supreme Council holds one regular 
session every year.
2. The Ministerial Council is formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states 
or other delegated Ministers, and they regularly convene every three months.
3. The Secretariat-General is composed of a Secretary-General who is appointed by 
the Supreme Council. The Secretary-General nominates the Assistant 
Secretaries-General, and he appoints the Secretariat-General’s staff. In addition, 
he is directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat-General.
In addition, each of the top organisations may establish sub-agencies as may be 
necessary.
2.3 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The regulatoiy system for air transportation in the GCC countries is based on the 
International rules and laws (i.e. ICAO) which regulate civil aviation and air 
transportation services. Therefore, airline operation between the GCC states is basically 
through a bilateral agreement which is mainly negotiated by the civil aviation authorities 
of each state.
One of the main objectives of civil aviation authorities when negotiating bilaterals is the 
protection of national carriers. The GCC national airlines are well protected by the 
bilateral agreements especially in their domestic markets. For example, Gulf Air is the 
only carrier which provides air services between four states which are Qatar, Bahrain, 
Oman and UAE (except Dubai). In addition, Saudia Airline has full monopoly in air
12
services inside Saudia Arabia.
However, the rules and laws which regulate the movement of passengers and cargo in 
the GCC airports are as follows:*
1. Rules and laws of air navigation which are the international regulations for air 
safety and meteorology which have been accepted by the international 
organisations and agencies.
2. Rules and laws for air transport which regulate the GCC national airlines and 
foreign carriers. This is accomplished through bilaterals between the GCC 
governments themselves and foreign governments.
3. Rules, regulations and procedures for passenger and cargo movements. This is 
regulated through the administrative regulation which is mostly through customs, 
immigration and health.
2.3.1 Air Transport and the GCC Secretariat General
The air transport activities in the GCC are coordinated through perm anent committees, 
subcommittees and Department of Transportation, Air Transport Section.
2.3.1.1 The Permanent Committees
The permanent committees include the following:’
1. The Ministers Committee which includes ministers who are responsible for civil
aviation matters. This committee would be in charge of and make 
recommendations on the following:
■ Reviewing the air transport rights which are given now for the protection 
of the national carriers.
■ The necessity of establishing bilateral agreements to organise the air
transport services between the GCC members.
■ Flight co-ordination between the GCC capitals.
■ Studying the possibility of establishing an airline that would serve the
GCC domestic market.
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■ A company In London has already been established for ground air services 
for the GCC countries.
2. The Operational Committee which consists of the GCC airline chairmen and the
directors of civil aviation departments. The following are some examples of the 
work and recommendations of this committee:
■ Discussion of air transport rights which are given to foreign airlines.
■ Discussion of bilateral agreements to organise the air transport services 
between the GCC countries.
■ Studying the proposal from GCC carriers to exclude them from over­
flying charges within the GCC countries, and to reduce fuel prices for 
them at GCC airports.
2.3.1.2 The Subcommittees
The subcommittees are specialists in studying subjects which are related to civil air 
transport. The subcommittees have taken many decisions such as the following:1'
1. The decision to co-ordinate flights between the GCC capitals.
2. The decision not to establish a cargo airline between the GCC countries.
3. Reduction by 35% in cargo fares for national products.
2.3.1.3 Departm ent of Cnmiminications - A ir Transport Section
The Air Transport Section in the Department of Transportation is responsible for 
monitoring the decisions and recommendations of the committees. However, the 
monitoring is only done through operational practices without interfering with the field 
practices or related matters.
2.4 AIRPORTS
There are 12 international airports in the GCC which all have runways of at least 3000 
meters. Nevertheless, Al-Fujera is the smallest. In addition, there are two more 
international airports under construction, one in Saudia Arabia and the other in Abu 
Dhabi. These airports have been designed and built with the latest technology such as 
navigation equipment, lighting systems, transportation and communication facilities.
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In 1986, the total passengers using GCC International airports reached 26 million. In 
addition, there were 6 million transit passengers. However, the total transported cargo 
was 670,000 tons and aircraft movements were 385,000. Table 2.2 illustrates the air 
transport movements between GCC airports.11
It is important to mention that air cargo transportation in the GCC has increased at a 
faster rate than passengers. This increase in cargo is due to the sea-air transport 
method where products are shipped to some GCC airports by sea from Asia, especially 
from the Far East and then transported by air to other countries especially to Europe.
However, it is very important to consider that most of the international GCC airports 
have significant spare capacity. Table 2.2 shows the actual passengers received in 1986 
compared with the estimated airport capacities. From Table 2.3 a conclusion could be 
made that in 1985-86 most of the international GCC airports received only 46% of their 
estimated capacity. This high level of capacity includes buildings, runways, terminals 
and ground handling facilities.
Nevertheless, the GCC published a study in 1987 of air transport. An estimation was 
made of an annual increase in passenger movements in the GCC international airports 
of 2.5-5% per year between 1990-2000. However, other forecasts indicate 4-6% increase 
especially from mid to late 1990s. Table 2.4 illustrates traffic forecasts and estimated 
saturation traffic year for the GCC airports.12
In addition to the 12 international airports, there are 21 domestic airports in Saudia 
Arabia and one domestic airport in Oman giving an overall total of 33 airports. Two 
more international airports are under construction. Figure 2.1 shows all the GCC 
airports.
2.5 AIRLINES
There are four mqjor airlines in the GCC: Kuwait Airways, Saudia Airlines, Gulf Air 
and Emirates. These carriers play an important role in both domestic and international 
air transport services. However, with regard to GCC airlines:
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1. Table 2.5 shows the GCC airlines fleet.
2. Table 2.6 illustrates the GCC airlines operations.
3. Table 2.7 highlights the GCC airlines net profit or loss.
2.5.1 Kuwait Airways
It was formed by a number of businessmen in 1954 under the name of National Kuwait 
Airline lim ited. Tbey operated two DC-3s. In 1958, the Kuwait government bought 
half of the ownership and in 1962 it became fully state owned.13
During the Gulf War all the airlines Airbus aircraft, two Boeing 767s, one 727, two 
Gulfstream G ills  and two BAe 125s, were seized by Iraq. However, the carrier’s 
London insurers paid out $300miDion to cover the carrier’s loss.14
Kuwait Airways serves 10 GCC airports and 33 other worldwide international airports. 
In general the daily aircraft utilisation is low especially when comparing the usage of 
Kuwait aircraft with other international airlines. Kuwait Airways also lease their own 
aircraft to other carriers such as leasing them to Egypt Air and Emirates.
Between 1982 and 1986, Kuwait Airways was faced with operating losses, however, in 
1986 additional investments covered the operation losses. Nevertheless, Kuwait Airways 
received many subsidies from the Kuwaiti government such as $58 million in 1985 and 
$83 million in 1986.15
2.5.2 Saudia Airlines
It was formed during 1945 by the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia with a fleet of DC-3s. At 
the present time, Saudia Airline is the biggest airline in the Arab world and provides 
a wide range of domestic and international air services. Saudia Airlines links domestic 
services in its 24 international and domestic airports. On the other hand, international 
service is provided to 44 cities in the Middle East, North Africa, Southern and Eastern 
Asia, the USA, East and West Africa and Europe.14
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It is important to mention that Saudia Arabia carried 3,366,402 passengers on their 
international flights in 1988. However, 6,891,991 passengers were carried on their 
domestic flights in the same year. The number of domestic passengers carried by 
Saudia Airlines is approximately doable that of international passengers.17
Saudia Airlines have been facing continuous net losses on their operations for the last 
12 years except in 1983 and 1984. The Kingdom of Saudia Arabia has given many 
subsidies to Saudia Airlines such as $107 million in 1983 and 1984, $99 million in 1985 
and $185 million in 1986.1*
Finally, although Saudia has a veiy large and advanced fleet, its daily utilisation is less 
than other international carriers who have similar aircraft.
2.5.3 Gulf Air
Gulf Air was formed in 1950 as Gulf Aviation Co.Ltd through financial backing from 
Bahrain. In 15174 the company’s ownership was restructured to be multinationally 
owned. Equal shares which are held by the states of Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Oman.19
Gulf Air has full monopoly of providing air services to these four states (except Dubai 
which is one of the UAE states). In addition, it flies to 24 cities in the Middle East, 
North Africa, Southern and Eastern Asia, and Europe.
Gulf Air achieved a net profit between 1982 and 1985. However, in 1986 and 1987 a 
net loss was recorded which is mainly because of the loss to Emirates of long distance 
routes from Dubai.
2.5.3.1 Cost Comparison
Gulf Air (GF) carried out a cost comparison study in January 1987 using data from the 
AEA and Orient Airlines Association (OAA). Table 2.8 illustrates the cost comparison 
of Gulf Air versus AEA and OAA airlines using 1985 data.
However, the conclusion of the study is that G Ps cost is higher than both the AEA and
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OAA especially In maintenance. In addition, It concluded that it would be hard for GF 
to be a "low cost carrier" and GF must compete in quality of service terms.20
2.5.4 Emirates
It was established by the government of Dubai (UAE) in May 1985, however, it started 
operation in October the same year.
Emirates was formed as a result of Dubai being unhappy with the services provided by 
the multinational airline (GF). The Dubai government believed that it could best fulfil 
the need for services to and from Dubai through the development of its own carrier.
Emirates started operation with two leased aircraft from Pakistan International 
Airways, and now the carrier operates 8 aircraft. Emirates is considered to be one of 
the newest and fastest growing airline in the world.21
Emirates achieved a net profit of $3.3 million in the first year of operation. However, 
since then Emirate’s net profit or (loss) has been considered to be confidential by the 
carrier management. As a result, their financial operation status is now mysterious.
2.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE GCC AIR LIBERALISATION
Having reviewed EC experience22 this thesis believes that the main obj ectives of the GCC 
air liberalisation plan should be:
1. For the GCC governments:
■ Accomplishing air liberalisation as part of the GCC Common Market.
■ Saving government expenditure on subsidies to airlines.
■ Maintaining safety standards.
■ Maintaining air services to smaller communities.
■ Allowing certain level of competition between the airlines.
2. For the aviation industry:
■ Promoting the aviation industry and increasing travel by air transport.
■ Opening certain level of competition between the airlines.
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■ Increasing productivity in air transport.
■ Efficient utilisation of resources (personnel, aircraft and airports).
3. For the consumer:
■ Variety of products
■ Establishing reasonable fares and rates.
■ Convenient air travel.
■ Avoidance of excess airline profit especially in the GCC domestic market.
4. For the airlines:
■ Maximising market opportunities and innovations.
■ Increasing airline efficiency and productivity.
■ Providing the opportunity to make higher profits.
■ Improving economic viability of airlines.
2.7 CONCLUSION
After studying the GCC air transport market, there are a number of basic factors which 
encourage liberalisation in the GCC which can be identified. These are as follows:
1. One of the ways to achieve the GCC goal of confederation is by economic
integration which means establishing a Gulf Common Market.
2. The GCC is economically stable.
3. The GCC average GNP is relatively high.
4. The existing highly regulated GCC domestic air transport market has resulted
in monopolistic markets which does not have many advantages for consumers. 
In addition, the uncompetitive markets have resulted in some airlines having high 
operating costs and low efficiency and productivity.
5. The GCC countries have very advanced international airports with high capacity
where some of them could at the present time double the received annual number 
of passengers.
6. The GCC airlines own some of the most advanced fleets in the world. However,
some of the GCC carriers are not utilising their aircraft very efficiently. 
Generally, all the GCC carriers have high operating costs, as a result some of the 
carriers make large operating net losses and receive large government subsidies.
There is essentially good demand for domestic air transport in the GCC. The 
number of domestic passengers that are carried annually by Saudia Airlines, 
which has the largest domestic market and airline fleet, is approximately double 
the number carried on their international flights.
Air transport services is the most convenient and best method of travelling 
between the GCC countries. In addition, there are no train service between 
GCC countries.
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TABLE 2.1: Selected Economic Indicators for the GCC States
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(Data are for 1986 unless otherwise Indicated; Monetary values are expressed in U.S. dollars) 
n/a - Data not available. * - Data are for years other than specified.
Source: ICAO Bulletin, Special Air Transport Report: International Air
Passengers and Freight in the Middle East (Canada: ICAO, 1989) 
p.60.
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TABLE 2J2: Air Transport Traffic between the GCC Aiiports xlOOO (1986).
AIRPORT PAX. TO 
FINAL 
DEST .








ABU DHABI 1163 957 45. 1 31 36
DUBAI 2224 1550 41 . 1 99 54
SHARJA 152 12 7.4 - -
RAS-ALKHAIMAH* 36 38 51.4 - -
BAHRAIN 99B 1026 50. 7 36 41
JEDDAH 7197** 323 4.5 149 70**
RIYADH 6128** 455 6.9 92 58**
DHAHRAN 3140** 424 11.9 73 35**
MUSCAT 1826 404 28. 3 23 32
DOHA 864 419 32. 6 25 20
KUWAIT 2337 298 11.3 77 25
TOTAL 26065 5906 18.5 371
* 1985
** Including domestic Saudia Arabian flights
(-) Information not available.
Source: Transportation Methods in the GCC countries (Riyadh: The
GCC, 1989) p.2.3
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TABLE 2.3: Comparison between the estimated airports buildings
capacity and the number of passengers traffic for 









DUBAI 5250 3774 71.9
MUSCAT 2750 1430 52.0
ALSHARJAH 2500 164* 6.6
RAS-ALKHAIMAH 2750 74* 2.7
BAHRAIN 2250** 2024 90.0
JEDDAH 15000 7250 48.3
RIYADH 20000 6583 32.9




KUWAIT 5000 2941 58.8
TOTAL 60500*** 27804 46
* 1985
** 4.5 million after 1990
*** Without King Fahad Airport
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TABLE 2.5: The GCC Airlines Fleets.
Type of Ai rcraft Emi rates Kuwai t 
Ai rway
Gul f Ai r Saudi a
A300-600 5* 11A300-600R 4 + 1 *
A310-300 4 + 4* 3*
A310-304 5*
A302-200 4* 3*A340 3*
B-747-5B 3
B— 747— 100 8
B— 747—200F 1
B— 747— 269ER 4
B— 747—300 11
B— 747— 400 3*
B— 767— 269ER 1
B— 767— 300ER
B— 727— 200 3 9 + 4*
B— 727—269 4
B— 707—200C 2B— 737—200 20DC-8 10 1DC-8-63F 1
L— 1011—200
L— 1011— 300 8 17
L— 1011— 500 1
Dassault Falcon 900 1
Beach King-Air-AlOO 2
Cessna Citation II 2
Gulf Stream IV 1GII 4G U I 5
Total without on orders 9 14 27 91 141
Total with on orders 14 32 34 91 141
* On orders 
one leased
Source: Flight International, World Airline Directory (UK:
Flight International, 25-31 March 1992) pp.79, 85-86, 
95, 114-115. In additional, mail contacts with Gulf 
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TABLE 2.8: Cost Comparison of Gulf Air versus AEA and OAA
COSTS/ATK OAA AEA GF
DOC/ATK
- Flight Deck Crew 1.78 2.40 2.46
- Fuel & Oil 9.05 8.84 11.72
- Flight Equipment Insurance 0.23 0.24 0.52
- Maintenance & Overhaul 2.77 3.81 7.40
- Flight Equipment Deprec. 4.72 2.39 3.15
- Rentals 0.48 0.44 1.13
- Landing Charges 1.09 1.98 1.85
- En-route Charges 0.49 0.91 0.76
- SUB-TOTAL 20.61 21.00 28.99
IOC/ATK
- Station & Ground 3.18 4.77 3.92
- Cabin Attendants 1.97 2.41 2.31
- Passenger Services 2.40 2.31 3.54
- Ticket/Sales/Promotion 7.83 8.49 7.06
- General & Admin. 1.95 1.94 4.03
- SUB-TOTAL 17.39 19.92 20.87
TOTAL OPERATING COST/ATK 37.94 40.92 49.86
Note that the two studies are not directly comparable at cost 
category levels. The GF figures used are from the AEA 
comparison.
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D ie objective of this chapter is to review the history of regulation and the subsequent 
deregulation and liberalisation in the airline industry. In addition, it discusses the 
development of the US Airline Deregulation Act and draws lessons for the GCC.
D ie domestic regulation of air transport varies from one country to another depending 
on many contributing factors such as political ideology, economic strategy and 
commercial philosophy. D ie USA is often the initiator of economic ideas and reforms 
particularly where a combination of demonstration and "bandwagon” effects, both 
domestically and internationally, cause changes in the home market and encourage other 
countries to imitate.
For example, competition within the US aviation industry was formerly very limited, 
because of the rigid control of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) on entry and exit, 
capacity, fare structure and price. On the other hand, the USA aviation industry is 
unique at present because of its size and the speed and level of liberalisation, and the 
nature of airline competition.
D ie Airline Deregulation Act which was passed in 1978 has changed airline 
management strategies, and has had an impact on efficiency, structure and services. 
Under the control of the CAB, airlines relied mainly on flight frequency for competition 
which made carriers engage in schedule rivalry. However, in the present deregulation 
environment, airlines have to be very efficient and have the capability to offer low fares, 
various marketing strategies and most important of all the need to compete and generate 
profits or face financial failure and market exit.
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3.2. REGULATORY VIEWS
3.2.1 Regulation and the Economists
Traditionally economists have favoured regulation of both International and domestic 
air transport for the following reasons:1
1. Regulations are required because under ’unregulated competitive market forces 
may have adverse consequences for the public at large’ (Richmond, 15171). In 
addition, it has been argued that the absence of any regulation in an oligopolistic 
industry such as air transport would lead to wasteful competition. New entrants 
would undercut fares which could lead to price wars with adverse consequences 
for all participants (Wheatcroft, 15164).
2. To ensure that the external benefits of civil aviation are not jeopardized, air 
transport has to be regulated because it is a public utility.
3. Regulation is necessary to protect scheduled services from non-scheduled 
operators in international air transport because they have "public service" 
features and they are vulnerable to price competition. (HMSO, 15169).
However, economists during the 1960s in the USA and other countries started to 
question the benefits of regulation with the following arguments:2
1. Regulation limited pricing freedom, product variety, stopped new entrants and 
restricted capacity.
2. With less regulation, competition would exist which would benefit the consumer 
by providing lower fares, innovative pricing, more product variety, higher 
efficiency and productivity.
3. The economics of the air transport industry did not suggest that freer 
competition would lead to economic instability.
3.2.2 Regulatory Performance
It is most notably said in US literature that regulatory agencies are unnecessary, slow 
and inefficient, unfair and unpredictable, prone to industry-orientation and politically 
anomalous.
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3.2.2.1 Regulation is unnecessary.
H ie House of Commons Industry and Trade Committee of 15181 concluded with a 
response to regulation which is now commonly heard:
"... it is our firm opinion that no regulatory body - however enlightened 
its policies or however good its intentions - will produce a more 
satisfactory service for the air passenger than will fair competition in the 
market place"3.
However, the British CAA’s main arguments in favour of regulation could be 
summarized as follows:
"(a) without regulation, network benefits may be lost; competition may 
not produce a reasonable balance between concentration and 
dispersal;
(b) free competition may not produce a regular scheduled service
available for off-peak as well as peak periods;
(c) given the absence of price competition, the scarcity of traffic on 
UK routes and, given conditions favouring the larger operators, it 
may be difficult for new carriers to enter markets. Lack of 
regulation might therefore produce, at best, imperfect competition, 
at worst, monopoly;
(d) there is some evidence, particularly on North Atlantic scheduled
services, that where competition does exist it tends to be wasteful 
or destructive. A tendency exists for the over-provision of capacity 
at peak periods. The scope for predatory pricing or over-stressing 
short-run revenue maximization is considerable;
(e) experience suggests serious grounds for expecting excess capacity
in a competitive environment"4.
Nevertheless, the main principle arguments against regulation made in the document 
are listed below:
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"(a) civil aviation is a naturally competitive industry: there are minimal
economies of scale and airlines cannot derive significant advantages 
over competitors by virtue of size; aviation technology is freely 
available; entry into the industry is easy; there is flexibility in 
operating aircraft capacity; neither the broad network operator nor 
the specialist has a preponderant advantage over the other;
(b) free competition is preferable to regulation: competition would 
produce regular services in order to attract traffic; off-peak 
periods would be utilized and, given pricing freedom, off-peak 
traffic would be generated; networking would be in the interests of 
the carrier;
(c) regulation is inherently undesirable: it purchases stability at the 
cost of inefficiency; a quasi-judicial system favours the easily- 
justified status quo; it blunts innovation and responsiveness to 
consumer needs; price regulation limits competition, innovation 
and new entry; it blunts the incentive to efficiency and cost- 
consciousness."5
Overall, the CAA did not completely relax regulation in the UK aviation industry
because of the following reasons:
1. Small scale of the domestic industry.
2. lim ited number of routes able to support more than one airline.
3. The limited effectiveness of competition from surface transport on longer routes.
4. BA produces three-quarters of total domestic seat-kilometres, and airport policy
restrained growth at Heathrow in favour of Gatwick.
5. Price reduction would not be expected.
6. BA would dominate the market in absence of effective rail competition.
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Having considered the above reasons, the CAA concluded:
"AD these considerations suggest that complete deregulation of domestic 
services is simply not feasible. It should, however, be possible to move 
significantly further to meet some of the objections to a highly regulated 
system while taking advantage of the positive aspects of relaxation. This 
policy would aim to let the market work to the maximum feasible extent 
consistent with the limitations which have been described. Such an 
approach might look slightly untidy; slightly different solutions might be 
appropriate to the different types of route"*
Therefore, the Authority searched for alternative strategies rather than full
deregulation:
"In a market where few city pairs can support the services of the two 
airlines, direct competition cannot be the sole tool of regulatory policy.
A more effective tool may be the possibility of substituting one operator 
for another where standards of service have been allowed to decline or 
costs have been allowed to get out of control... it may be more important 
to ensure that more than one operator is available than to insist that two 
operators compete."7
Criticism of the CAA by advocates of the free market at consultations, hearings and
submissions by the foDowing principles:*
1. It is too protective of existing operators.
2. It favours the status quo.
3. It is not consumer oriented.
4. It does not offer any incentive towards cost-consciousness.
5. It impedes innovation because of the slowness of the Dcensing process and the
creation of planning obstacles for the airlines when building efficient network or 
services.
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3.2.2.2 Regulation is slow and Inefficient.
Regulation is slow because it creates large volumes of paper, in addition it fails to react 
to industrial needs. Recently, especially in USA, there has been the desire to search for 
ways of regulating industries by methods that would be much less restrictive to the 
industries concerned than resort to bureaucracies.9
3.2.2.3 Regulation is unfair and unpredictable.
An agency usually has to negotiate a narrow path between accusations of capriciousness 
and complaints that it is inflexible or short-sighted.
However, the US agencies have been condemned for failure to develop standards, and 
rigid adherence to rapidly outdating rules.
Judge Henry Friendly19 wanted standards to ensure like treatment, to aid policy 
formulation, to limit discretion, to allow planning and prediction, to m aintain agency 
independence where he argued that the CAB and FCC were subject to political pressure 
and those most lacking in standards.
Len Fuller indicated that the FCC and CAB had not succeeded in developing standards 
because they had over-emphasized case law. Fuller believed that:
"The reason for this failure lies ... in the nature of the tasks assigned to 
these agencies: they are trying to do through adjudicative form something 
that does not lend itself to accomplishment through these forms.
... tasks of economic allocation cannot be effectively performed within the 
limits set by the internal morality of law. The attempt to accomplish such 
tasks through adjudicative forms is certain to result in inefficiency, 
hypocracy, moral confusion and frustration."11
3.2.2.4 The Regulatory Agency is Industry-Oriented.
The main criticism of the agencies of the USA is that they do not tend to serve the 
public as much as the interests of the regulated industries.
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Gabriel Kolko and George Strigler12 argue that the industry input into the design of 
regulatory legislation and into the continuing politics of regulation means that regulation 
is really organized to benefit existing industrial interests in the first place.
However, there are three main arguments with reference to regulation and industry 
which are listed below:13
1. Agency decisions are based on information supplied by the industry and only 
industrial interests are usually represented at formal proceedings/*
2. Individuals appointed to high regulatory office identify with industry interests 
with a view to past or future employment.
3. Industry control over agencies’ policies is exerted by threat.
3.2.2.5 Regulatory Agencies are Politically Anomalous.
Herbert Morrison14 who was on the London Passenger Transport Board indicated that 
the best form of public corporation was one in which members did not represent vested 
interests but acted as detached experts.
However, Marver H.Bernstein15 classified that every agency passes through stages of 
development in a "life cycle" which responded to predictable changes in its political 
environment which are the following:
1. Gestation - in which concern about a problem resulted in the creation of the 
agency.
2. Youth - inexperienced agency which is operated and manoeuvred by the
regulatees, and it managed with a crusading zeal. However, gradually the
political objectives died away.
3. Maturity - devitalization set in.
4. Old age - final period of debility and decline.
**In the UK, the Air Transport Users Committee has a formal role to play in 
bringing to the attention of the CAA the views of consumers.
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5. Senescence - the agencies take different periods to reach it, however when this 
happened, the public interest would be lost in quasi-judicialities. The agency 
would aim to protect the industry on lines laid down by the regulated group.
Louis LJaffe“  stated in 1956 that an agency would not develop a new policy once it 
established Itself. In addition, as E.Pendleton Herring said in 1934:
"... the control of business remains too controversial and too vital a 
political issue to be relegated successfully to a Commission independent of 
dose control by the policy-formulating agencies of government."17
3.3 REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
A philosopher once said "Transportation is dvilization"1*, on the basis that civilization 
depends upon transportation for its existence. The aviation industry is considered one 
of the youngest, fastest developing, and biggest economic and political influences on any 
economy making contributions both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, the 
Post Office in the USA was responsible for the start of commercial air transportation 
and the airline industry. Therefore, the Post Office is the father of US commercial air 
transportation.
Pricing policies under regulation went through the following stages:19
1. Prior to WWH the Board did not set the prices. They were established at the 
prevailing first-class rail fare.
2. After 1942 the Board approved across the board fare increases but without 
studying the level of earning of the industry.
3. In the General Passenger Fare Investigation (Docket 8008) in 1960, the Board set 
fares to achieve an average of 10.5% rate of return for the industry based on 
actual industry operating costs.
4. In the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (U.S.CAB 1974) the Board set fares 
to yield a 12% return based on load factors and seating density.
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However, In all the four phases the Board focused on Industry profitability rather than
on relationship between fares and costs in a particular market.
To fully understand the coming of deregulation, the following are the mqjor regulatory
acts and administrative decisions which led to the Airline Deregulation Act:2*
1. AIRMAIL ACT OF 1925 (KELLY ACT). It started the commercial air 
transport by enabling scheduled air transport to be a permanent service for the 
first time. It is "An Act to encourage commercial aviation and to authorize the 
Postmaster General to contract for the mail service."21
2. AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926 - Its purpose was to promote air commerce.22
3. AIRMAIL ACT OF 1930 (McNary-Waters Act). It gave the power to the 
Postmaster to unify and restructure the industry.
4. AIRMAIL ACT OF 1934 (Black-McKellar Act). It introduced a bureaucratic 
system of control involving not less than three separate regulatory bodies.
5. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938. It led to the establishment of the Civil 
Aeronautics Agency (CAA). However, economic and safety regulation of that Act 
was administered by three original agencies which consisted of the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority, an Administration of Aviation and an Air Safety Board.
6. The CAA was reorganized in 1940 to be the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
7. The FEDERAL AVIATION ACT of 1958 separated safety regulation from 
economic regulation.23
8. AIRPORT AND AIRWAY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1970 provided for the 
expansion, development and improvement of the airports and airway systems of 
the United States.24
9. In 1970 the CAB re-examined fares as part of its Domestic Passenger Fare 
Investigation (DPFI) which led to the adoption of a rigid formula that set fares 
strictly.25
10. Newly-appointed CAB chairman John Robson in the Spring of 1975 proposed an 
experiment to allow new and existing airlines to enter and exit selected routes.2*
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11. During 1975-76 the CAB relaxed some restrictions on charter carriers. As a 
result they operated frequent low-fare services in direct competition with 
regulated carriers.27
12. The chairman of the CAB Roy Pulsifer in 15176 issued a report supporting 
deregulation rather than reform, proposing to relax entry and exit and fare 
regulation over a three-to-five year period.28
13. In 15177, the CAB proposed to allow carriers to reduce fares as much as 70% 
below the DPFT fare without approval.29
14. The chairman of CAB Alfred Kahn in 15178 made a persuasive case both to 
Congress and the US public in support of reform.
15. However, the following illustrate the main political economy of deregulation:29
■ By mid 15170s economists believed that regulation was not needed.
■ In October of 15174 President Ford asked Congress to form a National 
Commission on Regulatory Reform.
■ President Kennedy asked Breyer to investigate government economic 
regulation by federal regulatory agencies (CAB was the prime target).
■ On October 28, 15178, President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation 
Act.
3.4 COMPARISON OF AIRLINE REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION
3.4.1 Regulation before 15178
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was the US regulatory authority which controlled 
airlines in the following ways:39
1. It regulated fares on overall industry profitability rather than on the relationship 
between price and costs.
2. It controlled entry and exit of carriers as listed below:
■ Routes granted to existing carriers.
■ Board rejected applications to start new airlines.
■ Competitive routes were only awarded when It was determined that entry
would not effect the incumbent carrier’s profits.
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3. It controlled mergers and Inter-carrier agreements which prevent the 
consolidation to form a new carrier that would divert traffic and revenues from 
competing carrier.
4. The CAB’s regulatory authority extended only over Interstate carriers, however 
many studies Indicated that unregulated intrastate carriers were operating at 
lower fares than airlines operating at similar Interstate routes.31
3.4.2 Deregulation after 1978
The Airline Deregulation Act of 15178 applied a drastic reduction in the CAB’s regulation
of the aviation Industry. The following highlight the m^jor reduction of regulation:32
1. FARES AND RATES
■ An upper limit of reasonableness became operational on July 1, 15179.
■ The CAB ended authority ova* domestic fares on January 1, 1984.
2. ROUTES
■ Automatic market entry programme was effective between January and 
April of 15179, 1980 and 1981, however the CAB’s authority over routes 
ended on December 31,15181.
3. Subsidy programme after the Airline Deregulation Act went through the
following phases:
■ Eligibility for essential air service established on October 24,15179
■ Criteria for eligibility under Section 419(a) had to be established on 
January 1, 1980.
■ Criteria for eligibility under Section 419(b) had to be established on 
January 1, 1982.
■ Denied boarding rule took effect on January 1, 1983.
■ Subsidy programme transferred to DOT on January 1,1985.
■ Section 406 terminated subsidy programme, however it continued until
1988.
4. MERGERS
■ Agreements, domestic mergers and interlock authority transferred to DOT 
on January 1,1985.
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■ Foreign mergers, agreements and foreign interlocks transferred to DOT 
on January 1,15186.
■ However, DOT’S authority over powers to grant Immunity and mergers 
expired in 15189.
Nevertheless, the CAB ceased all regulatory operations at the end of 15184.
However, the following are the mqjor provisions that took immediate effect after the 
passing of the Airline Deregulation Act:33
1. No need to prove that entry is required by passenger convenience and necessity.
2. No CAB review of approval of entry while the Airline Deregulation Act only 
provided for a limited degree of automatic market entry.
3. Allowed carriers to obtain dormant route authority for routes which were not 
flown by the carriers which had been certificated to fly them.
4. Fares were to be adjusted as airline costs changed, and they could vaiy without 
the permission of the CAB.
5. Route and merger cases were set with tight procedural deadlines which resulted 
in a reform of Board procedures.
6. Established notice procedures for airlines who desired to terminate services to a 
community.
7. Established a ten year Essential Air Service Program to small communities, and 
local service subsidies to phase out within six years.
8. Set employee protection measures for dislocated workers.
3.5 DEREGULATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
During the Carter administration, the White House identified in January 15177 three key 
factors which would lead to a new policy:34
1. ’Consumerism9 which aimed to reduce fares, open new routes and facilitate
access to air services.
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2. ’Competition’ which appeared to be successful in reducing fares in the early 
domestic stages of deregulation, and was also thought to be beneficial 
internationally.
3. ’U.S.market share’. Because US airlines only had 40% market share on routes 
between USA and Europe, it was thought that more liberal bilateral air service 
agreements and the entry of new USA carriers to the market would be beneficial.
Subsequently, President Carter signed an international air transport negotiation policy 
the aim of which was "to provide the greatest possible benefit to travellers and 
shippers". In addition, it suggested that "maximum consumer benefits can best be 
achieved through the preservation and extension of competition between airlines and the 
market place". In negotiations or renegotiations of bilateral agreements, it was decided 
that the USA would have the following objectives:
"(a) "creation of new and greater opportunities for innovative and 
competitive pricing that will encourage and permit the use of new 
price and service options to meet the needs of different travellers 
and shippers." This would be achieved by ensuring that tariffs 
were determined by airlines on the basis of competitive 
considerations. Government involvement should be the minimum 
necessary to prevent predatory or discriminatory pricing, to 
prevent monopolistic practices and to protect competitors from 
prices that are artificially low as a result of government subsidies;
(b) "liberalization of charter rules and the elimination of restrictions 
on charter operations";
(c) "expansion of scheduled services through the elimination of 
restrictions on capacity, frequency and route operating rights";
(d) "elimination of discrimination and unfair competitive practices 
faced by US airlines in international transportation." In particular, 
charges for providing en route and airport facilities should be 
related to the costs created by airline operations and should not 
discriminate against US airlines;
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(e) "flexibility to designate multiple US airlines in international air 
markets";
(f) encouragement of maximum traveller and shipper access to 
international markets by authorizing more US cities for nonstop 
direct service, and by improving the integration of domestic and 
international airline services; and
(g) "flexibility to permit the development and facilitation of 
competitive air cargo services."35
However, most countries which negotiate with the USA have only one airline or one
scheduled airline which is usually state owned. Therefore, most countries have the
following objectives when negotiating with the USA:34
1. Capacity control especially a control or reduction in US scheduled capacity rather 
than any increase. Examples of such countries were Japan and Italy.
2. Limiting USA fifth freedom rights. For example, by the UK and France.
3. Since many countries had only one m^jor international airline, most of them did 
not favour ’multiple designation’.
However, during the renegotiation process applied to bilaterals between 1977-80, the
USA introduced some new concepts into international regulation which are as follows:37
1. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN RULES FOR CHARTERS - the right to establish 
whatever condition for charter services originating from its own territory, at the 
same time leaving the other party in the bilateral free to do the same.
2. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN RULES FOR TARIFFS - it includes the following 
rights:
■ The right to approve or disapprove tariff levels or conditions only for 
traffic originating from its own territory.
■ DOUBLE DISAPPROVAL - a tariff cannot be refused by one government 
only, however, both governments have to reject it together.
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In addition, the following are not entirely new concepts but they have now become more 
widespread in USA bilaterals:3*
1. MULTIPLE DESIGNATION - the right of each party to designate more than one 
airline to operate on the agreed routes.
2. BREAK OF GAUGE - "Die right to change from a larger to smaller aircraft in 
the other country’s territory on a through service that is going beyond the other 
country, usually, but not necessarily, with fifth freedom."
3. COMBINATION RIGHTS - the right to have both the third and fourth freedom 
traffic on a single stopping service.
3.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Traditionally, economists have aigued in favour of the regulation of the air transport 
industry, but during the 1960s economists in the USA and other countries started to 
question the benefits of regulation. In addition, it is noted in the USA literature that 
regulatory agencies are unnecessary, slow and inefficient, unfair and unpredictable, 
prone to industry-orientation and politically anomalous.
The Airline Deregulation Act was signed by President Carter on October 28, 1978. 
However, to fully understand the coming of the Airline Deregulation Act, a review of 
the m^jor regulatory acts and administrative decision should be considered.
Before the Airline Deregulation Act, the CAB controlled entry and exit, fares, capacity, 
subsidies and mergers. The Airline Deregulation Act applied a rapid reduction on those 
controls and it brought to an end all the CAB’s regulatory operation in 15184. (The so- 
called CAB "sunset").
When considering the change of regulatory perspective, it is important to differentiate 
between domestic and international markets and to consider their impacts. 
Nevertheless, there were new concepts that the USA introduced when negotiating or 
renegotiating bilaterals such as country of origin rules for charters and double
47
disapproval for tariffs. In addition, multiple designation, break gauge and combination 
rights have now become widespread in US bilaterals.
Although the US aviation industry accounts for approximately one third of the world’s 
output, it is controlled by only one government which had many reasons to pass the 
Airline Deregulation Act including:
1. Economists had marshalled evidence that regulation was not needed.
2. Federal agencies were believed to increase costs.
3. The need to improve economic conditions through lower prices for customers and 
higher profits for the industry.
4. There was a belief that government regulation was interfering with productivity.
3.7 LESSONS FOR THE GCC
Air transport in the GCC is very tightly and rigidly regulated and this has resulted in 
a monopolistic market. As a result, competition between the airlines is very limited on 
some routes, and does not exist in others. In addition, although the present GCC 
regulatory policies protect their national carriers, airlines generally have high operating 
costs, low productivity and efficiency and some make high net operating losses. 
Furthermore, GCC consumers are not provided with variety of products, cheaper fares 
and better quality of services in the monopolistic routes. Airlines losses and 
unsatisfactory consumer service do not help to improve the economy, especially in the 
long run. Most importantly, these factors are some of the m^jor forces and pressures 
which led to the deregulation of the US airline industry.
After analysing the regulatory environment of the GCC air transport market based on 
the data and findings of this chapter, the following are the main results:
1. GCC air transport regulation has succeeded in providing stability at the cost of
inefficiency.
2. These regulations are too protective of the GCC carriers.
3. They are not consumer oriented.
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4. Due to these regulations, combined with the uncommercial operation objectives 
of some GCC carriers, the networks have proved not to be in the interest of the 
carriers. Some of the problems include slowness of the licensing process, with 
the creation of obstacles when building an efficient network For example, some 
GCC airlines have to operate unprofitable routes.
5. If price freedom were to be introduced, off-peak traffic could be attracted and 
utilised.4*
The factors that led to US airline deregulation and its subsequent success are the 
involvement of one government to deregulate or regulate, the volume of the US market 
and the private ownership of airlines which are operated under private and commercial 
managerial principles.
However, the GCC air transport market is closer in character to that of the EC than 
that of the USA because of the involvement of several governments and national carriers 
which are mostly state-owned. As a result, the decision to liberalise the GCC or EC air 
transport requires acceptance and approval of all members. This means a long and 
complicated process to establish an air transport liberalisation policy that satisfies all the 
members with respect to political issues and economic feasibility. At the same time, the 
policy is likely to contain a certain degree of protection for the member’s national 
carriers to avoid bankruptcy.
It is relevant that the UK CAA decided not to adopt full US style deregulation in the 
UK, due to factors such as the small scale of the domestic industry and thinness of most 
UK routes. For these reasons EC liberalisation is studied in Chapters 5 and 6.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE IMPACT OF THE US AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to review and study the impact of the US Airline 
Deregulation Act on the airlines, consumers, shareholders, aviation industry and 
governments. In addition, it aims to draw lessons for the GCC.
The US airline industry was regulated for 40 years before the application of the Airline 
Deregulation Act in 1978. During the period of regulation, competition between 
scheduled carriers was constrained, which resulted in the incumbent airlines being 
increasingly favoured as time passed.
However, the rapid transformation of the US airline industry during the period since 
the passing of the Deregulation Act has been the product of many important forces other 
than the passing of the Act itself. These include:1
1. Substantial operational and marketing advantages of more flexible thinking.
2. Marketing innovations such as hub and spoke networks, computer reservation 
systems (CRS), frequent flyer programs and code-sharing alliances which may 
have come anyway.
3. Continuing growth in the demand for intercity travel.
4. Sharp fluctuations in the costs of the main inputs used by the airlines forcing 
dynamic changes.
5. Recently, difficulties co-ordinating pricing and investment policies.
6. Because of congestion airport and airspace capacity has increasingly effected 
airline service patterns and fare levels.
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4.2 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON 
AIRLINES
The structure of the US airline industry has changed significantly especially with the 
entrance (and subsequent exit) of new airlines and the rapid expansion of carriers which 
were previously constrained by rigid regulation. Table 4.1 illustrates a comparison 
between new entrants and the already established airlines.
However, before deregulation, the generally accepted classification of the status of 
airlines was of trunk, local, intrastate, commuter and charter airlines. The nature of 
the airline business and the limitation of their operating certificate used to be defined. 
On the other hand, since deregulation, certificated airlines have not been limited in their 
field of operation, but now are classified as follows:2
1. MAJOR AIRLINES - with a turnover of over $1 billion.
2. NATIONAL AIRLINES - with a turnover of $75 million - $1 billion.
3. REGIONAL AIRLINES - with a turnover of under $75 million. In addition,
regionals are subdivided. If they only operate aircraft of 60 seats or less they are 
referred to as commuter airlines.
Nevertheless, all the trunk airlines and a few of the old locals have become majors, and 
the remaining locals and intrastate have become nationals. In addition, many of the 
commuters have acquired larger jet aircraft and become regionals. Finally, some 
charter airlines operate scheduled services as nationals, at the same time, they carry out 
some charter work.
Table 4.2 indicates airlines providing interstate jet services during the era immediately 
after deregulation and their present status.
4.2.1 The Airline Deregulation Act Advantages for Airlines
The following are the main post-deregulation advantages for the airlines:
1. Freedom of entry and exit from the market.
Freedom of price setting.
Freedom of scheduling, capacity and equipment.
The development of hub and spoke networks where they are advantageous for 
the reasons listed below:3
■ More production because of the following:
They facilitate the utilization of larger aircraft which offers lower
unit operating costs on most routes (Viton, 1986).
They allow the maximization of airport facilities.
■ Better marketing because of the following:
More frequent departures to many cities.
Allow carriers to charge higher fares than competition would 
otherwise permit.
Enhance the recent marketing innovations such as frequent flyer 
bonuses which raises the load factors.
■ Such system provides an airline with certain degree of protection from
competition, especially from less developed airline networks.
When viewing the m^jor US hub airports, most departure and arrival slots are 
occupied by one nuqor carrier. As a result, it gives that m^jor carrier more 
control over the traffic flow to and from that hub (such as Piedmont which 
controls 92% of the traffic at Charlotte Airport). Table 4.3 provides details of 
the proliferation of USA domestic hubs between 1979 and 1988.
The freedom from regulation of the route network has allowed the carriers to 
expand and tailor their route networks to match traffic flows.
Efficiency of an airline network may be defined in general as "the degree to 
which the system satisfies the needs of its passengers at the lowest possible 
economic cost"4 However, deregulation has accelerated the improvement in the 
efficiency of the airline industry. Managers have had to search for ways to use 
their resources very efficiently, and they have generally succeeded. As efficiency 
has been improved, costs and expenses of the airline operations have been 
lowered as a result of controlling labour costs and increasing productivity.
Most airlines adopted initially the two-tier pay structure where new recruits may 
receive half the pay of the established staff.
54
9. After deregulation, larger airlines were allowed to withdraw from services that 
were not commercially attractive or they no longer wished to provide.
10. New entrant airlines had the advantage of having costs of more than one third 
lower than the established airlines because of the following:5
■ Lower labour costs
■ Streamlined operation
■ Second-hand aircraft utilization
■ The "unbundling" of services*** offered which are charging separately 
unlike for other traditional services.
4.2.2 The Airline Deregulation Act Disadvantages for Airlines
The following are the main disadvantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for the
airlines:
1. The level of competition between the airlines increased at first when measured 
by the number of airlines in each market. This increased because of the ease of 
market access.
2. Some airlines could not adapt to the new deregulated marketing strategies, as a 
result, they declared bankruptcy, such as Braniff in 1982.
3. There is an argument that some airlines made short cuts in maintenance or flight 
operations to reduce costs.
4. Access to critical aiiports, especially to gates and slots, has become a crucial 
issue because of some of the following:5
■ Unfair or exclusionary practices by airlines with market power.
■ Allocating slots is based partly on market principles and partly on
"grandfather rights" both of which favour large airlines.
■ Prominent airlines at some airports have the power to block construction 
of expanding facilities intended to provide access to new competitors.7
■ Airport congestion.
***This concept was pioneered by People Express, but is no longer on offer.
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5. Carriers’ net profit decreased in the years following deregulation because of 
recession, fare wars and increases in the price of aviation fuel.*
6. Several of the established airlines have taken the following steps to offset 
competition9
■ the creation of non-unionised subsidiary companies;
■ the use of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to escape from wage
agreements which financially troubled airlines found onerous; and
■ the extraction of concessions from employees in collective baigaining.
4.3 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
CONSUMERS
One of the main objectives of the Airline Deregulation Act was to create competition 
between the airlines in the belief that passengers would benefit.
4.3.1 The Advantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for Consumers
The following are the m^jor advantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for consumers:
1. A wider variety of products are available to passengers. Some new operators 
such as People Express provided a veiy cheap (by offering fares of one-third of 
the incumbent airlines level), no-frills service and/or are based at secondary 
airports, but People Express failed in 1986.
2. Although there was a recession and an increase in fuel prices, the average fare 
fell by 14% between 1977 and 1983 due to open competition between carriers.1* 
OveraD, the industry average fare per mile declined from 1976 to 1986 by 
28.5%11 and then rose and then feD again until the end of 1987. Since then they 
have gone up.
3. Convenience of air services has not changed very much under deregulation.12
■ Convenience declined slightly in non-hub market categories, and it 
increased slightly in the hub market categories.
■ It improved in those small communities where locals and trunks have 
suspended operation because of the freedom of airlines to choose services 
to run.
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■ There has been a 7% improvement of service convenience to small cities.
4. When comparing the level of service in 15187 with that before deregulation, 
industry output in terms of available seat miles has risen by 65%. Nevertheless, 
the growth was due to a higher service frequency (26%), an increase in the 
number of points served (6%) and doe to an increase in total mileage covered by 
the airlines.13
5. The removal of entry and exit control led to increase in flight departures on more 
profitable routes.
4.3.2 The Disadvantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for Consumers
There are a number of disadvantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for passengers
which are listed below:
1. Higher prices for short routes.
2. Lower services on board the aircraft because of the attempt to reduce costs by 
airlines.
3. By the end of 1987, fare wars disappeared. In addition, yields and fares 
increased and signs of an emergence of oligopolistic stability in USA domestic 
market could be seen.14 Wheatcroft and I ipman concluded that in 1986 "there 
is no evidence that the airlines will find ways to avoid destructive price 
competition except through industry concentration which is likely to be anti­
competitive"15 Surprisingly, it is happening now.
4. The hub and spoke operation created quasi-monopolistic powers which in the 
long term may be a development resulting in a m^jor disadvantage to the public 
interest. Table 4.4 shows that some airports from which the mqjor airlines 
carried more than half of the total traffic in 15188. At three of these hubs, the 
dominant airlines carried more than 75% of the total traffic.14
4.4 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
SHAREHOLDERS
The rate of return of the m^jor US carriers between 15170 and 1975 was only 8.8%,
while it was 12.5% for all non-financial corporations in the USA. However, airlines
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attracted investors and were able to raise capital because of the CAB regulations which 
provided the following:
1. The CAB awarded new routes to unprofitable airlines to strengthen their 
finances.
2. Industry fares were based on average costs.
3. The CAB restriction on entry protected existing carriers from the entry of more 
efficient carriers.
4. The Board protective policies prevented financial ruin for inefficient airlines.
5. The CAB route rights made a troubled airline an attractive merger prospect for 
a healthy carrier.
The industry paid enough dividends to satisfy investors, it had debt-to-equity ratio of 
50:50, while the ratio for manufacturing was only 30:70. However, the following 
occurred between 15176 and 15178 which was the stage before deregulation:17
1. The operating surplus rose from $575 million to $1 billion.
2. This rise occurred because deregulation improved load factors.
3. The improved load factor could be attributed to the sale of discount tickets.
4. Discount fares appear to reduce profitability because:
■ The decrease in yield per RPM was as large or larger than the increase
in the volume of traffic.
■ The extra traffic led to an increase in expenditure.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the profitability of USA scheduled airline industry, the following 
should be considered:1*
1. Between 1976-1978, profitability was rapidly increasing, however, It steeply 
deteriorated in 15179 until 1980.
2. Between 1981-1983, the industry recorded a loss in every year.
3. Between 1984-1989, the industry recorded fluctuating profitability eveiy year.
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There are four contributory factors for the loss between 15181 and 1983 which are listed 
below:1*
1. 100% increase in the price of fuel between 19751-1983.
2. The US economy was depressed until 15183. In the USA every 1% increase in 
real personal disposable income will result in a rise of 1.4% in the number of 
passenger miles flown.
3. The main reason was that the trunk airlines had too many wide-bodied jets and 
too few narrow-bodied jets which resulted in the following:
■ Price wars for the long-haul markets.
■ The trunk airlines had difficulty in competing in short-haul routes both
with old carriers and the new entrants.
■ Stage length routes
- Below 500 miles - Operating profit of $125 million.
- Between 500-600 miles - Loss of $50 million
- Longest haul - Deficit of $640 million.
4. The PATCO strike and the resulting capacity restriction which started in August 
1981 had contributed to the loss in 1981 and 1982.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the rate of return on investment of the US scheduled airline 
industry for the period between 1972-1989. The rapid increase and decrease of the rate 
of return are caused by the profitability of scheduled airline industry as plotted in 
Figure 4 .I.2*
Some airlines faced financial problems that led them to bankruptcy as a result of 
deregulation. The first airline to cease operations due to bankruptcy was Braniff in 
May 1982. The list below is a background about Braniff and the reasons for its failure:
1. It was the nation’s tenth largest airline.
2. It was relatively profitable through most of the 1970’s.
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3. Braniff expanded aggressively following the passage of Airline Deregulation Act. 
It increased its routes by 60%. Some of the markets were overpopulated with 
competitors.
4. Low load factor.
5. Introductory discount fares.
6. High cost for training personnel and providing new ground facilities.
7. Resumed limited service operation in 15184, however It went bankrupt again in
1989.
Continental followed Braniff into bankruptcy in September 1983 because it failed to 
control costs, and their operating expenditure per capacity tonne-mile had increased 
faster than any mqjor airline.
However, the financially troubled airlines (especially Eastern, People Express, Frontier, 
Muse and PanAm) which became bankrupt, had valuable assets such as aircraft, takeoff 
and landing slots at congested airports, and long term leases on airport facilities. 
Considering the previous assets in depressed values, other airlines found them attractive 
takeover targets.21
Overall, Figure 4.3 indicates that improved revenue yields of 1987 continued in 1988- 
1989 regardless of the decrease of 1.7% in 1988 in traffic growth, the ratio of revenue 
to expenditure improved appreciatively to 105.22
4.5 EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON 
EMPLOYMENT
Wages in the airline industry appear to be substantially higher even for jobs that do not 
require skills. Fay at the American trunks between 1957 and 15177 was 45% more than 
the other manufacturing industry for comparable jobs. The following provides some 
comparisons of airline wages in 1980:23
1. Keypunch operators earned 31% more than the average elsewhere.
2. Typists were paid 41% more than the market rate.
60
3. Computer operators were paid 38% more than the market rate.
4. Air freight agents earned 58% more than shippers.
5. Aircraft cleaners (interior) earned about 82% more than janitors.
6. Aircraft mechanics earned about 28% more than the average motor vehicle
mechanics.
7. Aircraft inspectors earned 48% more than the average for blue collar 
supervisors.
8. Flight attendants earned about the same as nurses or school teachers.
9. Pilots for the mqjor airlines earned substantially more than either military or 
corporate pilots. For example, Captains were paid 59% more than the captains 
of company-owned aircraft.
However, the reduction in costs achieved between 1978 and 1984 seem to have resulted
from the following:24
1. Amended labour contracts and lower pay.
2. General tightening up of operations.
3. Higher productivity from employees.
4. Tbe contribution of new aircraft.
The airline employees have been affected by the Airline Deregulation Act for the
following reasons:25
1. H ie Airline Deregulation Act required higher productivity from the staff in order
for their airline to compete. The following are the mqjor changes in employment 
and worker productivity between 1977-1989.24 
■ Between 1977 and 1981:
Trunks did not experience rapid labour growth, but the locals did. 
AIM  per employee increased 3% for the trunks and 27% for the 
locals.
Employment was increasing about 5.2% per year for the trunks 
and 42% for the locals.
Both the tranks and the locals experienced a substantial 
improvement In employee productivity.
ATM per employee improvement of 3% for trunks and 12% for 
locals.
Employment was decreasing at about 6.5% per year for the tranks 
and 4.7% for the locals.
■ Between 1983 and 1989, Figure 4.4 shows that employment of US 
scheduled airline industry increased every year. However, Figure 4.5 
indicates an increase of worker productivity in 1983-84, but it decreased 
in 1985, and then it made progress every year.
From the previous data a conclusion can be made that an average of 5.6% of the 
airlines employees lost their jobs between 1981 and 1983 because some airlines 
allowed their management to break existing employment contracts to reduce 
costs. So, airline employees seemed to have benefitted from CAB regulation in 
the past and suffered under deregulation.
One of the m^jor provisions that took immediate effect with the Airline 
Deregulation Act was to provide employee protective measures for dislocated 
employees. "In the labour arena the Act provided temporary federal assistance 
payments and hiring rights to protected former employees in cases where 
deregulation was found to be the m^jor cause of a significant air carrier 
contraction. In practice, the compensation provisions have never been funded"27 
Adoption of the two-tier pay structures which new recruits receive as little as half 
the wages of already established staff.
However, it is not certain whether deregulation really directly caused employees 
to lose their jobs especially between 15182-83 which recorded the highest drop in 
airline employment after passing the Airline Deregulation Act. Given the 
following:
■ Total labour costs in the USA airline industry is more than one-third of 
total operating costs.2*
■ New entrant airlines were able to hire labour at costs of one-half of those
of established carriers which gave than a cost advantage of one-sixth of 
total costs.
■ Strong competition between the airlines.
■ 100% increase in the oil prices and the depression of the economy until 
1983.
■ At almost the same period that employees were reduced in the USA and
in the deregulated environment, British Airways which was not in a 
deregulated environment cut its staff between 15179 and 15183 by almost 
one-third, although labour costs at British Airways were 25% of the total 
operating costs in 1982.29
4.6 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY.
In the early years of deregulation, the US airline industry was influenced by several 
factors besides deregulation. These are as follows:3*
1. Between November 15178 and March 15181, aviation fuel rose by approximately 
237%.
2. General economic recession where real gross national product increased by only 
4% between 15179 and 1982, and the volume of air travel was adversely affected.
3. The Air Traffic Controller’s strike which occurred in 1981 disrupted the air 
traffic control system and prevented entry into the most attractive markets.
However, passenger demand for air travel decreased between 15179 and 1983 due mainly 
to the recession, but after economic improvement in 15183, the traffic volume continued 
to rise. It was 55% higher in 1987 compared to 15178. This increase in passenger 
demand was due to decreases in average fare and the accessibility to passengers of a 
wider range of destinations via hubs in addition to the effects of economic growth.
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4.6.1 The Advantages of Deregulation for the Aviation Industry
listed  below are the main advantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for the aviation
industry:
1. The number of airlines has more than doubled since deregulation. The growth 
of the airlines could be attributed to the removal of entry and exit control.
2. The average unit cost for the airlines decreased by 20% between 1981 and 1985. 
This reduction in costs was due to reduced labour costs, changes in the airlines’ 
employee work rules, the move towards hub and spoke operations.31
3. Dramatic technological advances in the aviation industry.
4. Both trunks and locals have increased productivity since deregulation as follows:32
■ Raised load factor.
■ Improved utilization of aircraft.
■ Increases seating density.
■ Increased stage length.
■ Accelerated retirement of inefficient aircraft.
■ Improved worker productivity. Trunk airlines have improved by 3% and 
locals by about 27%.
5. Development and exploitation of the new marketing strategies such as hub and
spoke networks and Computer Reservation Systems.
6. After deregulation there was a demand for efficient and smaller aircraft to
reduce operating costs and provide more flexibility. On the other hand, with the 
recent airport congestion constraints, demand for larger aircraft seems to be 
more favourable. In addition, many airlines retired and changed their fleet early 
for new aircraft to gain efficiency and lower operating costs.
7. Opening new airports, expanding and developing the old ones.
8. Air fares and rates changed as follows:
■ Prices became more cost related.
■ Increased use of peak-load pricing which had improved load factors.
■ Pricing innovation such as quantity discounts, corporate discounts, and 
frequent flyer discounts.
64
■ There are two basic pricing strategies to come out of deregulation:
Restricted discounts.
Low unrestricted fares (most notably by the new entrant carriers).
■ Lower prices occurred for two reasons:
Tourist markets could be served with higher load factors. 
Aircraft could serve these markets during off-peak hours where the 
demand for business travellers was relatively low.
9. Deregulation did not effect air transport safety. Considering the number of 
accidents before and after deregulation, accident rates fell in the mid 1970s and 
after 1980. This improvement was greater in the USA than in most other 
countries.33
10. Manufacturers benefited from the Airline Deregulation Act by selling more 
aircraft and equipment.
4.6.2 Disadvantages for the Aviation Industry
The following are the main Airline Deregulation Act disadvantages for the aviation 
industry:
1. Due to the increased level of competition between the airlines, especially in 1986,
many carriers merged with others for some of the reasons listed below:
■ The less successful carriers with high costs, large debts or uncompetitive 
services, merged with the big successful carriers in order to survive.
■ Weak carriers wanted the financial safety of strong carriers.
■ Other carriers have merged for strength and mutual protection.
As a result of many mergers in recent years, the aviation industry has become more 
concentrated. The trunk carriers market share has increased and nine airlines 
controlled 94% of the US market in 1987. In addition, Figure 4.6 illustrates that only 
eight airlines in 1989 carried more than 90% of US domestic passenger traffic. Alfred 
Kahn complained about mergers and consolidations:
"The reconcentration of the industry reflects in part the deplorable failure 
of the Department of Transportation to disallow even one merger or, in 
all but one case, even to set conditions to mitigate possible competitive 
consequences. In most cases there were positive arguments in favour of 
the mergers. I find it impossible to believe, however, that our traditional 
anti-trust agencies would have permitted all of than. H ie DOT seems to 
have no appreciation whatever of the dangers our anti-trust laws were set 
up almost a century ago to forestall"34
Services to small communities decreases slightly between 15178 and 1981. 
However, as the economy recovered since 15181, services to small communities 
have improved.
The two-tier employment structure could be a disadvantage for airline employees. 
Carriers in concentrated markets are able to charge higher prices than carriers 
in less concentrated markets.
There have been some concerns in 15185 that deregulation was affecting safety 
standards, however, there has not been a causal link, but the media and high 
political interest that led to publicised congressional hearings on the subject. 
Some of the main concerns were as follows:35
■ The large number of accidents and incidents especially in 15185 which the 
FAA reported an increase of 31.9% in near collisions over 1984. In 
addition, there was an unfortunate record number of deaths in 
international aviation.
■ Lower standards of maintenance, training and inspection where Eastern 
received $9.5 million fine and American Airlines a $1.5 million fine for 
breaching FAA safety procedures. However, John Enders, the President 
of the Flight Safety Foundation, mentioned that the traditional industry 
standards for maintenance, repair, record keeping and so on had been 
higher than the minimum standards of the FAA.
■ There is a likelihood that carriers under pressure cut corners to reduce
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4.7 THE EFFECTS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT ON 
THE US GOVERNMENT
The following are the main Airline Deregulation Act effects of interest to the US 
government:
1. Less governmental control on the airlines which requires less governmental staff 
and budget.
2. Improving the economy by increasing the use of air transport by passengers, 
airlines, airports, manufacturers, hotels, rental cars companies and so on.
3. Boosting and improving the aviation industry in both managerial and technical 
areas.
4. Spreading air transport to many cities and small towns that did not have air 
transport services before the Act.
5. Opening new jobs and requiring more employees by the increased use of air 
transport which reduces unemployment.
6. H ie US government achieved what they aimed for from deregulation:
■ It did boost the aviation industry and air transport in general.
■ It did reduce fares and rates. Although fares in the US have increased 
recently, they are still half those of Europe for comparable services.
■ New routes and new facilities have been accomplished.
■ Safety improvement is among the most rapid in the world.
■ Economic conditions have been improved.
7. The US government is now the most experienced in the area of airline 
deregulation.
However, the following are the m^jor disadvantages of the Airline Deregulation Act 
from the point of view of the US government:
1. Finding solutions to the problems that arose from deregulation for the airlines, 
especially the financial problems.
2. Congestion created problems for air traffic control because of:
■ H ie increased number of aircraft and busy airports as deregulation
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boosted air transport.
■ President Reagan’s decision to dismiss air traffic controllers who went on 
strike.
3. The airline employees appear to have benefitted from the previous CAB 
regulations. Some airline managements broke established contracts with their 
own employees.
4.8 ISSUES RAISED BY US AIRLINE DEREGULATION.
4.8.1 Hub and Spoke Networks
Nonstop flights can be less than cost-effective. Airlines established hub and spoke 
operations where various services stop at an intermediate point to change aircraft to 
continue to their ultimate destinations. An airline can maximize the average number 
of passengers per flight and decrease costs by combining passengers with different 
origins and destinations.
However, deregulation has accelerated the development of hub and spoke networks 
because of their importance in multiplying by permutation the number of city pair 
services whilst flying the same number of aircraft miles. In addition, they provide a 
quasi-monopolistic market for airlines at a particular hub. Some 19.9% of passengers 
landed and 15.6% departed from hubs in 1977 compared with 31% and 24.5% in 1984.34
Nevertheless, with the increased use of hubs in the USA domestic air transport, 
passengers like to make their connections with a single airline to reduce the risk of lost 
baggage, missed connections and to avoid walking between terminals. In addition, 
passengers and travel agents tend to book a flight with a carrier that provides the 
highest number of frequencies which usually charge higher than others with small 
frequencies. Baily, Graham and Kaplan estimated that a carrier with 50% of 
departures from an airport would charge 7% more than a carrier with 25% of 
departures.37
4.8.2 Computer Reservation Systems (CRS)
The initial idea of the CRS was to raise the number of passengers that could be handled,
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but now they are very highly effective marketing tools. United was the first airline to 
install a CRS in a travel agent in 1976. However, within a year it was overtaken by 
American who succeeded in signing up 90 of the top 100 companies.
Deregulation maximized the strength, role and importance of travel agents. There are 
a variety of products available at different prices which make passengers think that 
travel agents would advise them on the best available option. Before the Airline 
Deregulation Act, 45% of airline ticket sales were bought from travel agents. This 
doubled by 1987, and increased to more than 95% in 1990.
CRS became one of the most powerful marketing tools for the US domestic industry and 
95% of the travel agents were equipped with them by 1990. CRS made the airlines 
compete aggressively to link travel agents with their own system. Airlines have to pay 
travel agents high commissions which had tripled per passenger between 15178 and 1987. 
Some airlines used illegal ways to get some travel agencies to install their own CRS. For 
example, Feldman reported a case cited by a Northwest Congressional hearings in 1985 
where United had offered an agent $500,000 in cash, 10% additional commission on 
each ticket sale, five years free use including all telephone calls, if that particular travel 
agent would replace Sabre with Apollo.3*
Table 4.5 illustrates the share of agency generated revenue for all CRS’s in 1985. 
American Airlines with Sabre and United with
Apollo had accounted together for 74% of the US market share in 1985.
An Economist Intelligence Unit report published in 1987 noted that between 70% and 
90% of airline booking through travel agents are made from the first CRS availability 
screen displayed. Such practice resulted in some CRS vendors having more flights 
booked due to their name appearing first on the screen.39
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4.8.3 Frequent Fiver Programmes
These programmes were first introduced by American Airlines in 1980, since then they 
have become very important marketing tools. However, the high level of competition 
between the airlines in the last quarter of 1987, frequent flyer programmes got out of 
hand, especially when Delta offered triple mileage if a passenger purchased a Delta 
ticket with an American Express Card. Other airlines rapidly offered the same and 
some airlines added other incentives in their programmes. It was estimated in 1988 that 
the eight m^jor airlines had potential revenue loss of $940 million due to the triple 
mileage programmes which raised the annual cost to about $1.24 billion a year.40
Toh and Hu have outlined three main motives for operating frequent flyer programmes 
which are as follows:41
1. Establishing loyalty for an airline regardless of its efficiency.
2. Achieving product differentiation which smaller, low-cost, newer airlines could 
not offer.
3. Compiling demographic profiles and travel patterns of their members.
Frequent flyer benefits have reduced other forms of fare competition which pushed 
United and American to restructure their frequent flyer programmes by reducing the 
number of available seats, making it harder to earn free tickets, prohibiting free travel 
at peak times, and establishing expiry dates for free travel. These leads made other 
airlines follow them.42
4.8.4 Airline Consolidation
Many airlines grew rapidly after the passage of the Air Deregulation Act and started to 
provide strong competition especially for the smaller trunk airlines. In addition, they 
were joined by a host of new competitors during the early 1980’s. Nevertheless, the 
number of jet-equipped airlines which provided sufficient frequencies-services doubled 
by 1984. However, between 1984-1986, some airlines were faced with financial failure 
or mergers. This reduced the number of viable competitors in the market. By 1988, 
approximately 10 carriers left with sufficient of regional or national competitors
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remained in business. Figure 4.6 illustrates how 24 airlines consolidated since 1978 to 
produce 8 mqjor airlines in 15189.
However, there are many factors that pushed airlines to merge together, some of them 
are:
1. Some airlines had financial problems even before deregulation, and numbers 
reduced from 16 carriers in 1938 to 11 carriers in 1978. After deregulation, 
some airline consolidation was due to financial distress such as Eastern, People 
Express, Frontier, Muse and PlanAm.
2. The economic logic behind mergers or acquisition was to possess a large network 
which enabled them to be very strong competitors.
3. Control over airports and obtaining slots and facilities.
4. Their operations are complementary such as feeding traffic to each other.
4.9 CONCLUSION
There are many advantages and disadvantages of the Airline Deregulation Act for the 
airlines, consumers, shareholders, airline employees, the aviation industry and 
governments. However, deregulation of the US air transport succeeded in improving 
efficiency and productivity, providing lower fares, lower costs, more product variety, 
many marketing innovations, higher demand and number of airlines, and less 
governmental control and budget. On the other hand, the industry is moving towards 
concentration which could lead to a few giant airlines controlling the US market. Other 
problems such as airline financial instability, congested skies and airports, and control 
of slots and gates.
Conclusions about the American experience identified by Wheatcroft and Iipm an 
included:43
1. Deregulation produced a wide variety of products for consumers.
2. Competition from new entrant carriers improved efficiency and lowered costs.
3. Due to fares being lower than costs, airlines faced financial instability and
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3. Due to fares being lower than costs, airlines faced financial instability and 
inadequate profitability.
4. There were indications that a few large airlines would dominate the market.
5. The main reduction on airline operating costs was derived from the pay of 
employees.
6. There was widespread concern - misplaced - that deregulation had reduced safety 
standards, and that closer supervision of airline operational performance was 
needed.
Michael Levine indicated a surprising development which was inconsistent with the 
concept of perfect contestability which Whcatcroft and Lipman used in their 1990 study. 
The development included:
"a wave of mergers and consolidations; a higher than expected degree of 
vertical integration, particularly with feeder airlines; the domination of 
hub and spoke systems; a much more complicated fare structure; the 
importance of frequent flier programmes; the increased importance of 
travel agents; the dominant role of m^jor computerised reservation 
systems (CRS); the importance of controlling airport slots and gates; the 
persistence and success of predatory pricing; and the high casualty rate 
of new entrant airlines"44
In addition, Dr.George James identified the characteristics that would make an airline 
successful in the deregulation environment which are "hub and spoke route structure; 
yield (pricing) management; capacity (aircraft) management; low labour costs; 
computerized reservation system; and ability to take advantage of size"45
However, Sir Leon Brittan, EC Commissioner for Competition summed up the 
importance of lessons from the US for Europe:
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"Deregulation in the United States has been on balance a success, 
liberalisation in the European Community is in its early stages and will,
I am convinced, in the end be an even greater success. The challenge for 
the Community will be to learn from the US experience and avoid the 
pitfalls encountered there. This means that we must liberalise fast but 
smoothly, without causing unwarranted turbulence. We must also ensure 
that this liberalisation is accompanied by a rigorous application of the 
competition rules and merger control."44
4.10 Lessons For The GCC
The comparison of the US and GCC air transport industries in Table 4.6, and the
analysis of this chapter and the previous two suggest that the level of airline competition
in the GCC will be difficult and will never reach that of the USA under a deregulated
environment. However the following are the major lessons for the GCC:
1. The main lesson is that competition from new entrants has lowered costs and 
prices, and improved efficiency and productivity throughout the industry. These 
elements cover some of the objectives for the liberalisation of the GCC air 
transport industry.
2. The US airline types of operation have changed after passing the Deregulation 
Act which suggests a possibility of forming new types of airlines in the GCC if 
liberalisation is applied.
3. Freedom from route network regulation has allowed the US carriers to expand 
and tailor their route network to match traffic flows. The GCC airlines 
operation of unprofitable routes is one of the m^jor reasons for net losses.
4. A wider variety of products and reasonable fares are available to US consumers, 
which is considered to be one of the main reasons to liberalise GCC air 
transport.
5. The average unit cost of US airline operation has been reduced. This factor is 
one of the m^jor ways for the GCC airlines to reduce their net losses.
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6. Air transport is considered the main method of transportation in both GCC and 
USA.
7. Pressures from the US air deregulation assisted in opening new airports and 
expanding and developing the old ones. Since the GCC international airports 
have high estimated capacity, therefore, if liberalisation is permitted in the GCC, 
a better use of the facilities of these airports and an expansion and development 
of the domestic airports will probably occur.
8. Airline mergers and consolidations were disadvantages of US deregulation. These 
issues should be considered very carefully when establishing a GCC liberalisation 
policy.
Overall, there are considerable differences between the USA and GCC air transport 
industries, especially in the areas of regulation, airline and airport ownership and 
operations, the volume of the domestic traffic and the involvement of several states in 
the GCC. Because of this, a sudden reform such as the US Airline Deregulation Act is 
not feasible or advisable for the GCC.
However, the US deregulation experience is very useful for the liberalisation of the GCC 
domestic air transport market especially in terms of freedom to enter/exit the market 
and to set prices. However, the application of these two freedoms should be introduced 
smoothly, gradually and carefully to a certain level of freedom and to specific markets 
only. The level of air transport liberalization in the GCC will be proposed after 
studying the experience and expectations of the liberalisation of the European 
Community’s air transport market.
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TABLE 4.1: A comparison between new entrants and already established airlines.
OLD CARRIERS - 1981-1984 NEW ENTRANTS - 1981-1984
1. Costly labour and 
restricted work rules
2. Costly equipment errors 
which were made by past 
management.
3. Name recognition, 
amenities, and service 
convenience especially 
at their hub airports.
4. High range of services 
offered under congested 
conditions, and they are 
able to get peak time 
take off and landing 
slots
5. After establishing large 
and many hubs, big 
airlines have been 
having the advantage of 
benefit from them.
Largely free from such 
constraints.
Free from such errors.
Cost advantages where they 
can earn profits at prices 
that are not compensatory to 
incumbent carriers.
They were unable to obtain 
these advantageous factors, 
as a result they were 
excluded from the more 
lucrative business traffic.







slots and facilities 
because of being a major 
airline or feeding to 
one
Advantages of having CRS
Advantages of offering 
frequent flyer programs
Advantages of code 
sharing airlines.





TABLE 4.2: Airline providing Inter-state jet service during the deregulation era.
Origin and name Began Service* Date Status
Trunk carriers(ll)
Ameri can pre— 1978 1989 1st ranking carrier**




Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Conti nental pre-1978 1989 6th ranking carrier (under Texas
Air Corp)
Del ta pre-1978 1989 2nd ranking carrier
Eastern pre-1978 1989 Declared bankruptcy; conducting
limited operations (under Texas 
Ai r Corp)
National pre-1978 1980 Acquired by Pan Am
Northwest pre-1978 1989 5th ranking carrier
Pan Am pre-1978 1989 12th ranking carrier
TWA pre-1978 1989 8th ranking carrier
Uni ted pre-1978 1989 3rd ranking carrier
Western pre-1978 1986 Acquired by Delta
Local service carriers(8)
F ronti er pre-1978 1985 Acquired by People Express
Hughes Ai rwest pre-1978 1980 Acquired by Republic
North Central pre-1978 1979 Merged within Southern to form
1986
Republi c
Republic acquired by Northwest
Ozark pre-1978 1986 Acquired by TWA
Pi edmont pre-1978 1987 Acqui red by USAi rSouthern pre-1978 1979 Merged with North Central to form
1986
Republi c
Republic acquired by Northwest
Texas International pre-1978 1982 Acquired by ContinentalUSAi r pre-1978 1989 4th ranking carrier
Intra-state carriers(5)
Alaska pre-1978 1989 15th ranking carrier
Ai rCal 1979 1987 Acquired by American
Air Florida 1979 1984
1985
Ceased operation due to bankruptcy 
Acquired by Midway
PSA 1979 1987 Acquired by USAir
Southwest 1979 1989 9th ranking carrier
Charter carriers(2)
Capi tol 1979 1984 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Wor 1 d 1979 1985 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Commuter carriers(3)
Ai r Wi sconsi n 1982 1989 18th ranking carriers
Empi re 1980 1986 Acquired by Piedmont
Horizon 1983 1986 Acquired by Alaska
New carriers(17)
Air Atlanta 1984 1986 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Ai r One 1983 1984 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
American International 1982 1984 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
American West 1983 1989 11th ranking carrier
Florida Express 1984 1988 Acquired by Braniff
Frontier Horizon 1984 1985 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Hawai i Express 1982 1983 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Jet America 1982 1986 Acquired by Alaska
Mi dway 1979 1989 16th ranking carrier
Muse (Transtar) 1981 1985 Acquired by Southwest
New York Ai r 1980 1985 Acquired by Continental
Northeastern 1982 1984 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Pacific East 1982 1984 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
Pacific Express 1982 1984 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
People Express 1981 1986 Acquired by Continental
Presidenti al 1985 1987 Became feeder carrier for United
Sunworld 1983 1988 Ceased operation due to bankruptcy
* Date carrier began interstate service with jet aircraft.
** Size ranking based on passengers carried during 12 months ended September 1989.
Source: Donald Pickrell, "Airline Deregulation"
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TABLE 4.3: Proliferation of USA Domestic Hobs
AIRPORT AIRLINES HUBBING IN 1979 AIRLINES HUBBING IN 1988*
Atlanta Delta/Eastern Delta(58%)/Eastern(36%)
Baltimore — Pi edmont
Char1otte — Pi edmont(92%)
Chicago (Midway) — Mi dway
Chicago (O'Hare) Ameri can/Uni ted Uni ted(5IX)/American(29X)
Ci nci natti — Del ta
Dal 1as/FtWorth American/Braniff Ameri can(64%)/Delta(26X)
Dallas (Love) Southwest Southwest
Dayton — Pi edmont
Denver Fronti er/United Uni ted(44X)/Conti n '1(43X)
Detroi t — Northwest(59X)
Houston — Continental(77X)
LaGuardi a — Eastern(23X)
Memphi s — Northwest(84X)
Mi ami — Eastern(45X)
Mi nneapoli s Northwest Northwest(78X)
Nashvilie — Ameri can
New York (JFK) — Pan A m (2 9 X )/TWA(27X)
Newark — Continental(43X)
Phi 1adelphi a — USAi r(3 7X)
Phoeni x — American West(44X)
Pi ttsburgh USAi r USAi r(85X)
Ralei gh-Durham — Ameri can
Salt Lake City — Delta(79X)
San Francisco Uni ted Uni ted(40%)
Seattle Uni ted Uni ted(31X)/Alaska(2IX)
St Louis TWA/Ozark T W A (83%)
Washington (Dulles) — Uni ted
[* — First six months. % ‘s refer to enplanements.]
Source: G Williams, "Establishing An Effective Economic Regulatory 
Policy for the Airline Industry"
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TABLE 4.4: Hie M^jor US Hubs In 1988












Source: Wheatcroft and Lipman, "European Liberalisation and World Air Transport".
TABLE 4.5: CRS Maifcet Share in 1985
System Vendor(s) % of Locations
% of Agency 
Generated 
Revenue
Sabre American 35 46
Apollo United 24 28
Pars TWA/Northwest 13 10
SystemOne Texas Air 17 10
Datas II Delta 10 5
Source: Airline Business, January 18,1988.
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Market size Large domestic 
market
Significantly 
smaller than the 
USA domestic 
market





CRS Owned by the 
largest airlines 









Ownership of the major 
airlines




Passenger traffic by 
rail
Less than 0.05% Extremely low, 




Airport ownership Private Government owned and operated
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FIGURE 43 :  USA Domestic Airline Yields
































































































































































FIGURE 4.6: Consolidation of USA Airline Industry
CONSOLIDATION OF US AIRLINE INDUSTRY






















Source: Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1990, p.17.
NOTE: Since *hk figure was drawn up by these authors, PanAm has ceased
operation and both Texas Air (Continental) and TWA have become 
financially veiy weak. The Eastern part of Texas Air has closed. Parts of 
PanAm and TWA have been absorbed into Delta, American and United.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISATION
"We believe that the growing acceptance of 1992 as a focal point for the 
achievement of a single internal European market will have significant 
benefits for the development of air transport and tourism"
(Wheatcroft and lipm an, 1990)1
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Article 1 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 reaffirmed the concept of sovereignty over 
airspace, and it has been the keystone of aviation nationalism ever since. In addition, 
the Chicago Convention recognised the rights which protect any state within its own 
territory from foreign competition. International routes are established on the basis of 
bilateral air service agreements which are operated only by an airline "substantially 
owned and effectively controlled" by its own nationals2.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Rome created more constraints on a common air transport 
policy within the European Community by its initial exclusion of air and sea transport 
from the general provisions dealing with Community transport policies.
In the 1980’s, the focus of airline deregulation changed to the European market. In 
1986, the Community agreed to move towards the creation of a single European market, 
by adopting the Single European Act which was defined as "an area without internal 
frontiers in which the freedom of movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured"3
However, pressures for air transport liberalisation in the Community came on the one 
hand from outside as a result of the US experience in deregulation and the challenge 
from low cost Asian carriers. On the other hand, pressures for liberalisation came from 
the Community itself through the Directorate General Transport (DGYH) and the 
Directorate General for Competition (DGIV), accepting the rules of the Treaty. Other
factors included consumer organizations, general liberal bilaterals being signed, and 
multilateral liberalisation through the Commission or European Court of Justice. The 
overall aviation objectives of the European governments are illustrated in Table 5.1.
The objective of this chapter is to review the development of liberalisation within the 
European air transport market and to draw lessons for the GCC market.
5.2 MAIN EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE CURRENT STATUS
In order to understand the development of the EEC air transport legislation, it is
important to review the main events that led to the current status. These are as follows:4
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) 
A Memorandum was published raising the issue of the applicability of the 
competition rules to air transport.
Memorandum adopted on the basic approach to a common transport 
policy.
"Air transport was exempted from the competition rules"5 
Draft Council decision was issued on the first measures of a common 
approach to air transport.
1975 Report and draft decision were published regarding an action programme
for the European aeronautical sector.
15174-15178 The European Court of Justice decided that transport rules do not apply 
to air and sea transport. However, they come under the General Rules 
of the EEC Treaty.
15177 A special working party was established to research future actions that
could be necessary in the field of Community air transport.
1978 A priority list of nine issues approved by the Council for air transport 
covering economic, social and technical matters.
1979 A consultation procedure was proposed by the Commission on relations 
between member States and third countries in air transport.
The Commission issued Memorandum N o .l, "Air Transport: A 







1980 Proposal was made by the Commission regarding the authorization of 
scheduled inter-regional air services. However, after modification it was 
adopted in 1983 as Inter-Regional Air Services Directive which was a 
historically important step.
1981 A proposal was issued for a Council Regulation which applies Articles 85 
and 86 to air transport.
A report was published by the Commission on the level of scheduled 
passenger air fares and the procedures for fixing these fares.
A proposal was issued for a Council Directive on tariffs for scheduled air 
transport between Member States.
1984 A second Memorandum (No.2) was issued by the Commission on
"Progress towards the development of Community air transport Policy".
1986 Reaffinnation of the competition rules of air transport by the judgement 
of the European Court of Justice in the Nouvelle Frontiers case.
1987 A package of legislation was introduced which is known as Phase 1 of 
liberalization of air transport in the EC.
1988 The Commission introduced a regulation concerning Article 85(3) to 
coordinate revenue sharing, capacity, slot allocation at airports, ground 
handling services, consultation on tariffs and computer reservation 
systems which are known as the block exemptions.
1989 The Commission issued a report on the first year (1988) of implementation 
of the aviation policy approved in December 1987 (Phase 1).
A proposal by the Commission was submitted for Phase 2 which covers 
market access, fares, capacity and the application of Article 85(3).
15)90 The Ministers agreed the details of the second package (Phase 2).
1991 Proposal was published for the third package (Phase 3)‘
15)92 It is anticipated that the third package will be agreed by the end of 195)2.
5.3 TREATY OF ROME
The Treaty of Rome was signed on 25 March 1957 by six governments, Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and W.Germany, and it established the
European Economic Community (EEC). The aim was to remove constraints and
barriers to trade between the Member States In order to establish a "Common Market". 
Nevertheless, the six members were joined by Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 15173, 
Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986.7
The structure of the Treaty is divided into six main parts which are as follows:*
Part 1 - Principles (Articles 1-8)
Part 2 - Foundation of the Community (Articles 51-84)
Part 3 - Policy of the Community (Articles 85-130)
Part 4 - Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories (Articles 131-136)
Part 5 - Institution of the Community (Articles 137-209)
Part 6 - General and Final Provisions
Additional parts such as Setting up of the Institutions, Final Provisions, Annexes and 
Protocols are included.
However, Article 84 of the Treaty of Rome allows special provisions for air transport 
and it gives the Council a lot of freedom to decide how to regulate air transport.
In addition, the Treaty lays down only general and a large amount of secondary 
legislation, in the form of regulation, directives and decisions, which are needed to 
interpret and enforce these basic rules. The liberalisation process, therefore, depends 
on the introduction of legislation which enables the liberal policies of the Treaty to be 
applied to air transport.
5.4 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PROCESS
H ie decision making processes in the EC distinguishes between the "consultation 
procedures" and the "cooperation procedure" as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Policy 
proposals start from the Commission, which is divided into 23 General Directorates 
headed by 17 commissioners who are politicians nominated by the Member States. Staff 
members, who are the civil service of the Community, serve the Commissioners9.
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H ie Council of Ministers make decisions In the form of Directives, Regulations, 
Decisions or Recommendations as illustrated in Figure 5.2. If matters of great 
importance are on the agenda, the Council of Ministers is attended by heads of 
government, but when special subjects are under consideration, attendance of 
departmental ministers of each Member State is more normal. The Council of Ministers 
decisions following the adoption of the Single European Act are made by a qualified vote 
(Article 148 of the Treaty) instead of the unanimity rule19.
The Commission’s proposals go through an extensive process of consultation involving 
the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament before going to the 
Council of Ministers for decisions. Lobbying in Brussels is important and many 
industry sectors have established "Euro-lobbies" to influence the final form of the 
proposals given to the Council of Ministers. Finally, the European Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg is responsible for the interpretation and implementation of Community 
law11.
5.5 MEMORANDUM N O .l AND NO.2.
The Commission has issued two Memoranda that outline its objectives. Memorandum 
N o.l is "Air Transport: A Community Approach" which was published in 1979 to 
outline the Commission’s objectives in civil aviation and suggesting measures to be taken 
to achieve these objectives. Memorandum No.2 is "Progress towards the Development 
of a Community Air Transport Policy" which was published in March 1984. It re-stated 
and expanded the initial objectives, under four main headings:12
1. Balancing of interests without airline deregulation.
2. Flexibility and more competition within the current regulatory system.
3. Restriction to intra-community transport
4. Other important guidelines for the common air transport policy.
Nevertheless, Memorandum No.2 rejected the USA style of deregulation and advocated 
the following:
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harmonisation of bilaterals between Community states to reduce 
government and airline constraints on market forces, most noticeably in 
respect of tariffs and capacity;
- application - at least initially - to intra-Community traffic; and
- Introduction of the competition rules of the Treaty, but with exceptions for 
certain activities exempted".13
However, the following are the main proposals of the Memorandum:14
1. Adoption of fare zones or "zones of reasonableness" for greater pricing flexibility.
2. Introduction of a zone of free capacity with safety net of 25% of the market 
before any state intervenes to protect its own airlines.
3. Encouraging competition through allowing revenue-pooling agreements only if the 
transfer limits are extremely tight.
Nevertheless, from this Memorandum and from several speeches by officials of the 
Directorate General, the Commission’s long-term air transport objectives could be 
summarised as follows:
Community airlines should be free to operate between any airports in 
the 12 member states.
- Until the creation of the single internal market on 1 January 1993, fifth freedom 
rights should be available for members’ airlines on intra-Community services, 
but with some limits on the capacity offered.
- Multiple or double designation of airlines on all routes once traffic surpasses 
certain threshold levels.
- No capacity controls on air services.
- Cabotage (that is, the right to cany traffic between two points in the same 
country) should be available within limits.
- Fares to be set freely by airlines, but states should have powers to control 
predatory pricing. In time, a ’double disapproval’ regime should be introduced.
- Airlines of one state (A) should have the same rights In another state (B) as 
airlines of that state (B).
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- Anyone meeting the technical and economic standards required for establishing 
an airline in any Community state should have the right to set up an airline in 
that state without hindrance.
- Negotiations of traffic rights with non-community states should be carried out 
by the Community rather than bilaterally as previously"15
5.6 THE 1983 INTER-REGIONAL AIR SERVICE DIRECTIVE.
This was the first step towards the liberalisation of European air transport. However, 
the Council viewed the Directive to be of an experimental nature. The purpose of the 
Directive was to widen the scope of carriers, to develop markets, to contribute to 
increasing the intra-Community network, and to aid the development of the regions.
The Directive included the following restrictions:1*
1. Between second msyor provincial airports (Category 2 airports) and smaller 
airports with international flight facilities (Category 3 airports).
2. Aircraft of 70 seats or less or maximum take-off weight of not more than 30 tons.
3. Maximum stage length of 400 kilometres, and shorter over mountains or sea.
4. Tariffs on inter-regional services had to be approved by both stages in 
consideration of "reasonable proportion of the costs of the air carrier’s 
operation".
The basic principles of the Directive were as follows:-
1. The rules and regulations do not affect the relationship between the Home State 
and Its airlines.
2. It applies to scheduled transport of passengers, or in combination with cargo 
and/or mail between Community airports.
3. It applies to Community airlines
4. Fares and rates should be based on a fair cost to price ratio and a fair return on 
capital.
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5. Member states can, if they want, apply conditions that are less restrictive than 
the Directive.
5.7 BILATERAL LIBERALISATION
The UK-Netherlands renegotiation in June 15184 was the first m^j or breakthrough in EC 
bilateral liberalisation. The key features introduced were free entry of new airlines, 
access by designated airlines to any destination in either country, a "double disapproval" 
regime for fare and no capacity controls17. Table 5.2 illustrates the traditional and new- 
style European air services agreements.
However, the UK-Netherlands agreement established the pattern for liberalised 
renegotiation of European bilaterals. Since then, the UK government has made 
agreements with West Germany in December 1984, Luxembourg in March 1985, 
Belgium in October 1985, Switzerland in December 1985 and the Irish Republic, and 
some relaxing of bilateral agreements with France in September 1985. The UK 
renegotiations with Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium were more liberal than the 
others1*. Table 5.3 shows the main features of those bilateral agreements with regard 
to the liberalisation of route access, capacity constraints and tariff constraints.
The impact of bilateral liberalisation is the encouragement of more airlines to serve the 
international market. A good example is the UK-Netheriands where in June 1984 there 
were only four airlines flying between Amsterdam and London airports. However, by 
15190, there were 10 airlines flying Amsterdam/Rotterdam-London routes19. There was 
a significant jump in available capacity between the previous routes which traffic growth 
did not match despite the drop in the level of promotional fares29. Since then the 
number of carriers has fallen significantly, largely through merger or failure and is now 
reduced to six and the two m^jor players, British Airways and KLM, are considering 
some form of meiger.
5.8 THE 1987 PACKAGE
The Council of Ministers adopted its first "package" on December 17, 1987. It is 
considered a m^jor step in European aviation policy and the first step towards air
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transport liberalization as a whole within the Community- It covers a much wider range 
of issues than the Inter-Regional Directive. The package consisted of the following:21
1. Two regulations which dealt with the application of the competition rules to air 
transport (Council Regulation No.3975/87) and the procedures for exemptions 
(Council Regulation No.3975/87) permitted by Article 85(3) of the Treaty of 
Rome.
2. A directive (Council Directive 87/501) which dealt with scheduled air fares.
3. A decision (Council Decision 87/502) which dealt with market access and capacity 
sharing.
Overall, the package introduced a more liberal fares regime which includes the concept 
of fare zones. In addition it abandoned the 50:50 sharing of capacity by air carriers of 
each state, and it facilitated the entry of new carriers by opening up market access22. 
Table 5.4 illustrates the first phase compared with the second phase of the European 
liberalisation.
Karel van Miert, the EC Commissioner for Transport, described the first package as 
"A modest success". He summed up the 1987 package in June 1989 when he was 
speaking at an IATA Aviation Symposium in the following way:
"In my view the first phase of the package is proving a modest success.
In traffic between member states a variety of more flexible arrangements 
have been made -some under bilateral agreements but many stemming 
directly from the December 1987 package. New routes have been created, 
especially between hub and regional airports, and airlines have been 
availing themselves of the fifth freedom possibilities created by the 
package. Scheduled passenger traffic has increased, and it would appear 
that in general airline yields have also improved. However, there is cause 
for concern since the fully flexible economy fare appears to have gone up 
slightly on intra-Community routes"23.
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However, the Commissioner’s views are given in detail about the first phase of 
liberalisation in the Report on the First Year (1988) of the Implementation of the 
Aviation Policy Approved in December 15187 which was published in 1989. This report 
was based on replies to Commission’s questionnaire that was sent to all Member States. 
Wheatcroft and lipm an summarised the main conclusions of the report as follows:
Community airlines have made good use of favourable 
macroeconomic trends which have generated traffic increases.
Unit operating costs of AEA airlines have been reduced, although 
fuel prices have played a key role in this development.
The majority of airlines experienced a substantial increase in their 
load factors between 1986 and 1988.
The general level of fares has followed the rate of inflation.
Profitability has improved.
There has been little change in the distribution of bilateral capacity 
shares within the Community.
No requests have been made for exemptions from the application 
of the liberalised capacity sharing roles.
The establishment of new routes between hubs and regional 
airports has developed favourably.
In three instances applications for fifth freedom rights have been 
turned down but, in general, there has been a significant re- 
emergence of fifth freedom routings"24.
Nevertheless, some states were reluctant to accept the implications of the 15187 package 
such as the following25:
1. France did not allow Belgian carrier Sobelair to operate a charter flight between 
Brussels and the French Antilles, and it refused to grant route rights in Europe 
to UTA.
2. Italy did not grant fifth freedom rights to Aer Lingus between Manchester and 
Milan or to British Airways between Lyons and Milan.
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H ie Council of Ministers agreed further liberalisation measures should be taken in order 
to complete the internal market for air transport by 1992. The Commission had to 
produce a proposal, the second "package", before November 15189, and an agreement 
had to be accomplished on the next policy by June 30, 19510.
5.9 THE 1990 PACKAGE (Phase 2)
The Brussels meeting of the Council of Transport Ministers in December 15189 prepared 
a new package of measures. However, in June 151510 in Luxembourg, the Ministers 
agreed the details of the second package and to the longer-term objectives which are as 
follows:24.
1. The zonal fare system was replaced with a "more liberal and effective" zonal 
system.
2. An increase of a further 7.5% of capacity points was allowed in each of the 
subsequent two years for any member state whose air carrier(s) had already 
reached a 60% share of total capacity on a country-to-country basis.
3. Allowing multiple designation to increase market access in all Community air 
routes with more than 140,000 passengers per year, by opening all intra- 
Community points (with some exceptions) to third and fourth freedom airlines 
and through increasing fifth freedom rights up to 50% of the seats on a through 
service.
4. By 1 January 15193, all bilateral limits on capacity shares will be abolished. 
Approval by double disapproval** of all intra-Community air fares may be 
established by that date.
5. By June 1992, the Council of Ministers plans to agree a common specification 
licensing system for the establishment of new airlines.
Overall, air transport services will be covered by a very liberal regulatory regime by 
1993 if all these developments and proposals are implemented. Air carriers will be very
**In early 1992 it seemed unlikely that double disapproval will be a feature of the 
third package.
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free to operate on any route from their State to any destination in the Community with 
extensive fifth freedom rights, but without any capacity control and very few tariff 
controls, given that double disapproval* is unlikely to block any fare proposals27.
5.10 THE 1991 PROPOSALS
The European Commission has proposed the third and final package on air transport 
liberalisation approved in July 1991. Most of the remaining restrictions on competition 
should be abolished by January 1993.2* The following are the 1991 proposals in regard 
to licensing of carriers:
1. Simple and dear minimum standards regarding financial structure, liquidity, 
insurance, licence duration and monitoring methods.
2. New airlines should have a minimum Ecu 100,000 of starting up capital, and they 
have to show that they can meet actual and potential obligations for two years.
3. Airlines should be owned by the majority of EC nationals, and the board should 
consist of a majority of EC nationals, too.
The following are the main fifth freedom and cabotage proposals:
1. Fifth freedom and cabotage should be fully implemented from January 1993 
which means EC-licensed airlines have the freedom to fly anywhere within the 
Community without capacity limitations.
2. Essential but uneconomic air services to national development regions and 
between regional airports should survive in the single market.
3. Routes with less than 30,000 seats per year can be protected by limiting access 
to only one carrier or restricting aircraft size to a maximum of 80 seats.
4. Safeguard measures to deal with financially troubled airlines due to the absence 
of capacity restrictions.
5. The Commission decided against phasing the introduction of cabotage rights.
The Commission proposes that a double disapproval air fare regime will prevail from 
January 1993, in addition the Commission gave it three years to take effect. From 1996
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automatic approval should be possible. The Commission seeks to restrict procedures 
where government and others can appeal against fares to only routes where competition 
is limited and to fully flexible fares.
The Commission proposes to integrate scheduled and charter air services because it 
could not find good reasons to introduce different rules for basically the same product. 
The Commission proposed also that all the unused slots should be pooled and then at 
least half of them allocated to new entrant carriers.
However, the EC Transport Ministers met in Brussels on 26 March 1992, and they came 
down in favour of free fare pricing with safeguards to stop fares being too high or too 
low. In addition, the AEA said that double disapproval will not be applied. The EC 
ministers will meet in June 1992 to pass the third and final set of resolutions on air 
transport liberalisation. Furthermore, the Commission is to investigate additional 
subjects such as tax breaks, route subsidy, waiving landing charges and duty-free trade 
concessions to state-owned airlines.29
5.11 ACTIONS IMITATED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE
The European Court of Justice made its first historical decision in the Nouvelles 
Frontieres case in 1986, which arose from a French Court. The Court declared that air 
transport is subject to the Competition Rules of the Treaty of Rome3*.
In addition, there are two European Court of Justice decisions which enforce the extra­
territorial nature of the Community rules which are as follows:31
1. The "Pulp Paper Case" in 1988, in which the Court upheld a decision of the 
Commission to fine 36 USA, Canadian and Scandinavian pulp paper companies 
for price fixing.
2. The "Ahmed Saeed" judgement in 1989, the Court re-endorsed the view of the 
previous case. Two Frankfurt travel agencies sold cheap Frankfurt-Tokyo tickets 
that were bought very cheaply from Portugal as Iisbon-Frankfurt-Tokyo tickets.
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After throwing away the Lisbon-Frankfurt coupon, the agencies resold these 
tickets which was contrary to IATA and German regulations. The Court decided 
that this was not contrary to Community Law.
5.12 CONCLUSIONS
The Commission has developed four main areas of policy which are listed below:32
1. Liberalisation, which includes the following:
■ Air transport policy which contains air fares, market access, capacity 
control and licensing of air carriers.
■ Protection against anticompetitive behaviour.
■ Protection against unfair behaviour.
2. Harmonisation which covers the following areas:
■ Safety for accident investigation, common airworthiness requirements, 
common licences requirements, and for flight-time limitations.
■ Fair competition through a code of conduct for computer reservation 
systems, allocation of slots, and regular consultation between airports and 
users.
■ Consumer protection through rules for denied boarding compensation,
common rules for liability and a code of conduct for travel agents.
■ Environment (noise limitations).
3. Infrastructure issues, which relate to serious problems in the European aviation 
system, such as capacity problems arising from unsatisfactory air traffic control 
systems and from insufficient runway capacity.
4. External policy which covers agreements between a Member State and a third 
country especially in matters such as air fares, capacity control and market 
access.
5.13 LESSONS FOR THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL STATES
Lessons can be learned from the European Community air transport liberalisation 
process by the GCC, given that the GCC does not have any infrastructure problems 
especially at its nuyor airports. On the other hand, most of the GCC market is very
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regulated. For example, monopolistic markets exist in Saudia Arabia controlled by 
Saudia Airways and in four Gulf States (except Dubai) controlled by Gulf Air.
The main lesson from the European liberalisation for the GCC is that the GCC has 
initially to define the level of freedom they are aiming for, and what would be best for 
the GCC consumers, airlines and governments. The second important and main lesson 
is that the liberalisation process in the GCC has to be smooth and gradual following the 
example of what happened within the European Community.
The third lesson is that the GCC has to establish a Court of Justice, such as the 
European Court of Justice, to be responsible for implementing the Community law.
The fourth lesson is that there is a need to establish consumer organizations in the GCC 
in which consumers views and problems related to air transport could be sent to officials 
who have the power to regulate, deregulate and re-regulate the market.
The fifth important lesson is that the GCC governments do protect their national 
carriers which are mostly govemmental-owned airlines. Therefore, the 1983 Inter- 
Regional Air Services Directive, with some modification, is a very suitable model for the 
GCC to follow as a first step because it does not cause mqjor threats to the national 
carriers.
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TABLE 5.1: Aviation Objectives of European Governments
1. ON BEHALF OF THE CONSUMER
1.1 Reasonableness of tariffs:
a. A range of market oriented products
b. No need to pay for unwanted product features
c. Cost related fares
1.2 Simple, comprehensible tariff structure
1.3 Convenient interlining arrangements
2. ON BEHALF OF AIRLINES
2.1 Economic viability of airlines
2.2 Improvements in airline efficiency
2.3 Maximisation of market opportunities for their airlines
3. ON BEHALF OF OTHER PARTS OF THE AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM
3.1 Avoidance of capacity problems (e.g.airport congestion, air traffic control 
delays)
4. ON BEHALF OF OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
4.1 Maintenance of services to smaller communities
4.2 Protection of tax payers against airline subsidies
4.3 Avoidance of excess airline profits
4.4 Benefits for the tourist industry
4.5 National economic, prestige and cultural objectives
4.6 Environmental protection (e.g. noise)
4.7 Efficient use of resources (e.g. energy)
4.8 A balance between air and surface transport
4.9 Maintenance of safety standards
Source: Wheatcroft and lipm an, 1986.
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TABLE 5.2: Traditional and new-style European air services agreements.
Traditional bilateral New-style bilateral*
Airlines One per route from each 
state - in most cases this 
was the national carrier
Multiple designation
Routes Only to points specified 
in bilateral
Open route access - 
airlines can fly on any 
route between two states.
Capacity Shares 50:50 - between 
airlines of two states
No capacity control
Fares Approval of both 
governments needed - but 
negotiated through IATA
Double disapproval - 
fares can be rejected 
only if both governments 
disapprove.
* e.g. UK-Netherlands as negotiated in 1984 and amended 1985.
Source: Rigas Doganis, "flying Off Course", 1991.
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TABLE 5.3: liberalised UK Bilateral Agreements with other European Countries.
Country Route Access 
Freedom




Ireland (II) Yes Yes Yes
West Germany Yes Yes Limited
Luxembourg Yes Yes Yes
Belgium Yes Yes Yes
Switzerland Yes Yes Limited
France Limited Limited No
Spain Limited Limited No
Italy Limited Limited No
Source: R.Doganis, 1991, pp.80-81, K.Button, 1991, p.95, and F.Alamdari, 1989, p.59.
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TABLE 5.4: Second Phase of Euroliberalisation Compared with First Phase.
SECOND PHASE O F EUROLIBERALISATION 







To be enforced unless block 
exemptions agreed for intra- 
European agreements.
Block exemptions to be ex­
tended to domestic and third 
country agreements.
FARES Pricing controls relaxed by 
zonal systems.




"Safety net" reduced to 60/40 
from October 1989.
“Safety net" further reduced 
to 75/25 from April 1992.
MARKET
ACCESS
New encouragement for 
regional services but no 
obligation to give double 
designation to own airlines.
States obliged to grant li­




“Trigger levels" reduced from
250.000 passengers in 1988 to
180.000 in 1990.
"Trigger levels" further re­




Agreed but limited to 30% of 
seats.
Limit increased to 50% with 
no limit for regional services.
CABOTAGE Not included Allowed on intra-European 
routes with 30% limit.
Source: European Commission
Source: Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1990
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FIGURE 5.1: EC Legislation from Start to Finish














































Source: European Commission, and Wheatcroft 1990.
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FIGURE 5.2: Community Actions
COMMUNITY ACTIONS
(  REGULATIONS )
Regulations have general application. They are binding 
in their entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States.
Q DIRECTIVES )
Directives are binding on Member States, as to the results 
to be achieved, but leave the implementation to 
Member States through their own legislation.
(  DECISIONS ^
Decisions are binding on those to whom they are addressed 
and no national legislation is needed.
(  RECOMMENDATIONS J  
Recommendations are not laws and have no binding effects.
Source: European Commtswon
Source: European Commission, and Wheatcroft, 15190.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISATION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Tbe objective of this chapter Is to study the impact of the European Community’s 
liberalisation process on the airline industiy, and to draw lessons for the GCC. Ibis 
objective will be achieved through analyzing the European air transport market, types 
of European carriers, infrastructure, congestion, mergers and consolidation, CRS and 
code sharing, hub concentration and airline strategies.
Tbe US experience of deregulation attracted the European policy makers for the 
following reasons:
1. Lower fares, where the House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities (1980) pointed out that the fares in Europe are double those of 
comparable services in the USA1.
2. Cost-benefit terms, i.e. the US government paid fewer subsidies.
3. US airlines yielded a positive rate of return.
However, it was recognised that the European Community’s commercial environment 
in a liberalised atmosphere would be very different from that in the deregulated USA 
because Europe has the opportunity to learn from the USA experience. In addition, the 
USA had few previous examples and references on deregulation on which to gauge the 
effect. As a result, the USA carrier did not have any modern examples of appropriate 
strategies and commercial behaviour to adopt in a deregulated environment. On the 
other hand, Europe has the US experience of deregulation, and a knowledge of other 
industiy sectors within Europe.
Overall, with regard to European liberalisation, the following are important points to 
consider^
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1. Tbe move towards European liberalisation, no matter how gradual, is now 
reaching a conclusion.
2. Many European carriers have changed their strategies and now are planning on 
the assumption of a free European
market.
3. Global factors that have an impact on European liberalisation are US 
deregulation, strong competition from Asian and North American carriers, and 
increased pressure from pro-liberalisation forces within Europe.
6.2 THE EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT MARKET
Tbe European Community’s air transport market is different from the USA and other
countries in the world. Table 6.1 illustrates a comparison between the European and
the USA markets.
In addition, the following are the main characteristics of inter-European competition:3
1. AD EC carriers have less than 17% of the intra-Community scheduled market.
2. Competitors range from fully private to fully government-owned.
3. Newcomers to scheduled service do not really represent a threat in the intra- 
European market in the coming economic upturn.
4. High speed rail might capture 4-7% of the short haul high yield O&D markets 
by 1995-97.
5. Except in the UK, most of the national domestic markets are at present 
monopolies.
6. Incremental capacity will not be available in the future at the main European 
airports.
7. All Euro majors have less than 46% market share of their home intra-EEC hub 
traffic flows.
8. There is a 8-10 cents high/low range difference from the average in terms of 
operating costs per ASK within the European scheduled carriers group.
9. There is much less momentum for charters to move to scheduled services after 
the failure of Air Europe and TEA.
113
10. Charters have cost advantages over Mqjor carriers.
11. Many forecasts, such as those of the Eurocontrol and ECAC, suggest that the 
demand within Europe will double by the end of the century. However, the 
European single market would generate more Intra-European business class 
passengers4.
With regard to liberalisation, Europe has the following characteristics which will tend
to increase stability:5
1. Most of the European carriers are not privatised.
2. Europe did not suffer a single unified economic downturn in the early 1990s.
3. Most of the American and Asian foreign competitors are in the early 1990s faced 
with economic downturns in their own countries.
4. The UK air transport domestic market is the only liberalised market in Europe.
5. The European airlines have not been involved in permanent yield-depressing fare 
wars.
6. Most of the European carriers have until now been able to avoid massive 
infrastructural investment.
On the other hand, Europe has the following disadvantages:4
1. No fast recoveiy is forecast for the European economies.
2 . There are strong signs of stronger USA "mega" competition which is already
changing market shares on the Atlantic.
3. European airlines have made limited gains in decreasing absolute costs and 
optimising organisational structure.
4. The European social/labour laws will limit the European-nuyors ability to
compete with USA-m^jors on an absolute cost basis.
5. There is only marginal growth in intra-European air travel.
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6.3 TYPES OF EUROPEAN CARRIERS
H ie European airlines based in ECAC countries (European Civil Aviation Conference) 
are not all Community airlines. However they can be considered as "European" and 
can be divided into the following categories (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1988) :7
1. There are 22 ECAC states and the same number of flag carriers such as British 
Airways and Air France. However there are 12 Euro-nnyors - essentially the 
m^jor airlines of the EC - which are illustrated in Table 6.2. In addition, Table
6.3 presents the Euro-m^jors rankings by passengers carried, passenger yield and 
passenger load factor.
2. Charter carriers which provide non-scheduled services such as Britannia in the 
UK and Air Charter in France.
3. Regional carriers which serve non-schedule and regional markets such as Air UK 
in the UK and TAT in France.
4. There are approximately 60 small airlines with less than 250 employees which 
serve charter, local and minor cargo operations.
There are factors which influence the growth of Euro-m^jors such as fare wars, their 
use of charter affiliates to take traffic from the Euro-charters, mergers and alliances 
and establishing multi-hub networks.*
However, factors that reduce the growth of the Euro-m^jors include infrastructure 
constraints, Euro-charter airlines moving to scheduled services, increasing competition 
from US mega carriers, and ground transport competition such as rail (especially after 
the opening of the Channel Tunnel)-9
Since at least half of the intra-European traffic is carried on non-scheduled services, in 
order for the Euro-m^j ors to expand at a faster pace, they have to increase their market 
share by gaining from non-affiliated charter traffic. In addition, they have to fight 
between themselves. Therefore, the EC has to establish relevant competition legislation 
that prohibits unfair competition and the abuse of dominant position.
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The US experience showed that after deregulation, the m^jor US charter carriers 
expanded into scheduled services where one by one they collapsed. Furthermore, all the 
US charter carriers which entered the scheduled market in the early 15)805 are not in 
business today. World Airways tried to survive by becoming a pure charter airline,but 
this too fa iled .10
There are many reasons behind the decision by some European charters to enter 
scheduled services. They include the following:11
1. To increase yields by carrying higher fare business and independent leisure 
market.
2. Selling blocks of seats on their scheduled flights to tour operators.
3. Scheduled services attract passengers in winter when charter operations are very 
low.
4. Scheduled operations have priority over charters on allocating runway slots at 
congested airports.
5. To expand the total market base profitably.
6. Charter carriers have lower operating costs which makes than feel that they will 
be in a good competitive position compared with the scheduled carriers.
However, air transport in Western Europe has been unique because large percentages 
of holiday passengers have been carried by charter flights operated by privately owned 
airlines. Figure 6.1 indicates that 65% of total passenger-km in 15)88 on international 
services within ECAC Europe was carried by charters. Nevertheless, this fraction of 
the airline industry will change in the next decade for the following reasons:12
1. The decreasing demand for "sun and sand" holidays.
2. The mqjor scheduled airlines will have greater freedom in the holiday travel 
market due to liberalisation.
3. The m^jor scheduled airlines have some marketing advantages with respect to 
their large size.
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Finally, the European Regional Airline Organisation (ERA) is estimated that regional 
air traffic increased by 20% in both 1990 and 1991. This success by the regional airlines 
has attracted the major airlines to invest in some of them so that they could be used as 
feeders. The two main problems that face the regional airlines are airport congestion 
and impending shortages of skilled personnel (particularly engineers) D.
6.4 INFRASTRUCTURE CONGESTION
Infrastructure congestion is one of the biggest constraints facing liberalisation in the 
European Community. However, Wheatcroft and Iipman in 1990 indicated the seven 
most important facets:
Demand, in terms of passenger numbers and aircraft movements, 
is increasing much faster than forecast.
Air traffic control equipment in key locations needs to be modernised and 
coordination between control centres needs to be improved.
There are shortages of trained ATC staff and entrenched industrial 
relations problems.
The planning, decision and financial appropriations process for 
infrastructure enhancement can be extremely long due to complex 
government procedures and political impediments, 
liberalisation accentuates the difficulties, accelerating the dynamics of 
change and encouraging hub concentration.
Governments and airlines are considering radical solutions to avoid the 
waste and delays, like privatisation of airports and streamlining of ATC 
management. They are speeding up development of new technology like 
satellite communication and collision avoidance systems.
Increasing environmental consciousness is placing new limits on aircraft 
operation and airport expansion"14
However, the key congestions in Europe with regard to liberalisation are constrained air 
traffic control facilities, airport constraints, and the traditional method of national 
control of aviation infrastructure ownership operation and financing.15
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Furthermore, Susan Carey described the European congestion problems in the Wall 
Street Journal in December 1987 as:
"Quite simply Western Europe doesn’t have enough runways, airports, 
airspace or air traffic controllers to handle the existing aviation demand.
That has serious implications for the European Community’s plan to begin 
limited, gradual deregulation of the air travel industry on January l" .1*
6.5 MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATION
Deregulation has produced strong pressure for concentration and globalisation in the 
airline industry. The US experience of deregulation has led the airlines into mergers 
and concentration. By 1989, the six largest US A airlines carried 84% of the US domestic 
passenger-km.17 US experience showed that large size airlines have the following 
benefits:
Attractions of large and widespread network.
Ability to dominate operations at a hub(s)
Control of distribution especially through CRS (Computer Reservation 
System).
Ability to exercise price leadership.
Value of network size in ’loyalty’ marketing schemes e.g. ’Frequent 
Flyer’.
Range of markets allows cross-subsidising of competitive pricing on 
particular routes.
Marketing power of large scale advertising"1*
The first of the modem mergers in Europe took place in 15188 when British Airways 
merged and took over British Caledonian, KLM with NederLines and Lufthansa 
acquired the majority shareholding in DLT. Furthermore, in 151510, Air Fiance bought 
55% of the shares of UTA.W
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In addition, there is growing concentration among tour operators within the European 
travel industiy which means that the inclusive tour market, which accounts for more 
than half of the intra-European air travel, will be controlled by few "mega" tour 
operators.2*
It should be noted that some analysts believe that the only consolidations that will 
survive in the long term are the true mergers or joint ventures which involve operation 
under the same management, name and ownership.
However, the following are the barriers to mergers:21
1. The traditional concept of ownership and control.
2. Human nature of managers especially when nationalism and cultural differences
existed.
3. Conservatism to believe that "Our way of doing things is best".
4. Government efforts to preserve competition.
Nevertheless, the European Commission will attempt to stop larger carriers from 
abusing their dominant position by the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome 
Treaty and by applying strict conditions on further take overs or mergers.22
However, there are many indications from the US experience and from recent European 
mergers and consolidations that in the future the European airline industry will be 
dominated by a few giant companies.
6.6 CRS AND CODE SHARING
The ownership of powerful CRS and participation in global CRS distribution channels 
will be an important element of the competitive strategy of the mega carriers. Super 
CRS would provide an airline with the ability:
to cope with rapidly changing product and price information; 
to manage yields and inventoiy;
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to hook up travel agency networks;
to distribute their products electronically;
to protect national and regional markets;
to penetrate foreign markets;
to support a growing global market presence;
to make money from fees and limit their own costs;
to prepare for automation1123
However, in July 1989 the Council of Ministers approved the following code of conduct 
for the use of CRS:24
1. The system must be available to all airlines without discrimination and on an 
equal basis.
2. Participating airlines should have the right to join other systems.
3. Flight operations must be ranked on the following basis:
First non-stop direct flights between two cities ranked by departure time.
Second direct flights with stops but without changing aircraft.
Third connecting flights with aircraft changing.
4. Code-sharing flights should be treated as connecting flights.
5. Excessive screen exposure should not be given to certain options nor discriminate 
against others.
Code-sharing and blocked space arrangements are another form of cooperation between 
the airlines. Code sharing is where some airlines use the same flight number for 
connecting flights to gain a higher priority positions on CRS displays for regional feeder 
operations. However, blocked space is where an airline leases a block of seats on 
another airline on a route that it does not itself offer.25
6.7 HUB CONCENTRATION
Dominant hubs and distribution control is one of the main strategic priorities for the 
m^jor carriers to succeed in and dominate certain markets. Nevertheless, it is very 
difficult for Europe to reach the level of hubbing reached in the US for the following
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reasons:24
1. The traditional concept of ownership and control where many European airports 
are government-owned.
2. ATC problems.
3. Runway congestion at busy airports.
4. European railway systems offer an alternative travel mode.
5. USA average route is 1300km, and the European is 750km which indicates that 
Europe has less scope for hubbing where most Western European scheduled air 
transport sectors are less than 2 hours, on most of these sectors non-stop and 
high speed trains are available.
6. The European Commission is very likely to take action to stop potential abuse of 
dominant airlines at hub airports.
6.8 AIRLINE STRATEGIES
European liberalisation is going through a period during which many airlines’ financial 
fortunes are declining as a result of the Gulf War and economic recession. 
Liberalisation would be easier and more acceptable in a period of high growth and 
profitability than in a period of relative decline.27
However, Wheatcroft and Iipman highlight the m^jor considerations which the airlines 
need to take into account in order to survive in a liberalised market. These are as 
follows:2*
1. Corporate structure and strategy.
2. Quality of service and product control.
3. Cost, yield and inventoiy control.
4. Appropriate equipment.
5. Human resource management.
In addition, Rigas Doganis indicated that most of the European airlines have followed 
three main approaches to the challenge of liberalisation:2*
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1. They have bought into, or bought out, the smaller and the feeder airlines in their 
own countries.
2. They have purchased shareholdings in other European airlines, and in a few 
cases in non-European airlines.
3. They have established marketing alliances with other large airlines.
In addition, he indicated that the main objectives of airline strategies in a deregulated 
environment is by obtaining the full marketing advantages of large scale and size to 
survive profitably. These objectives could be reached by one of the following 
strategies:3®
1. Growing faster than other European airlines which requires dominance of 
national market, low cost effective hubbing, two European hubs, frequent flyer 
programme and entering high growth markets.
2. Growing faster through alliances/mergers which requires similar brand/product 
image, compatible management, real integration, effective hubbing, two 
compatible hubs and low costs, OR
3. Becoming a specialist niche carrier.
Furthermore, Louis Gialloreto indicated that the Euro-m^jors need the following in a 
liberalised market:31
1. Achieving an annual increase in capacity of 12-18% in the peak and upturn of 
the cycle, steady or 2-3% in troughs.
2. If the product brand is good, then the cost structure should be among the bottom 
five. However, for the lower quality brands, it should be in the lowest two.
3. Establishing a multi-hub operation with minimum of two. One of them should 
be strongly dominated on intra-Europe traffic.
4. Pursuing the charter carriers and their leisure traffic.
In addition, he indicated the following which are the main strategic objectives for other 
carriers:32
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1. Avoiding network overlaps.
2. For an airline with a good product, the cost structure should be among the lowest 
eight. However, it should be among the lowest five or six for the lowest 
perceived brands.
3. Implementing frequent flyer programmes for intra-Europe air travel.
However, the following are some of the European nuyor carriers strategies:33
1. British Airways (BA) is using all three of Doganis’ approaches. Recently BA and 
KLM have discussed a joint venture.
2. KLM has planned to establish a worldwide system.
3. Air France is ensuring the dominance of its home market.
4. Swissair is establishing alliances with Delta and SIA.
5. S AS has linked international airlines into their concept of a global travel alliance. 
This linking of the worldwide networks included charters, hotels, tour operations 
and ground services.
6. Lufthansa agreed to work together with Air France and Iberia in the following 
areas:
harmonisation of aircraft purchasing policies; 
rationalisation of marketing and sales activities; 
establishment of a jointly owned catering company; 
joint pilot training;
increased collaboration in CRS developments; 
a new joint computer system for cargo operations; 
joint scheduling of European services; 
joint operation of some long haul routes.”34
6.9 CONCLUSION
As a result of the process of European liberalisation, there is a tendency for the airlines 
to form so-called "multi-mega” carriers, establishing aligned airline groups to ensure 
geographical coverage, global market share, financial leverage and product and brand 
excellence.35
Nevertheless, the following are the main changes in the European airline industry as a 
result of the liberalisation process:34
1. There have been some mergers and transnational alliances.
2. A tendency for charter carriers to move towards scheduled markets.
3. Increasing concentration among tour operators.
4. listed  below are some of the operational changes:
■ Entry of a few small airlines into scheduled services such as Ryanair and 
Hamburg Airlines. Others have expanded operations such as Crossair 
and British Midland.
■ As a result of the December 1983 package, which allowed the new fifth 
freedom rights, two airlines in particular have taken advantage of this 
freedom (Aer Ungus and Air Portugal).
■ Another result of the 1987 package was the abandonment of most of the 
revenue pooling agreements. As a consequence, airlines have started to 
bunch up frequencies at the more popular times. Previously frequencies 
on pooled routes had been distributed throughout the day.
5. Decreasing yields on some routes.
However, the overall impact of European liberalisation up to 1990 is less dramatic than 
US deregulation with regard to traffic growth, fare reductions, new entrants and new 
airlines for the following reasons:
1. The European liberalisation has been slow and gradual rather than taking place
over a short period of time.
2. There have been no large and aggressive new entrants or expansions, such as
Braniff up to 1982, due to the gradual process and the existence of barriers to
new entrants in many European countries.
In addition, the real competition in the European airline market can be generated only 
from the existing carriers. Given that those airlines have mutual shareholdings, share 
swops and marketing alliances, it is very hard to identify whore the new competitors to
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the incumbent European airlines will come from.
6.10 LESSONS FOR THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL STATES
The main lessons for the GCC from the impact of European air transport liberalisation
are as follows:
1. The European Community - and the wider group of 22 ECAC states - had the 
opportunity to learn from the US deregulation experience, and the GCC can 
learn from both the US and Europe.
2. The key element in the European liberalisation process was that it could succeed 
only by applying it using a gradual and smooth process.
3. Since there is no infrastructure nor airway congestions in the GCC, these 
governments will face fewer problems than the Europeans in planning and 
applying air transport liberalisation. In addition, the GCC carriers will not have 
the troubles of the EC carriers in dealing with airport and airway congestion.
4. Since the only type of carriers flying within the GCC domestic market are the 
national carriers, the GCC national carriers will have fewer problems than the 
European earners in facing competition.
5. Since there are no train services between the GCC countries, the airlines will 
have no surface competition.
6. The European and the GCC governments are similar in respect of the traditional 
way of national control of aviation infrastructure, ownership, operation and 
financing. However, this characteristic is one of the key constraints to growth 
in Europe especially with regard to expansion and liberalisation. The GCC 
governments should draw lessons to avoid future congestion.
7. There is less opportunity for the GCC carriers to merge because of their 
governmental ownership, the consideration of being flag carriers and the 
availability of one type (i.e. scheduled) of airline in the GCC. However, if 
regulatory reform is to occur, the GCC should have powers similar to those of 
the European Commission under Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty to apply 
stricter conditions on take overs and mergers.
Since there are no regional carriers and a very small number of charter flights 
between the GCC countries, new entrants in the GCC are more likely to enter 
the market than in Europe - possibly as charters and regionals.
Saudia Airlines will have the advantage of being the largest airline in the GCC. 
However, it has a disadvantage in having high operating costs. It can enter the 
Gulf Air domestic market and move freely to/from Kuwait and Dubai.
Gulf Air will have the advantage of being able to enter the Saudia domestic 
market and move freely into Kuwait and Dubai.
Kuwait will have the advantage of being able to enter the Saudia and Gulf 
domestic market, and move freely into Dubai.
Emirates will have the advantage of low costs and being able to enter the Saudia 
and Gulf domestic markets and move freely into Kuwait.
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Deregulated market is 
domestic
80% of flights are 
international




Market size Large domestic market Significantly smaller 
than the US domestic 
market
Average Route Length 1300km 750km (which 
indicates less scope for 
hubbing)
Scheduled airlines costs Lower Higher
Productivity Higher Lower
CRS Owned by the largest 
airlines (eg United 
owns Apollo and 
American owns Sabre)
They are owned by a 
number of airlines (eg 
Galileo is owned by 
BA, KLM and several 
other airlines)
Ownership of the msyor 
airlines
All of them are 
privately owned
Most of them are 
government owned
Passenger traffic by rail Less than 0.05% 13% of passenger 
-kilometres
Airport ownership Private Mostly governmental
Airport congestion Lower Very high
ATC facilities problems Low Very high
Strength of labour unions Low Medium
Strength of labour laws Low Very high
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TABLE 6.2: Tbe Ownership of M^jor European Communities Airlines in 15188.
Airline Stake in company 
<%)
Participation in other airlines 
(%)
Aer Lingus government (100) Aer Turas Toeranta (msg.) 
Air Charter (80)
Air France government (100) Air Inter (36)
Air Guadeloupe (45)
Euskal Air-via Air Charter 
(29)
Alitalia government (67)
private (33) British Caledonian (100)
British Airways private (100) British Airtours (100)




Iberia NLM Cityhopper (100)
KLM government (100) Netheriines (100)
government (36.9) Air UK (14.9)
private (63.1) Condor (100) 
DLT (40) 
Cargolux (24.5)








Olympic AW Greenlandair (25)
Sabena government (100) Wideroe (22)








* Including that of other Scandinavian governments.
Source: Kenneth Button, Airline Deregulation, p.88.
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By passenger yield By passenger load 
factor
1. British Airways 7 2
2. Lufthansa 3 6
3. Air France 4 5
4. SAS 2 8
5. Iberia 8 1
6. Swissair 1 7
7. Alitalia 5 4
8. KLM 6 3
Note: Based on 1990 Data
Source: Louis Gialloreto, Tbe Avmark Aviation Economist, January 15192. p.19.
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FIGURE 6.1: LT.Chariers In Europe
I.T. CHARTERS IN EUROPE
International passenger-kilometres 
performed within ECAC Europe 1977-88









o f  w h ich :
BY SCHEDULED MODE —
20
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Sourer* Association of European Airlines
Source: Wheatcroft and Iipman, 1990. p.139.
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THE FEASIBILITY MODEL OF AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALISATION IN THE
GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL
H ie feasibility model of air transport liberalisation in the GCC models and researches 
the GCC domestic market through traffic demand, new routes, fleet planning and 
aircraft selection, financial analysis and scheduling on a possible new network. This 
part provides the main answer to the question of the feasibility of liberalisation in the 
GCC from an airline operation perspective.
H ie feasibility model figure illustrates the basic framework of the model and the process 
of its m^jor structure and development. The model answers the following main 
questions which are directly essential and important for establishing the feasibility of air 
transportation in the GCC:
1. Is domestic passenger demand large enough to support a liberalised air transport 
market?
2. Which types of aircraft could serve the GCC market according to total costs and
quality of service?
3. Are there new potential routes?
4. Are the new routes commercially attractive to new carriers to operate them?
5. What is the form of an operational network?
The feasibility model can examine the possibility of successful liberalisation in the GCC, 
capable of simulating the prospects for carriers’ operations as in real situations. In 
addition, this quantitative feasibility model is based on fundamental theories, justifiable 
assumptions and is statistically valid.
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7.1. FORECASTING IN GENERAL
Forecasting is one of the most challenging topics faced by human beings and has been 
so for thousands of years. It is as old as mankind. Predicting the future Is one of the 
miracles featured in most practised religions and prediction (or prophesy) is one of the 
criteria which make some people believe in than. There are some arguments about 
whether forecasting is a science, art, magic, or logic.
This chapter explains the main problems of forecasting in a real situation and identifies 
those techniques most appropriate for use in examining traffic flows in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).
Forecast can be defined as "A process of estimating a future event by casting forward 
past data. The past data are systematically combined in a predetermined way to obtain 
the estimate of the future'1.1 However, a prediction can be defined as, "A process of 
estimating a future event based on subjective considerations other than just past data".2
The modem scientific foundations of the field of forecasting were laid in the 1930s. The 
following which date back over a century, however, were instrumental to all subsequent 
work3:
1. The least squares estimation by Gauss and Legendre (Abbe, 1871).
2. Hidden periodicities by Schuster (1906).
3. The development of autoregression by Yale (1927).
4. Moving average models by Slusky (1937).
5. Decomposition of time series by McLanley (1930).
6. The application regression techniques to real life data by Galton (1877); Pearson 
(1896); Snedecor (1937).
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Forecasting is an important process in social, economic, and technological planning. 
Forecasting does not only decide where, when, and how billions of dollars will be spent, 
but also establishes and commits national policies and regulations far into the future. 
At the same time, there is no forecast that is a 100 percent free of errors, and it is very 
difficult to know how to judge the reliability of forecasts. Was it possible to predict the 
price of a barrel oil could increase from $2 in 1973 to $39 in 1979?
Forecasting provides a range of possible future scenarios which are conditional upon the 
policy enacted. So, there is no single future, but several possible futures which are 
supported by social, political and economic leverages. Planning for the future is no 
longer just desirable but essential.
The following are the main correlations of forecast accuracy4:
1. The most important factor in forecasting is its time horizon.
2. Different results are acquired by different institutional scenes or projection 
effects, primarily in relation to systematic biases rather than absolute accuracy.
3. The choice of methodology in implementation is not linked to differences in 
accuracy.
4. Forecasts which are less accurate than others might suffer from the following:
■ They are based on old information, or
■ They have been influenced by dominant events in the development of the
trend in a way not completely anticipated by the forecaster.
5. Mathematical methods with correlation to official measured economy.
7.1.1. Forecasting Perspectives
There are many forms of forecasts, nevertheless, the rest of this section will concentrate 




All forecasts usually Include technological components such as communication, energy, 
transportation, weaponry, agriculture, and other fields. So, it is important to define 
technological forecasts (TF) which focus primarily on the changes in technology rather 
than efforts to estimate other types of trends even if they include a technological change. 
The term TF came into prominence in the early 1960s, and it was appreciated and took 
its lead from the US government through its funding of m^jor projects.5 Marvin Cetron 
expressed his conception about TF with the general statement, "Future technical 
possibilities are not hard to project, but forecasters find their most difficult job is 
getting planners to use the predictions effectively".5
There are three main problems facing the appraiser of TF which are listed below:
1. Few specific technologies have captured attention as much as transportation, 
energy, population, warfighting and economics.
2. Few independent forecast were made to allow good comparisons.
3. Most TF predictions have yet to reach reality. Therefore, accuracy could not be 
tested using the benefit of hindsight. As a result, concentration has focused on 
nuclear energy and the development of computer capabilities.
7.1.2. Transportation Forecasting
Transportation forecasters usually search for more basic economic, social, and 
technological clues for predicting the future which would include great variability in 
transportation forms such as air, sea, or land and in the configuration of individual or 
mass transport. Gershuny suggested in relation to transport projections that "We must 
not think of the future, but of the alternative possible futures".7
Transportation forecasting is a complex task because of its derivatives, and they are 
usually required to perform many more operations than other types of forecasting to 
transform core assumptions on basic trends into projections. There are two technical 
problems arising from transportation plans which are listed below5:
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1. They are often expressed in terms of their usefulness for policy-makers, but are 
not consistent with official statistics available for evaluating the forecasts.
2. They focus on somewhat different trends even overlapping ones. Forecasting 
may have the effect of "fixing the future" for two different reasons’:
■ The continual complication of forecasting methods. The difficulty could 
result from complexity of the social system and the models themselves. On 
the other hand, the complexity might be intentional on behalf of the 
forecaster to hide, mystify or disguise his assumptions and methods.
■ The exclusion of specific policy options and other alternatives from 
consideration. For example, if in the context of circumstances in a road 
building programme are excluded in traffic forecast making the projection 
relatively conditional instead of unconditional. Figure 7.1. pictures the 
process of "fixing the future" for a road building project.
It has traditionally been difficult to make air transport forecasts accurate and reliable.
The following are some characteristics which have to be taken into account when
considering passenger forecasting demand models19:
1. Mathematical models could follow rules or procedures that represent only some 
important aspects of a real process.
2. They translate from individuals to the aggregate actions of people.
3. Travel decision by people include psychological inputs such as where, when, how 
to go which are extremely hard to distinguish.
4. The data base is often bad.
5. The model is frequently applied to some cases not representative of the data base.
6. The investigator should have judgement skills besides mathematical proficiency. 
Makridakis,11 listed the advantages and disadvantages of both statistical and 
judgement forecasting methods in Table 7.1.
7. Overall, until investigators are able to collect a big enough data base, the 




Energy forecasting is a very difficult task that has become a mixture of science, art, and 
politics especially after the electricity shortage in the beginning of 1960s, the oil crisis 
and gas shortages, the chronic problem of energy related to pollution and the Chernobyl 
accident in 1987. However, energy forecasting and modelling became a competent 
industry after the oil crisis of 15173-74. It is influenced by economic interests, Ideological 
bias, and political needs at all level of the modelling process starting from estimation of 
the parameters and the utilisation of the results. Politics has become a big part of this 
modelling process, eventually, making the usage of energy forecasts mostly for political 
and institutional purposes.
The International Institute for Applied System Analysis (HASA) researched a world 
energy model which began in 1973 and took seven to eight years, 225 person-years of 
effort to complete, and cost approximately $10 million. The HASA model is widely 
considered as the most comprehensive, and it has achieved recognisable impact. It 
combined mathematics, scenario, and judgement to analyse over a fifty-year period of 
the possible transition in world energy system. The followings are the main criticisms 
of the HASA model12:
1. Lack of recognition of diverse levels of decision making.
2. Lack of recognition of decentralized methods of deciding on energy supply.
3. Keepin and Wynne criticised the method with the following terms," ...the models 
are analytically empty, have had no real iteration or sensitivity analysis, and 
when so tested are extremely brittle to minor changes in important variables".13
7.2 OTHER ASPECTS OF FORECASTING
Forecasting has very extensive utilisation. However, the following are some of the main 
abuses of forecasting14:
1. Most projections are of one interest or another, serve a single interest, and by 
supporting these interests they either try to change the world in some way or
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preserve It from certain changes. So, images of the forecast tend to be presented 
in ways that serve certain benefits.
2. The exigency for value changes. Mesarovk and Pfestel stated, "Man must be 
ready to trade benefits to the next generation for the benefits to himself".15 
Therefore, one of the immediate purposes of the exercise is to Influence public 
values and attitudes.
3. Sam Col supported an argument that projections could be used as propaganda, 
"Suggested changes in value systems are often associated with proposals for or 
against the reform of political structure".15
4. Most predictions might be considered solely advertising accomplishments to 
promote specific political, commercial enterprise or other more personal 
interests. Wink E. commented about that controversy that the elected politician 
perceives his planning as not a long term. His policies should show effects during 
his period of control, especially if he should seek to be reelected, etc. All these 
factors might reflect in the forecast he selects or uses17.
5. All forecasters aim to influence public and official perspective, and the ones who 
work outside official agencies are vulnerable to exaggeration and to jumping to 
overstatements. Mesarovic and Pesal argue that "People will not grasp danger 
unless personally and seriously affected".1*
6. Confusion is intended and encouraged on purpose to some extent to discredit 
other forecasts or to promote their own.
7. Many authors demand a dramatic institutional changes. Herman Khan for 
instance, suggested that a great relaxation of government control of private 
enterprise is needed, at the same time, others lobbied for a considerable increase.
8. There are two methods in which forecasting relate to policy:
■ Service to the present policy makers (Blackaby, F.).
■ Service to the broader debate about policy goals and objectives.
The following points should be considered in relation to the use of complex mathematical 
models:
140
1. Complex mathematical models are used more and more, but believed less and 
less15.
2. "...the whole point about models is their formalism, which should allow 
mathematically rigorous consistency, discrimination, and testability to be 
achieved, to the benefit of policy".20
3. " Formal models are first, testable, and second, documented, so that the 
assumption are clear and you can examine the data being used".21
4. "Models should be designed for insight and understanding22".
The following list displays the main issues of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
independent projections in comparison with in-house work23:
1. The following are the main advantages:
■ Increasing the need for the independent plans to expose a wider discussion 
and to provide pluralism in forecasting.
■ Formulated by individuals or group who may have no direct political 
power and interests.
■ In-house forecasting may lead to what Gershuny believes to be " fixing the 
future".
2. The following are the main disadvantages:
■ One-sided independent forecasts should be balanced with or corrected 
with others.
■ They may reflect a certain degree of irresponsibility and or lack of data.
■ In-house forecasting may reduce uncertainty in the policy makers minds 
about the future.
■ In-house staff gain less expertise in thinking about assumptions and 
conditions.
M akridakis suggests some issues that should not be attempted in forecasting for specified 
reasons listed in Table 7 2 .
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7.2. AIR TRANSPORT FORECASTING
Forecasting is an important task for the civil aviation industry where the researcher 
utilizes it as an analytical process which involves economic theories, statistics and 
mathematics. At an industiy wide level it should involve technological forecasting, 
transportation forecasting and energy forecasting.
In the past, air transport forecasting has usually ignored external constraints. However, 
for the users as airlines, airports, manufacturers, and governmental authorities 
forecasting is only a tool to be used for a specific task given infrastructure, technical 
and financial constraints.
Traffic forecasting is one of the most critical areas of air transport planning and 
management because every decision taken within an airline flows from ft. However, 
forecasting is a process in which mistakes are very often made, and there is no absolute 
truth nor optimum method which is 100 percent error free. There are advantages and 
disadvantages for each technique of forecasting, but none of them can provide 
consistent accuracy. At the same time, forecasts should be made since many decisions 
stem from them.
A simple way to go bankrupt is to develop a rigid, fixed plan and then follow it. The 
implication is that the plan should be able to deal with changing conditions. The airline 
industiy is more complicated than most others because of the regulatory nature of the 
industiy where it is not completely free nor fully regulated. Another reason for Its 
complexity is that it must deal with economic variables which often are perplexing.
A forecast’s time horizon could be summarized as the following:
1. Short term traffic forecast: From 1 to 18 months or so. They are for planning 
operations and budgeting such as scheduling process which include flights, crew, 
maintenance, advertising and sales campaigns.
2. Medium term traffic forecast: From 2 to 5 years. They are for forecasts such as 
opening up new routes, planning marketing policy and investment in new
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maintenance facilities.
3. Long term traffic forecasting: From five years and oyer. Such forecasts are for 
airport building, aircraft construction and fleet planning.
Table 7 3  analyses areas and aspects that can andean not be forecasted and implications 
involved under different time horizons.
There are many factors that influence the passenger’s choice to travel by air, and they 





5. Quality of service which probably include the following:
■ Frequency of service.
■ Quality of in-cabin and on-ground services.
■ Block travel time.
■ Time of departure and arrival.
■ Type of aircraft.
■ Number of stops.
6. Biased advise.
7. Customer loyalty programmes.
7.4 FACTORS INVOLVED IN FORECASTING DEMAND
7.4.1 Use of Forecasting
Forecasting is a very essential instrument for planning and marketing development in 
the air transportation industry, however, forecasting in general is important for the 
following reasons:
1. Planning company resources, priorities and efforts.
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2. Seeking market opportunities and knowing the relevant parameters which
influence the market development in the future.
3. Projecting a reliable picture of the traffic development for the future with
consideration of quantity and structure.
4. Controlling performance and efficiency.
5. Preparing contingency plans.
7.4.2. Purpose O f Forecasting
Due to the planning horizon for the decision makers, forecasting can be classified as 
the following24:
1. Infrastructure Planning which are listed below:
■ Short Term Forecasting
Modifying within the existing terminal and buildings.
Handling new traffic procedures.
■ Medium Term Forecasting
Extension of runway system and terminal area at the airports. 
Planning new hangers, parking areas, and public transport.
■ Long Term Forecasting
Planning new airports and new airports buildings.
Revision of airway system.
2. Air Traffic Operation
■ Short term traffic which are listed below:
Planning airline budgeting, scheduling, marketing development, 
and pricing policy.
Planning airport operators’ budgeting and aircraft manufactures’ 
deliveries.
■ Medium Term Forecasting
Planning new routes, aircraft requirement, workshops and 
hangers.
Forecasting aircraft manufactures’ production plan.
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■ Long Term Forecasting
Determining the environmental influences of air traffic. 
Forecasting the future of air traffic control capacity, noise 
carpets, and performance requirements of future aircraft.
AD the above subjects are the main sectors of and purposes of forecasting in air 
transport, however, there are others that were not included. It should be considered 
that particularly for marketing development forecast, a view of the total travel market 
including all means of transportation beside air transport may be needed.
7.4.3 Forecast results
There are many techniques for forecasting, but choosing the right one depends on the 
following:
1. The purpose of the forecast and what exactly is being forecast.
2. The availability of the resources and data.
3. The precision required, the time horizon and the risk of operating upon the 
forecast results.
4. The scale of the results required.
Eveiy organization require different results. Airlines may be more interested in 
passenger-Kms, on the other hand, passenger numbers will be of more interest to 
airports. Overall, a forecast might need to provide a combination of results, including 
volume, rate of change, a market share, timescale, probability, assumption and 
sensitivity.
The scale of the results is related to the type and purpose of forecasting required which 
includes the following:
1. Global traffic growth on an existing route, specific market, or geographical area
with the assumption of conditions.
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2. The share of a particular airline or an airport of the global traffic, considering 
the competitive environments.
3. Forecast of segmental demand and entirely new markets.
4. Responsiveness of traffic to changes such as fares, aircraft type, frequency, 
airport pricing policy, or the change of the government on entry and exit 
regulations.
7.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING DEMAND
There are many variables which have been researched by analysts to explain the demand
for air transport. Demand factors are generally categorised into two main groups which
are socioeconomic and transport factors.
7.5.1 Socioeconomic factors
They are known as exogenous factors because they are determined independently of the
transport process which include the following:
1. INCOME : It is the key element considered by economists. It is measured by 
statistics such as GNP, GDP, National Income and National Income per head, 
Personal Income, Personal Disposal Income and Corporate Profits before taxes. 
In the case of leisure travel, the Survey Research Centre Of The University Of 
Michigan25, found that the higher the family income, the higher is the 
percentage spent on travel. On the other hand, business travel demand is not 
sensitive to personal income but depends on GNP, imports, exports, level of 
investment abroad and industiy structure. It increases when an economy expands 
and decreases when an economy recesses.
2. OCCUPATION: This is a good indicator of income levels. Travellers with higher 
level occupations are usually more educated, earn higher incomes, and belong to 
higher social classes.
3. EDUCATION : Educated people have the desire to know about new things and 
new places which make them potential travellers. According to the USA National 
Travel Survey25, 66 percent of the adult passengers over the North Atlantic had 
some college education, and 94 percent of them had high school training.
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4. SOCIAL STRUCTURE: Many studies found that the life cycle, family structure 
and conformism have influences on air travel. As researched by Taneja^, the 
likelihood of travel is influenced by the social class of the traveller.
5. POPULATION : Travel volume is directly proportional to the size of the 
population, and the demand for air travel increases in proportion to population 
growth.
6. POLITICAL FACTORS : They have strong influence on air travel through 
government regulations such as visas and permits, political crisis, wars and 
strikes.
7. COST OF LIVING : The relationship between the price of goods and services 
in one country versus another is an explaining factor of specific market growth. 
This can be influenced by exchange rate.
8. INTERSPATTAL RELATIONSHIPS : Bojorkman derived a conclusion in his 
study that a correlation exists between scheduled air passenger traffic and telex 
traffic (See Figure 1 3  )a . Brown and Watkind took the number of long 
distance telephone calls as a proxy for community of interest29.
9. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS : Leisure traffic is influenced by climate and 
landscape.
7.5.2 Transport factors
These are known also as endogenous factors because they are determined by the 
transport service itself. They generally respond to the simple economic law that the 
demand increases when the price is low, and It decreases when the price is high. So 
in general, the demand for travelling will increase when prices decrease.
According to R.Simpson’s theory39 of USA domestic airline economics, so-called 
generalised travel costs, take into account all costs in addition to the fare, and cover the 
following:
1. Total trip time.
2. Trip reliability.






This method is based upon the experience of the analyst/forecaster. The more experience 
the forecaster has in the matter to be forecast, the more accurate is the technique. 
Overall, this approach is basically subjective, crude and unscientific. On the other 
hand, this technique is one of the most widely used. Table 7.5 describes the common 
biases in judgemental forecasting and proposes ways to reduce their negative impact. 
The more long-term the forecast is, the more it will prove inadequate. However, this 
approach is useful for the following reasons:
1. Cases where no relevant data exists.
2 . Cases when forecasting new market penetration.
3. The forecaster might know extraneous factors which other techniques would not 
pick up.
4. It is quick.
5. It can be cheap.
6. It is confidential.
7.6.1.2 Delphi Technique
This method is often used to overcome the subjective weaknesses of executive 
judgement. The process of this technique is usually done in two steps. First, a selected 
group of experts are given a questionnaire and asked to give their forecasts of growth 
in a market or region. Sometimes they are asked for their opinion on influencing factors 
such as fuel prices, technology or political development. This is consolidated and the 
composite response returned to all the contributors who wish to revise their original 
forecast of what other experts forecast. From the second round of consultation, an 
agreed forecast can be taken. The Delphi technique is usually not suitable for individual 
route forecasts as much as for regional or market growth. IATA use the Delphi 
technique for their regional forecast.
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7.6.1.3 Market Research
This technique includes surveys of passengers, travel agents and business houses. In 
addition,it analyses of trade flows, and other business factors. It also involves studies 
of hotels, tourism facilities and fashions. The market research technique is useful for 
the following reasons:
1. Understanding the variation between the demand for air transport and different 
sectors of population.
2. Forecasting new routes or routes from developing countries where past traffic 
data is not enough or does not exist.
3. Forecasting demand (market share) for the airlines with different supply 
(product or price) conditions.
7.6.2 Time Series Forecasting
They are also known as trend models which are based on the assumption that what 
happened in the past will occur in the future. Although they assume that the internal 
changes in structure of the traffic will not affect the total traffic. This technique usually 
uses either linear trend, which suggests constant increase of traffic with each unit of 
time, or a declining percentage growth each year. The formula for the linear or straight 
line is given as31:
Rn =  R a ( l  +  b * t )
Where Rn Traffic volume at year (n)
Ra Actual traffic
b Average annual growth
t Forecast period in years
The other technique is exponential which suggests traffic grows by a constant percentage 
each year, having in consideration, the growth of every year in absolute term is higher 
than the one for the previous year. The equation which used for the exponential 
curve is expressed as32:
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Rn =  Ra (1  +  b T  t
There are other more sophisticated time series analyses such as Box Jenkins, Spectral 
and the S-shaped logistic trend. Time series techniques are best used for forecasting on 
actual routes and for the short term projections where reasonably accurate data can be 
achieved. However, the following are some of the disadvantages of this method:
1. Considering time as the only variable that affects traffic growth.
2. Depending on the assumption of "What occurred in the past would occur in the
future," and ignoring the reasoning of the occurrences such as why it happened. 
At the same time, that assumption may be critical as we are living in a very 
changing world with changing attitudes, evolutions, economics, regulation and 
politics.
3. Ignores resources or logistical constraints.
H ie typical time series methods would include the following:
1. Exponential Forecasts
■ Average rate of growth
■ Moving average annual rate
■ Exponential smoothing
2. lin ear Trend Projections
■ Simple tend linear
■ Moving average trend
7.6.3 Causal Models
Causal models develop mathematical relationship between demand and the factors which 
influence it such as time, economics, supply or social changes. The process of the causal 
models is usually done by the following:
1. Identifying and selecting the independent variables which would lead to the
dependent variables.
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2. Determining the functional relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables and identifying the model to be used.
3. Calibrating and testing the mathematical expression of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables.
Causal analysis include a complex calculation in the form of regression models/multi 
variant analyses. However, most econometric forecasts of air traffic tend to use simple 
or multi regression models.
Causal forecasting has an advantage of being logical. Although logic and mathematics 
are inherent in this model, judgement is involved at all stages. The following are some 
of the weaknesses of the causal model:
1. Dependant on historical data and accurate statistics for the past many years.
In the case of third world countries, adequate data is often either unavailable or 
may be unreliable.
2. Using logic in this approach, the forecaster transposes his problem in to one
where he has to use somebody else’s forecast for the independent variables or
making his own in a situation where they are not available.
3. The frequent assumption of market homogeneity and using the average values 
that are influenced by the arbitrary choice of component such as income, fare 
or inflation.
Gravity models were developed in the 151th century by analogy with Newton’s gravity 
equation. This model assumes that travel demand between two cities Is directly 
proportional to the product of the two populations and inversely proportional to the 
square of the distance between them. However, this has been modified to include fare 
or time rather than distance. More detailed explanation of gravity models will be 
included in section 8.5.1.
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7.6.4 Simulation/System Dynamics
These methods are based on the process of developing and building up a complex 
computer-based model to simulate the demand under different interacting factors. 
Such a model is largely used by big airlines or manufacturers to simulate fleet 
planning, scheduling, traffic and resource allocation. It has the advantage of being 
able to simulate the interaction of supply and demand.
7.6.5 Scenario Approach
It is a combination of judgemental techniques with econometric modelling in a series 
of possible future "scenarios" where it could be used to develop a forecast.
7.7 SELECTING A MODEL
It is obvious that there is no forecasting technique that can guarantee the accuracy of 
its prediction. However, in evaluating or starting any model, one should determine 
the purpose of the forecast (see Table 7.5) and comprehend the different empirical 
types, methods and time horizons of forecasting as they are Illustrated in Table 7.6 and 
Table 7.7. The ICAO approach of building a model include the following33:
1. Selecting relevant causal factors
2. Collecting data over an appropriate time
3. Identifying the relationship between the dependent and independent variables
4. Evaluating the proposed form of the statistics
5. Forecasting the independent variables which will lead to the dependent variables. 
According to Taneja, a model validity should have the following guide-lines34:
1. The model should be based upon a fundamental theory.
2. Its specification should be dynamic reflecting the time difference between a
change in the independent variable and the response of the dependent variable.
3. The assumption should be justifiable.
4. The model and the calibration must be statistically valid.
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7.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
Bearing in mind all the points made in this chapter, it was decided that the most
appropriate forecasting model for use in the thesis was the Gravity Model for the
following reasons:
1. One of the objectives of the feasibility model is to forecast the demand on new 
routes where gravity model is considered to be good at that specific type of 
forecasting.
2. The gravity model is based on a fundamental theory, justifiable assumptions and 
is statistically valid.
3. It is simple to use and apply where simple, automatic and inexpensive forecasting 
methods produce realistic forecasts.
4. Empirical evidence has shown that the gains in accuracy of sophisticated methods 
are usually small. Furthermore, complexity or statistical sophistication does not 
seem to improve forecasting accuracy.
The gravity model characteristics and the application of the technique to the GCC
market are explained in the next chapter.
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FIGURE 7.1: Fixing The Future For A Road Building Programme.
CAR FORECASTS
VALIDATESSUPPORT
ROAD-BUILDING .VEHICLE—USE*  ENCOURAGES
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FIGURE 7.2: Number Of Departing International AirPassengers By Country Versus 
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TABLE 7.2. The Do and Do Not of Forecasting
If large forecasting errors, or other 
problems exist, do not attempt to solve 




Using more sophisticated methods
Subscribing to more expensive 
newsletters, or several forecasting 
services
Assuming that present economic 
conditions will continue for ever
Dealing with planning and strategy will 
be even more problematic if no formal 
forecasting is done.
People do not necessarily produce more 
accurate forecasts than methods. At the 
same time, their forecasts are usually 
more expensive.
Empirical evidence has shown that 
gains in accuracy from sophisticated 
methods are usually small.
Empirical evidence has shown that 
forecasting accuracy is not improved by 
buying more expensive forecasts.
Histoiy has shown that cyclical factors 
have always influenced business and 
economic series.
Source: Makridakis, S. "The Art and Science of Forecasting: Assessment and Future 
Directions."
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TABLE 7.4. Common Biases in Judgemental Forecasting and
Proposed Ways of Reducing their Negative Impact.
T y p e  o f  B i a s D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  B i a s Wa y s  o f  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
n e g a t i v e  i m p a c t  o f  b i a s
O p t i m i s m ,  w i s h f u l  
t h i n k i n g
P e o p l e ' s  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  
f u t u r e  o u t c o m e s  a f f e c t  t h e i r  
f o r e c a s t  o f  s u c h  o u t c o m e s
-  H a v e  t h e  f o r e c a s t s  ma d e  
b y  a  t h i r d ,  u n i n t e r e s t e d  
p a  r  t  y .
-  H a v e  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  p e r s o n  
i n d e p e n d e n t l y  m a k e  t h e
f o  r e c a s t s
I n c o n s i  s t e n c y I n a b i l i t y  t o  a p p l y  t h e  s a m e  
d e c i s i o n  c r i t e r i a  i n  s i m i l a r  
s  i t u a t  i o n s
-  F o r m a l i z e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
m a k i n g  p r o c e s s
-  C r e a t e  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  
r u l e s  t o  b e  f o l l o w e d .
R e c e n c y T h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  m o s t  
r e c e n t  e v e n t s  d o m i n a t e s  
t h o s e  i n  t h e  l e s s  r e c e n t  
p a s t  w h i c h  a r e  d o w n g r a d e d  o r  
i g n o r e d
-  R e a l i z e  t h a t  c y c l e s  e x i s t  
a n d  t h a t  n o t  a l 1 u p s  a n d  
d o w n s  a r e  p e r m a n e n t
-  C o n s i d e r  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  
e v e n t  o f  i n t e r e s t .
A v a i 1 a b i 1 i t y E a s e  w i t h  w h i c h  s p e c i f i c  
e v e n t s  c a n  b e  r e c a l l e d  f r o m  
memo r y
-  P r e s e n t  c o m p l e t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n
-  P r e s e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  a  
wa y  t h a t  p o i n t s  o u t  a l l  
s i d e s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n s  b e  
c o n s i  d e r e d
A n c h o  r i n g P r e d i c t i o n s  a r e  u n d u l y  
i n f l u e n c e d  b y  i n i t i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  i s  g i v e n  
m o r e  w e i g h t  w h i l e  
f o r e c a s t i n g >
-  S t a r t  w i t h  o b j e c t i v e  
f o r e c a s t s
-  As k  p e o p l e  t o  f o r e c a s t  i n  
t e r m s  c h a n g e s  f r o m  
s t a t i s t i c a l  o n e s  a n d  d e m a n d  
t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  d o i n g  s o
1 1 1 u s o  r y  
c o r r e l a t i  o n s
B e l i e f  t h a t  p a t t e r n s  e x i s t  
a n d / o r  t w o  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
c a u s a l l y  r e l a t e d  w h e n  i t  i s  
n o t  t r u e
-  V e r i f y  s t a t i s t i c a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  p a t t e r n s
-  M o d e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i f  
p o s s i b l e ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  
c h a n g e s
C o n s e r v a t i  sm F a i l u r e  t o  c h a n g e  ( o r  
c h a n g i n g  s l o w l y )  o n e ' s  own 
m i n d  i n  l i g h t  o f  n e w 
i n f o r m a t i o n / e v i d e n c e
-  M o n i t o r  s y s t e m a t i c  
c h a n g e s  a n d  b u i l d  
p r o c e d u r e s  t o  t a k e  a c t i o n s  
w h e n  s y s t e m a t i c  c h a n g e s  a r e  
i d e n t i f i e d
S e l e c t i  v e  
p e r c e p t  i o n
P e o p l e  t e n d  t o  s e e  p r o b l e m s  
i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  own 
b a c k g r o u n d  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e
-  As k  p e o p l e  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  
b a c k g r o u n d s  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  
t o  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  p r e p a r e  
t h e  f o r e c a s t s
R e g r e s s i o n  e f f e c t s P e r s i s t e n t  i n c r e a s e s  o r  
d e c r e a s e s  m i g h t  b e  d u e  t o  
r a n d o m  r e a s o n s  w h i c h ,  i f  
t r u e ,  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
c h a n c e  o f  a  c h a n g e  i n  t r e n d .
-  E x p l a i n  t h a t  w h e n  e r r o r s  
a r e  r a n d o m  t h e  c h a n g e s  o f  a  
n e g a t i v e  e r r o r  i n c r e a s e s  
w h e n  s e v e r a l  p o s i t i v e  o n e s  
h a v e  o c c u r r e d .
Sources Makridakis, S. "Me taf or ecas tings Ways of Improving 
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TABLE 7.6: Comparisons of Different Methods of Forecasting
T y p e  o f  
f i n d i n g s S u m m a r y  o f  R e s u l t s R e f e r e n c e s
J u d g m e n t s  1 
V e r s u s
Q u a n t i  t a t i  v e  
F o r e c a s t i n g
J u d g m e n t a l  f o r e c a s t s  a r e  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  m o r e  a c c u r a t e  t h a n  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  o n e s .  An e x c e p t i o n  
i s  t h e  f o r e c a s t i n g  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
e a r n i n g s  w h e r e  a n a l y s t s  do 
b e t t e r  t h a n  m o d e l s  i n  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  p u b l i s h e d  s t u d i e s
Da we s  ( 1 9 8 6  ) ;
G o l d b e r g  ( 1 9 7 0 )
H o g a r t h  a n d  M a k r i d a k i s  
( 1 9 8 1 ) ;
A r m s t r o n g  ( 1 9 8 3 )
E c o n o m e t r i  c
V e r s u s
T i me Se  r i e s  
M e t h o d s
E c o n o m e t r i c  m o d e l s  a r e  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  m o r e  a c c u r a t e  t h a n  
t i m e  s e r i e s  ( e x t r a p o l a t i v e )  
m o d e l s .  I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  
o r  n o t  e c o n o m e t r i c  m o d e l s  a r e  
m o r e  a c c u r a t e  f o r  l o n g e r  t e r m  
f o r e c a s t i n g  h o r i z o n s  w h i l e  t i m e  
s e r i e s  m e t h o d s  f o r  s h o r t  t e r m .
N e l s o n  ( 1 9 7 2  ) ; 
N a y l o r  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ;  
A r m s t r o n g  ( 1 9  7 8 )
C o m p l e x  o r  
S o p h i  s t i  c a t e d
V e r s u s
S i m p l e r  M o d e l s
C o m p l e x i t y  o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  s e e m  t o  
i m p r o v e  p o s t  s a m p l e  f o r e c a s t i n g  
a c c u r a c y
A r m s t r o n g  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  
M a k r i d a k i s  a n d  H i b o n  
( 1 9 7 9 ) ;
M a k r i d a k i s  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 2 )  
E i h o r n  & H o g a r t h  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  
A r m s t r o n g  ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
M o r e  D a t a  o r  
I n f o r m a t i  o n
V e r s u s
L e s s  D a t a  o r  
I n f o r m a t i  o n
L a r g e r  s a m p l e  s i z e  d o e s  n o t  
i m p r o v e  p o s t - s a m p l e  f o r e c a s t i n g  
a c c u r a c y .  M o r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  d o e s  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i m p r o v e  
p r e d i c t i v e  a c c u r a c y .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  
i n c r e a s e s  o n e ' s  c o n f i d e n c e  o f  
t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  
p r e d i  c t i  o n s .
S l o v i c  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ;
O s k a m p  ( 1 9 6 5 )  ;
A l p e r t  a n d  R a i f a  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
B e s t  M e t h o d  o f  
F o r e c a s t e r
V e r s u s  
Co mb i  n i ng
No f o r e c a s t i n g  m e t h o d  o r  
f o r e c a s t e r  h a s  b e e n  f o u n d  t o  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  o u t - p e r f o r m  o t h e r s .  
I n s t e a d  i t  h a s  b e e n  s h o w n  t h a t  
c o m b i n i n g  t h e  f o r e c a s t s  o f  
m e t h o d s  o r  p e o p l e  i n c r e a s e s  
f o r e c a s t i n g  a c c u r a c y  a n d  
o u t p e r f o r m s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
m e t h o d s  o r  f o r e c a s t e r s .
N e w b o l d  & G r a n g e r  
( 1 9 7 4 ) ;
M a k r i d a k i s  a n d  W i n k l e r  
( 1 9 8 3 ) ;
Ma h mo u d  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ;  
Z a r n o w i t z  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ;  
S c h n a a r s  ( 1 9 8 6  ) .
L e a s t  S q u a r e s  
Ve r s u s
D i s c o u n t e d  
L e a s t  S q u a r e s
F o r e c a s t i n g  m e t h o d s  u t i l i s i n g  
t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  
m e t h o d  o f  e s t i m a t i o n  ( g i v i n g  
m o r e  w e i g h t  t o  m o r e  r e c e n t  
o b s e r v a t i o n s )  o u t p e r f o r m s  l e a s t  
s q u a r e  m e t h o d s  ( g i v i n g  e q u a l  
w e i g h t  t o  a l l  o b s e r v a t i o n s ) .
M a k r i d a k i s  a n d  H i b o n  
( 1 9 7 9 ) ;
M a k r i d a k i s  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
TABLE 7.6: Comparisons of Different Methods of Forecasting 
(continued).
T y p e  o f  
f i n d i n g s S u m m a r y  o f  R e s u l t s R e f e r e n c e s
F i x e d  P a r a m e t e r
V e r s u s
A d a p t  i v e  
M e t h o d s
F i x e d  p a r a m e t e r  a n d / o r  m o d e l  
m e t h o d s  o u t - p e r f o r m  a d a p t i v e  
o n e s .
G a r d n e r  a n d  D a n n e n b r i n g  
( 1 9 8 0 ) ;
M a k r i d a k i s  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
A g g r e g a t e
V e r s u s
Di  s a g g  r e g a t e  
S e r i e s
T h e  l e s s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
a g g r e g a t i o n  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  r a n d o m n e s s  ( n o i s e )  a n d  t h e  
b e t t e r  t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  s i m p l e r  
m e t h o d s .
M a k r i d a k i s  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ;  
S c h n a a  r s  ( 1 9 8 6  ) .
F o r e c a s t i n g  
E r r o r s  b e f o r e  
1 9 7 3
V e r s u s
A f t e r  1 9 7 3
No d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  s i z e  o f  
f o r e c a s t i n g  e r r o r s  b e f o r e  a n d  
a f t e r  1 9 7 3  w e r e  f o u n d
D a u b  & P e t e r s o n  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ;  
D a u b  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ;
M a k r i d a k i s  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
L i n e a r
V e r s u s
N o n - L i  n e a r  
A c c u  r a c y  
M e a s u  r e s
T h e  r e l a t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  
f o r e c a s t i n g  m e t h o d s  v a r i e s  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  t y p e  o f  
a c c u r a c y  m e a s u r e  ( l o s s  f u n c t i o n )  
e m p l o y e d .
S h o  r t
V e r s u s
L o n g
Fo r e c a s t  i n g  
H o r  i z o n s
T h e  r e l a t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  
f o r e c a s t i n g  m e t h o d s  v a r i e s  
d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  
f o r e c a s t i n g  h o r i z o n .  F o r  l o n g e r  
h o r i z o n s  m e t h o d s  w h i c h  d a m p e n  
t h e  t r e n d  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  
o u t p e r f o r m s  m e t h o d s  w h i c h  d o  
n o t .
M a k r i d a k i s  a n d  H i b o n  
( 1 9 7 9 ) ;
M a k r i d a k i s  e t  a l  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ;  
S c h n a a r s  ( 1 9 8 6  ) .
Source: Makridakis, S. "The Art and Science of Forecasting Assessment and Future Directions".
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TABLE 7.7 Major Empirical Evidence and Its Implications
Major findings Empirical Evidence Implications
1 .  S i m p l e  m e t h o d s
2 .  S e a s o n s  1 i t y
3 .  C o m b i n i n g
4 .  S h o r t  v e r s u s  
l o n g  t e r m
5 .  D a m p e n i n g  t h e  
t r e n d
S i m p l e ,  a u t o m a t i c  a n d  
i n e x p e n s i v e  m e t h o d s  g i v e  
r e a l i s t i c  f o r e c a s t s
S e a s o n a l i t y  c a n  b e  
p r e d i c t e d  a c c u r a t e l y  n o  
m a t t e r  w h a t  a p p r o a c h  i s  
b e i n g  u s e d
C o m b i n i n g  d i f f e r e n t  m e t h o d s  
( b y  a  s i m p l e  a r i t h m e t i c  
a v e r a g e )  i m p r o v e s  
f o r e c a s t i n g  a c c u r a c y  a n d  
r e d u c e s  t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  
e r r o r s .
So me  m o d e l s  a r e  m o r e  
a c c u r a t e  f o r  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m  
( e . g . s i n g l e  e x p o n e n t i a l  
s m o o t h i n g )  o t h e r s  a r e  m o r e  
a c c u r a t e  f o r  t h e  l o n g  t e r m  
( e . g .  l o n g  m e m o r y  ARARMA 
m o d e l s )
D a m p e n i n g  t h e  t r e n d  
i m p r o v e s  f o r e c a s t i n g  
a c c u  r a c y .
U s e  s i m p l e  m e t h o d s  t o  a  
g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  u n l e s s  
s p e c i f i c  r e a s o n s  t h a t  c a n  
b e  s u n s t a n t i a t e d  b y  
c o n c r e t e  e m p i r i c a l  
e v i d e n c e  e x i s t s .  F o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  u s e  e x p o n e n t i a l  
s m o o t h i n g  m e t h o d s .
D e s e a s o n a l i z e  t h e  d a t a  t o  
d e v e l o p  a  m o d e l  a n d  
f o r e c a s t .  T h e n  r e -  
s e a s o n a l i z e  f o r e c a s t s .
No m a t t e r  w h a t  t h e  
a p p r o a c h  u t i l i z e d  u s e  
s e v e r a l  m e t h o d s  a n d  
c o m b i n e  t h e i r  f o r e c a s t s .  
C h o o s e  m e t h o d s  i n  s u c h  a  
wa y  a s  t h e i  r  f o r e c a s t s  
w i l l  b e  a s  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  
( t h e r e f o r e  i n d e p e n d e n t )  a s  
p o s s i  b l e .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
m e t h o d s  a l s o  u s e  a n  A R ( p )  
m o d e l  w h e r e  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  
p i s  l a r g e .  S u c h  A R ( p )  
( c a l l e d  l o n g  m e m o r y )  i s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  c a p t u r i n g  
a n d  e x t r a p o l a t i n g  t h e  l o n g  
t e r m  t r e n d .
Da mp e n  t h e  t r e n d  
e x t r a p o l a t i o n  u s i n g  a  
d a m p e n - t r e n d  e x p o n e n t i a l  
s m o o t h i n g  m o d e l .
Source: Makridakis, S. "New Approach to Statistical Forecasting".
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CHAPTER EIGHT
MODELLING AIR TRAFFIC DEMAND FOR DOMESTIC GCC 
SCHEDULED AIR SERVICES
8.1. BACKGROUND
D ie gravity model was selected in the previous chapter to examine traffic demand in the 
GCC. However, the objective of this chapter is to model the scheduled air traffic 
demand in the GCC especially for new routes with consideration of distance, fares and 
quality of service.
D ie technique for traffic forecasting that is used in this study is the gravity model which 
was first formulated by Henry Cary in 1885 by analogy with Newtonian physics of 
matter. It has since become known as the " Gravity of concept of human interactions." 
Cary1 indicated the idea that social phenomena are based on the same fundamental law 
as physical phenomena and that "gravitation is here, as everywhere else, and is in 
proportion to mass and in the inverse one of the distance".
D ie gravity concept was partially used by E.GJtavenstein2 in an explanation of 
migration in the 1805. However, its first application to transport was by Lill3 when he 
incorporated it into a "travel law” during analyses of movement on the Austrian State 
Railways in 1889.
In 1951, D’Arcey Harvey while doing work for the Civil Aeronautics Board, suggested 
th a t the gravity model with little modification could be used to evaluate traffic flow 
between two communities4. D ie route traffic will be roughly proportional to:
P I  *  P 2 /D
Where P1&P2 D ie populations of the two cities
D D ie distance between them
I d 1956 Stephen Wheatcroft modified it in his book D ie Economics Of European Air 
Transport5 on acceptance of the proposition that
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Traffic Potential =  a (P1*P2) /  D 
Where a H ie community of Interest factor
The simple gravity concept makes a basic assumption that all populations have the same 
generative force. At the same time, market variation exists in the volume of air traffic 
such as structure of the population and quality of service provided at airports. So, a 
more effective method was used by Rigas Doganis in 1966*. He used the total air traffic 
rather than population, and he raised the distance to a power other than unity. As a
result, the air traffic between two communities will be proportional to the product of
their total air traffic with the following formula
Route Traffic =  K ( T1*T2/ITP ) 
where T1&T2 =  Total airport traffic of the cities.
DAP =  Distance between them raised to a power p.
K =  A constant.
8.2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of the study detailed in this chapter is to model the scheduled air traffic 
demand in the GCC especially for new routes that do not have services at the current 
time. After researching many techniques for the purpose of this study, the gravity 
model was found to be the most successful for forecasting new air routes, in addition, 
these routes are in developing countries. Ib is model is the starting stage to model the 
GCC air traffic flows under various air liberalisation environments.
8.3. DATA COLLECTION AND CALIBRATION
The data which are obtained for this model are mostly from The ICAO Digest Of 
Statistics7 such as On-Flight Origin and Destination, Airport Traffic and Statistics, and 
Traffic by Flight Stage. The ABC World Airways Guide has been used as well*. The 
flight route Bahrain-Bhahran-Bahrain was excluded from all stages of the model 
because it was always very far away from the regression line and clearly has different 
characteristics to the other routes. There are many reasons to explain this occurrence, 
some of which are the following:
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1. It was the most dense route where the total O/D traffic was reported in 1987 to 
be 82,007 passengers. On the other hand, the mean of the O/D routes amongst 
the GCC was 20,760 passengers. Although in 1986 a causeway was opened 
between Saudia Arabia (Alkober which is very dose to Dhahran) and Bahrain, 
that route still has the highest total of O/D passengers in the GCC.
2. It is the route with the shortest distance. The mean distance of all the GCC 
routes is 925 Kms and the distance between BAH-DHA is only 45 Kms.
8.4. MODEL METHODOLOGY
Already in 8.1 above the forecasting methodology has been touched on as to the
Newton’s formulation of the gravity modd and Doganis’s modifications to the model.
However, the building up process of the modd and the selection of the formulation
options are illustrated in Figure 8.1 which will indude the following alternatives:
1. The Basic Airport Traffic-Distance Modd.
2. The Basic Airport Traffic-Distance Modd With Distance Modifications.
3. The Basic Airport Traffic-Fare Modd.
4. The Airport Traffic, Fare And Quality Of Services Model.
5. Modelling Saudia Arabia Domestic Market.
6. Modelling All the GCC Traffic (Domestic and International Airports)
7. Selection of a model giving best results.
8.5. THE BASIC AIRPORT TRAFFIC-DISTANCE MODEL
8.5 .1 . D ata C alibration
The traffic routes of Bahrain-Doha-Bahrain and Bahrain-Kuwait-Bahrain have been
excluded from this part of the modd for the following reasons:
1. BAH-DOH-BAH routes reported the second highest number of O/D passengers
(77,229 pax) of all the GCC routes.
2 . BAH-KWT-BAH route reported the third highest one with a total of 75,005 
passengers, and the mean of all the O/D routes at that region, as mentioned 
before, was 20,760 passengers.
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3. H ie previous routes were veiy for from the regression fine when they were 
plotted.
8.5.2. Model Results
At the first part of the study, the basic airport traffic-distance technique has been used 
and modified for different powers of distance. The formula which is applied is expressed 
as
Route Traffic =  A l A2 /IT P  
Where A1&A2 The total annual traffic of the first and second airports.
D~P The distance between the two airports to the power of (F).
K A constant.
The following are some of the various distance power values that produced different 
regression coefficients:
DISTANCE POWER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
PRODUCED 
P = 0 0.741
P = 0 3  0.727
P =1 0.529
P = 1 3  0.421
P = 2 0331
When using P at a value of 2 , this gave the lowest result for correlation coefficient. 
However, replacing P with 0.0 produced the most successful results. The correlation 
coefficients improved as we lower the value of P. A conclusion under this technique can 
be derived that the interactions in terms of air traffic dimmish with distance more than 
the physical situations.
Figure 8 3  plots the route traffic against A1A2/DA0, and figure 8 3  plots it against 
A1A1/D*03 which is the second best result giving a correlation coefficient of 0.727. 
When looking at both of these figures, we notice that each one tends to have two 
regression lines which give us the idea of dividing the data to obtain better results. Table 
8.1 fists the actual and fitted traffic for The Basic Gravity Model.
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8.6. THE BASIC AIRPORT TRAFFIC-DISTANCE MODEL WITH 
DISTANCE MODIFICATIONS
8.6.1. Data Calibrating
There are five routes that were not included In this part of the model. However if  these 
routes were grouped together, the correlation coefficients between the route traffic and 
A1A2/D^1.9 will produce a regression coefficient of 0.997. The following are the five 
routes with their fitted values of route traffic:
Distance Actual Traffic fitted  Traffic
1. BAH-KWI 432 73145 73200
2. KWI-BAH 432 75005 74320
3. BAH-AUH 436 31557 28778
4. DOH-KWI 576 19634 19019
5. KWI-DOH 576 16114 19019
At this model the traffic routes wffl be divided according to the distances between than  
which win include the foUowing three divisions:
1. Less than 400 Kms.
2 . Less than 790 Kms and more than 400 Kms.
3. More than 790 Kms.
8.6 .2 . Less Than 400 Kms
This is the smallest division which includes only four routes. Taking distance to the 
power of 0.5 produces a value of correlation coefficient which is 0.9998. The foUowing 
contain those routes and their fitted traffic values:
Distance Actual Traffic Fitted Traffic
BAH-DOH 146 77229 76347
DOH-BAH 146 75464 76397
DOH-DHA 180 12437 12277
DHA-DOH 180 12116 12277
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The following are the resulting correlation coefficients between route traffic and 
A1AMTP:
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
P = 0 0.9998
P = .5  0.9998
P =1 0.9998
P =1.5 0.9998
The regression coefficients were almost the same for the various powers. This means
that the distance variable at this stage of the modd does affect traffic demand
specifically for those routes.
8 .6 3 . M ora Than 400 Kms & Less Than 790 Kms
The correlation between the route traffic and A1A2/D"P (where D is less than 790 Kms 
and more than 400 Kms) has been analysed to different values of P. The following are 
the results which have been obtained:
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
P =0 03150




Substituting a distance power of 0 3  produces the best correlation coefficient. When 
decreasing the value of P, the regression results decrease more than increasing P to 
above 0.5. Taking d k tan ra  to the power of 0.5 is therefore the best interaction with 
dktancg, the interactions dfanfaifch more towards P  to be 0 rather than to be 1. This 
means th a t at this division of distance calibration, the interactions increase more slowly 
than with distance in the physical situation.
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Table 8.2 shows the data used, the actual traffic and the fitted traffic of the best results 
obtained in this section. Figure 8.4 {dots the 15187 route traffic against AlA2/DA0 i .
8.6.4. M ore Than 790 Kms
This section analyses the route traffic and A1A2/DT where D is more than 790 Kms. 
The following are the correlation coefficients which were produced for the various 
distance powers:
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
P = 0 0.819




As can be seen, the most successful results were obtained when P is 2, and the 
interactions increase slowly with distance which make the formula A1A2/D*2 is the best 
for the long distance routes division.
figure 8.5 plots the route traffic against A1A2/D*2, and Table 8 3  exhibits the data and 
fitted values for this division.
8.7. REPLACEMENT OF DISTANCE WITH FARE 
The correlation between the fare and distance for GCC routes have been analysed and 
were plotted in figure 8.6. This produces a correlation coefficient of 03111 which 
indicates a strong relationship between fare and distance. Table 8.4 shows the calculated 
fitted values of fares against distances where disproportional fares and distances can be 
seen. The fares th a t are used in this modd are in Qatari Riyals (QR). Full fares for the 
economy class were used. The business class fares were assumed to be in a constant ratio 
to the economy fares.
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8.7.1. Data Calibration






These routes were not Included because of their high annual number of O/D passengers 
In relation with the mean of the other routes which was explained in detail earlier.
8.7 .2 . R em its O btained
The correlation coefficients produced between route traffic and A1A2/F*P were 
approximately similar to the ones which were produced in the basic airport 
traffic-distance modd. This means again, the interactions decrease more slowly with 
fare than in the physical situation. The following are the results obtained:
FARE POW ER REPRESSIO N  COEFFICIENTS
P =0 0.741




Surprisingly, the best value of P is (0.0) which is exactly the same as the previous basic 
airport traffic-distance modd produced under the same power of (0.0).
8.8. ESTIMATING THE DEMAND WITH QUALITY OF SERVICE 
VARIABLE
Recent models of regulation suggest that the quality of service could play an important, 
but hitherto ignored, variable for setting prices and fares by the regulators, and these
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models have recently been used very widely in regulated airline environments’.
Empirical models usually assume that demand is insensitive to the level of quality. 
However, DeVany incorporated flight frequency as a quality of service variable affecting 
demand in his econometric models.
A study by Richard A.IppoIito1' succeeded in estimating a model of airline demand that 
incorporates a level of service. He chose monopoly flight segments for the following 
reasons:
1. Excluding potential competitive problems.
2. Avoiding being sensitive to the arbitrary specification of oligopoly models.
8.8.1. D ata C alibrating




As before, the first two routes were included in the model, however, the third route is 
being excluded in this part of the model only because it was out of scale.
8.8.2. Method Of Calculations
Since the airline industry in the GCC is mostly based on national monopolies, quality 
of service measurement could be applied to the gravity modd with replacement of 
distance with fare. The measurement of quality of service in this study is done by 
calculating the number of frequencies and considering whether the flight is direct or 
transfer. Since all the flights that are contained in this study are jets, the type of 
aircraft is excluded in this model. Differences between wide bodied and standard bodied 
types were ignored. The level of quality of service will be as follows:
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2. Transfer Connection Flights
■ One connection none-stop 0.500
■ One connection one stop 0350
■ Two connections, one stop or
others 0.250
The formula which is used is expressed as
Route Traffic =  K (AlA2QAn/F*p) 
Where Q^n Quality of service to the power of n 
K A constant
The best correlation coefficient between the route traffic and AlA2QAn/F*P produced 
a regression coefficient of 0.87 under P =2 and n = 0.4 . However, this regression 
coefficient is the highest that include all the airports without divisions. Figure 8.8 plots 
route traffic against A1A2QA2/FA0.4. Table 8.6 presents the data used, the quality of 
services weights, Y class fares, actual route traffic and the fitted values.
8.9 MODELLING SAUDIA ARABIA DOMESTIC MARKET
This section analyses the Saudia Arabia domestic market where 125 routes were studied 
and analysed. In this chapter, the Saudia domestic routes gave the best regression 
results without applying any distance division, deleting any routes, or including any fare 
or quality of service variables. The correlation coefficient between the route traffic and 
(A1*A2/DT) produced the following results:
DISTANCE POW ER REPRESSIO N  COEFFICIENTS
P =  0 
P =  0.5  
P =  1 
P =  1.5 







Figure 8.9 plots the route traffic against (A1*A2/D~0.5).
8.10 MODELLING ALL THE GCC TRAFFIC (Domestic and 
International Airports)
This part of the forecasting model analyses all the GCC traffic which includes domestic
and international airports. There are 166 routes that have been involved at this part.
The following results have been obtained:
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
P =  0 0.785
P =  0.4 0.804
P =  0.5 0.803
P =  1 0.758
P =  1.5 0.631
P =  2 0.443
Figure 8.10 plots the actual route traffic against the estimated (A l^A l/D M .^.
8.11 OTHER ATTEMPTS TO FORECAST ALL GCC TRAFFIC
The following are the attempts to forecast all the GCC traffic:
1. The basic traffic-distance with distance modification gave the following results:
■ Distance less than 250nm (includes 34 routes)
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
P =  0 0.249
P =  0.5 0.164
P =  1 0.085
P =  1.5 0.078
P =  2 0.076
■ Distance more than 250nm and less than 500nm (includes 56 routes)
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
P =  0 0.213
P =  0 9  0.199
P =  1 0.184
P =  1.5 0.169
P =  2 0.154
■ Distance more than 500nm (includes 76 routes)
DISTANCE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
P =  0 0.881
P =  0.5 0.915
P =  1 0.937
P =  1 9  0950
P =  2 0957
Replacement of distance with fare produced the following results (includes 63 
routes)
FARE POWER REGRESSION COEFFICIENT
P =  0 0.108
P =  0 9  0.087
P =  1 0.051
P =  1 9  0.069
P =  2 0.072
Although previously this technique produced good results when analysing the 
GCC traffic (international airports only), when mixing the international and 
domestic airports the regression results were poor.
Estimating demand with fare and quality of service variables, the following are 








P =  0
eIIa 0.814
P =  0 n =  1 0.811
P =  0 n =  0 0.792
P =  0 n =  1.5 0.781
P =  0.5 n =  0.5 0.739
P =  1 n =  0 0.597
Although previously this method produced the best results when analysing the 
GCC traffic (international airports only), when analysing all the GCC traffic 
(international and domestic airports) it only produced reasonably good results, 
based on 63 routes only.
8.12 SELECTION OF THE FINAL MODEL
When reviewing the various options that have been explained, we find the following:
1. The Basic Airport Traffic-Distance Model and the one with replacement of 
distance with fare, produced almost the same correlation coefficient of 0.714 
when both distance and fare were raised to the same power of (0.0). Both these 
parts are for the GCC traffic between international airports only.
2. The Basic Aiiport Traffic-Distance With Distance Modifications Model which 
is between international airports only produced the following correlation 
coefficients:
■ Distance less than 400 Kms
P =0.5 r=0.9998
■ Distance less than  790 Kms and more than  400 Kms
P =0.5 r=0.977
■ Distance more than 790 Kms
P =2.0 r=0.908
3. Estimating demand with quality of service variable gave a regression coefficient 
of 0.87 when P = 2 and n=0.4 for the GCC traffic between international airports 
only.
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4. Saudia domestic traffic produced a regression coefficient of (0.960) when the 
distance was raised to (0.5). This part includes 125 routes.
5. All GCC traffic including international and domestic airports produced a 
regression coefficient of (0.804) when the distance was raised to (0.4). This part 
involves 166 routes.
6. Other attempts were made to model aD the GCC traffic including international 
and domestic airports. Such methods included basic distance method with 
distance modification, replacement of distance with fare, and fare and quality of 
service variables. However most of the regression results obtained from these 
results were not satisfactory.
The model which was chosen is the Basic Airport Traffic-Distance for all GCC traffic 
for the following reasons:
1. It involves all the GCC traffic including international and domestic airports.
2. It includes the highest number of O/D routes of 166 routes without any
modification or divisions.
3. It produced a relatively good regression coefficient of (0.804).
4. It is simple to use.
5. For the purpose aimed, this model can forecast new routes based on distances 
which are already known rather than fares or quality of services that are not 
available for new routes.
8.13 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the purpose of this model is to establish a good 
technique that can forecast the scheduled air traffic demand in the GCC, especially on 
new routes that do not have services at the present time. Having that purpose in 
consideration and checking the chosen model with the ICAO approach to building-up 
a model, the following are significant:
1. Relevant causal factors were selected such as distances, fares, quality of services,
total airport traffic, and total O/D passengers.
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2. Data was collected for the years of 1987 and 15188.
3. H ie Independent variables were forecast such as total annual O/D passengers, 
fares and quality of services which led to forecast the dependent variables such 
as the route traffic.
4. Tbe following three formulae identify the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables:
■ Route Traffic =  K(A1A2/D"F)
■ Route Traffic =  K(A1A2/F~P)
■ Route Traffic =  K(AlA2QAn/F~P)
5. Tests and evaluations at all the stages of the model have been done to get the best 
results in term of fitted values of air traffic in regression formulations, and the 
results of the chosen model have been tested and compared with the actual values 
which were obtained for 1987 and 15188.
When validating the chosen model with Tanqa’s model of validity we find the following:
1. The chosen model is based upon a fundamental theory which is Newton’s gravity 
formula.
2. The assumptions that have been used in this model are justifiable according to 
Doganis’s modifications of the old gravity model where he used the annual total 
passengers at airports instead of the population of the cities and raised the 
distance to a power.
3. Statistically this model is valid. All the formulae are mathematically valid and 
the regression formulations were used to calculate the correlation coefficients.
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TABLE 8.1s Actual And Fitted Traffic For The Basic Gravity Model for the GCC



























ABU DHABI ♦BAHRAIN 436 1173 1867 31557 6008 7798
DHAHRAN 478 1173 2786 4564 8026 9976
JEDDAH 1595 1173 7197 8485 17710 12999
KUWAIT 835 1173 2644 19291 7714 7918
RIYADH 782 1173 6373 8156 15901 15731
BAHRAIN JEDDAH 1272 1867 7197 22030 27058 21075
RIYADH 432 1867 6373 31092 24179 30632
DHAHRAN ABU DHABI 478 2786 1173 5359 8026 9976
DOHA 180 2786 967 12116 6577 12483
KUWAIT 404 2786 2644 12364 15696 20573
MUSCAT 870 2786 918 766 6696 6911
DOHA DHAHRAN 180 967 2786 12437 6952 12483
JEDDAH 1330 967 7197 5975 14935 11996
KUWAIT 576 967 2644 19634 6695 7879
RIYADH 492 967 6373 9051 13444 16244
JEDDAH ABU DHABI 1595 7197 1173 13078 17710 12999
BAHRAIN 1276 7197 1867 29012 27058 21046
DOHA 1330 7197 967 8241 14935 11996
KUWAIT 1241 7197 2644 55238 37524 29055
MUSCAT 2020 7197 918 3017 14275 9855
KUWAIT ABU DHABI 835 2644 1173 21197 7714 7918
DHAHRAN 404 2644 2786 11021 15696 20573
DOHA 576 2644 967 16114 6695 7879
JEDDAH 1241 2644 7197 42654 37524 29055
MUSCAT 1200 2644 918 5910 6452 6098
RIYADH 517 2644 6373 33118 33447 38866
SHARJAH 861 2644 180 5840 2800 3468
MUSCAT DHAHRAN 8709 918 2786 1088 6696 4015
JEDDAH 2020 918 7197 2406 14275 9855
KUWAIT 1200 918 2644 6882 6452 6098
RIYADH 1183 918 6373 1753 12859 10983
RIYADH ABU DHABI 782 6373 1173 7595 15901 15731
BAHRAIN 432 6373 1867 28724 24179 30632
DOHA 492 6373 967 9838 13444 16244
KUWAIT 517 6373 2644 35155 33447 38866
MUSCAT 1183 6373 918 3704 12859 10983
SHRJAH KUWAIT 861 180 2644 5892 2800 3468
Al=Annual Scheduled Passenger Traffic (1987) of the first airport 
A2=Annual Scheduled Passenger Traffic (1987) of the second airport 
SOistance between the two airpots (Kms)
♦For year ending 30 June 1988
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TABLE 8.2: Calibrated Data For The Basic Gravity Model With Distance Modification




DATA FOR THE BASIC GRAVITY 
< DISTANCE < 790 Kms )
MODEL WITH DISTANCE MODIFICATION





CITIES CITIES [KM] [1000 [1000 [1000 [1000
[A1J [A2] PAXs] PAXs] PAXs] PAXs]
ABU DHABI DHAHRAN 478 1173 2786 4564 2738
RIYADH 782 1173 6373 8156 9245
BAHRAIN RIYADH 432 1867 6373 31092 26091
DHAHRAN ABU DHABI 478 2786 1173 5359 2738
KUWAIT 404 2786 2644 12364 14719
DOHA RIYADH 492 967 6373 9051 9825
KUWAIT DHAHRAN 404 2644 2786 11021 14719
RIYADH 517 2644 6373 33118 35400
RIYADH ABU DHABI 782 6373 1173 7595 9245
BAHRAIN 432 6373 1867 28724 26091
DOHA 492 6373 967 9838 9825
KUWAIT 517 6373 2644 35155 35400
A1 ANNUAL PASSENGER TRAFFIC OF THE FIRST AIRPORT <1987) 
A2 ANNUAL PASSENGER TRAFFIC OF THE SECOND AIRPORT (1987) 
* DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO AIRPORTS
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TABLE 83: Calibrated Data For The Basic Gravity Model With Distance Modification
























ABU DHABI JEDDAH 1595 1173 7197 8485 9738
KUWAIT 835 1173 2644 19291 14002
BAHRAIN JEDDAH 1272 1867 7197 22030 28531
DHAHRAN MUSCAT 870 2786 918 766 9964
DOHA JEDDAH 1330 967 7197 5975 12040
JEDDAH ABU DHABI 1595 7197 1173 13078 9738
BAHRAIN 1276 7197 1867 29012 28342
DOHA 1330 7197 967 8241 12040
KUWAIT 1241 7197 2644 55238 43852
MUSCAT 2020 7197 918 3017 3323
KUWAIT ABU DHABI 835 2644 1173 21197 14002
JEDDAH 1241 2644 7197 42654 43852
MUSCAT 1200 2644 918 5910 3587
SHARJAH 861 2644 180 5840 376
MUSCAT DHAHRAN 8709 918 2786 1088 2678
JEDDAH 2020 918 7197 2406 3323
KUWAIT 1200 918 2644 6882 3587
RIYADH 1183 918 6373 1753 12983
RIYADH MUSCAT 1183 6373 918 3704 12983
SHRJAH KUWAIT 861 180 2644 5892 376
A1=Amual Scheduled Passenger Traffic (1987) of the first airport 
A2=Annual Scheduled Passenger Traffic (1987) of the second airport 
aoistance between the two airpots (Kms)
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TABLE 8.4: The Relationship Between Fares & Distances For The GCC Traffic
Routes.






ABU DHABI BAHRAIN 271 398 365
DHAHRAN 298 396 386
JEDDAH 1191 886 1058
KUWAIT 520 623 478
RIYADH 489 519 530
BAHRAIN DOHA 91 210 230
JEDDAH 794 589 759
KUWAIT 262 342 359
RIYADH 268 240 363
DHAHRAN ABU DHABI 298 407 386
DOHA 112 216 246
KUWAIT 245 353 346
MUSCAT 555 797 579
DOHA BAHRAIN 91 207 230
DHAHRAN 112 204 246
JEDDAH 826 671 783
KUWAIT 352 428 426
RIYADH 307 332 393
JEDDAH ABU DHABI 1191 895 1058
BAHRAIN 794 610 759
DOHA 826 714 783
KUWAIT 766 859 738
MUSCAT 1255 1279 1106
KUWAIT ABU DHABI 520 536 553
BAHRAIN 262 295 359
DHAHRAN 245 295 346
DOHA 352 379 426
JEDDAH 766 717 738
MUSCAT 756 761 730
RIYADH 322 417 404
SHARJAH 529 536 560
MUSCAT DHAHRAN 555 960 579
JEDDAH 1255 1105 1106
KUWAIT 756 789 730
RIYADH 750 788 726
RIYADH ABU DHABI 489 535 530
BAHRAIN ■ 268 248 363
DOHA 307 353 393
KUWAIT 322 502 404
MUSCAT 750 911 726
SHARJAH KUWAIT 529 536 560
A1 ANNUAL SCHEDULED PASSENCER TRAFFIC OF THE FIRST AIRPORT (1987) 
A2 ANNUAL SCHEDULED PASSENCER TRAFFIC OF THE SECOND AIRPORT (1987) 
Y ECONOMY CUSS
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TABLE 8.5: Actual And Fitted Traffic For Hie Basic Fare Model for the
























ABU DHABI BAHRAIN 1173 1867 398 31557 5984
DHAHRAN 1173 2786 396 4564 8005
JEDDAH 1173 7197 886 8485 17704
KUWAIT 1173 2644 623 19291 7693
RIYADH 1173 6373 519 8156 15892
BAHRAIN DOHA 1867 967 210 1867 967
JEDDAH 1867 7197 589 22030 27066
KUWAIT 1876 262 342 1867 2644
RIYADH 1867 6373 240 31092 24183
DHAHRAN ABU DHABI 2786 1173 407 5359 8005
DOHA 2786 967 216 12116 6929
KUWAIT 2786 2644 353 12364 15687
MUSCAT 2786 918 797 766 6673
DOHA BAHRAIN 967 1867 207 967 1867
DHAHRAN 967 2786 204 12437 6929
JEDDAH 967 7197 671 5975 14925
KUWAIT 967 2644 428 19634 6672
RIYADH 967 6373 332 9051 13431
JEDDAH ABU DHABI 7197 1173 895 13078 17704
BAHRAIN 7197 1867 610 29012 27066
DOHA 7197 967 714 8241 14925
KUWAIT 7197 2644 859 55238 37548
MUSCAT 7197 918 1279 3017 14263
KUWAIT ABU DHABI 2644 1173 536 21197 7693
BAHRAIN 75005 262 295 2644 1867
DHAHRAN 2644 2786 295 11021 15687
DOHA 2644 967 379 16114 6672
JEDDAH 2644 7197 717 42654 37549
MUSCAT 2644 918 761 5910 6429
RIYADH 2644 6373 417 33118 33465
SHARJAH 2644 180 536 5840 2772
MUSCAT DHAHRAN 918 2786 960 1088 6674
JEDDAH 918 7197 1105 2406 1429
KUWAIT 918 2644 789 6882 6429
RIYADH 918 6373 788 1753 12846
RIYADH ABU DHABI 6373 1173 535 7595 15892
BAHRAIN 6373 1867 248 28724 24182
DOHA 6373 967 353 9838 13431
KUWAIT 6373 2644 502 35155 33464
MUSCAT 6373 918 911 3704 12846
SHARJAH KUWAIT 180 2644 536 5892 2772
Al=Annual Scheduled Passenger T ra ffic  (1987) of the f i r s t  a irport 
A2=Annual Scheduled Passenger T ra ffic  (1987) of the second airport
8.6: Actual And fitted  Traffic For The Quality Of Service And Fare Model for 




















ABU DHABI BAHRAIN 1173 1867 31 398 31557 33821
DHAHRAN 1173 2786 9 396 4564 6255
JEDDAH 1173 7197 11 886 8485 13477
KUWAIT 1173 2644 16 623 19291 12168
RIYADH 1173 6373 11 519 8156 15086
BAHRAIN JEDDAH 1867 7197 14 589 22030 35880
DHAHRAN ABU DHABI 2786 1173 12 407 5359 9191
DOHA 2786 967 16 216 12116 16115
KUWAIT 2786 2644 11 353 12364 15677
MUSCAT 2786 918 9 797 766 4776
DOHA DHAHRAN 967 2786 15 204 12437 14757
JEDDAH 967 7197 9 671 5975 10030
KUWAIT 967 2644 14 428 19634 9821
RIYADH 967 6373 8 332 9051 8339
JEDDAH ABU DHABI 7197 1173 11 895 13078 14462
BAHRAIN 7197 1867 13 610 29012 29727
DOHA 7197 967 6 714 8241 5669
KUWAIT 7197 2644 12 859 55238 30954
MUSCAT 7197 918 6 1279 3017 4551
KUWAIT ABU DHABI 2644 1173 16 536 21197 13089
DHAHRAN 2644 2786 11 295 11021 16648
DOHA 2644 967 13 379 16114 9122
JEDDAH 2644 7197 13 717 42654 40055
MUSCAT 2644 918 8 761 5910 4355
RIYADH 2644 6373 11 417 33118 34678
SHARJAH 2644 180 6 536 5840 2886
MUSCAT DHAHRAN 918 2786 6 960 1088 3666
JEDDAH 918 7197 6 1105 2406 4666
KUWAIT 918 2644 7 789 6882 4170
RIYADH 918 6373 7 788 1753 5625
RIYADH ABU DHABI 6373 1173 13 535 7595 4253
DOHA 6373 967 9 353 9838 11102
KUWAIT 6373 2644 12 502 35155 35089
MUSCAT 6373 918 9 911 3704 7417
SHARJAH KUWAIT 180 2644 7 536 5892 2950
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CHAPTER NINE
FLEET PLANNING AND AIRCRAFT SELECTION
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The m ain objective of this chapter Is to review and study different aircraft for intra- 
GCC air services. The candidate aircraft should be commercially attractive with regard 
to the assessment of the operating costs and quality of service. To accomplish this 
objective, fleet planning and aircraft selection are studied and analysed in detail.
Air transport can be considered to be one of the youngest of the world’s mqjor 
Industries. It is still faced with constant changes within the technical, economic, 
regulatory and political spheres. However, until the 1970s those changes were 
progressive and evolutionary. In the last two decades, changes have been radical, 
dynamic and overlapping. For example, sudden changes in fuel prices after 1973 and 
again after 1979 brought rapid increases in costs and changes in traffic patterns. The 
passing of the Deregulation Act in October 1978 in the United States, which has almost 
one third of the world’s fleet, opened up a new type of competitive environment amongst 
its airlines. Recently, there has been a large variation in the capacity and quality of 
services, which is forecast to increase in the coming years. Any new airline based in the 
GCC would have to take this environment into account and the purpose of this chapter 
is to set the fleet planning process in context.
There is no straightforward definition of fleet planning, but for the purposes of this 
chapter it can be defined as "The process of choosing the fleet, or fleet m ix, which 
brings the optimum economic results for the airline when the differences between costs 
and revenues on the one hand, and total investment on the other, are taken into 
account." (see also 9 3  below).
Unfortunately, some airline management were not adequately equipped with planning 
concepts, philosophies or processes to cope effectively and efficiently with the
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fundamental changes that will continue to shake the air transport industry.1 This has
led to a number of bankruptcies.
According to Holloway in a recent Cranfield MPhil submission, a successful planning 
process in this rhanging environment requires total commitment from the top 
management, a concern with long-term results, a team approach, a reward system, 
effective organisational structure and appropriate analytical tools.2
9.2 AIRCRAFT SELECTION
Aircraft selection is a very complex process in which much expertise, analysis, planning, 
consultation and evaluation are very likely to be required. In a regulated environment, 
the aircraft selection process is not as complicated as in a deregulated environment 
where the freedom of entry, exit, fares, capacity and frequency are permitted. With 
ah these freedoms, aircraft selection is more challenging with more variables so that 
failure of the process could lead the airline to suffer from many financial problems. On 
the other hand, the success of the process determines an airline’s power in a competitive 
industrial environment. As Mr James3 described the importance of that selection in an 
airline,
"The 1990’s win be the decade when the modernity of aircraft fleets 
largely dictates the ability of individual carriers to maintain and 
strengthen their dominance".
The fmal choice of an aircraft could be influenced by technical performance, financing 
costs, contribution to overall profitability in the light of certain route structures, and 
external factors such as government pressure. However, the escalation o f fuel prices 
and aircraft noise requirements have changed airline priorities in aircraft selection.
9.2.1 Re-equipment Factors
Airlines usually tend to re-equip their fleets due to different factors. The more 
important are likely to emerge from the following listed reasons:4
Expected growth in traffic.
Changes (particularly upwards) in the price of aviation fuel.
Environment regulation such as aircraft noise.
Lower unit costs of operation (such as cost per Seat-Km).
International route proliferation and new routes authority.
Life expectancy such as the regulation of retirements of civil air transport and 
cases of re-engining.
Operational factors which could emerge from the following:
■ The desire to improve efficiency which includes fuel consumption, speed, 
range and required man hours of maintenance labour.
■ The desire to increase frequency, capacity and market share.
■ The desire to improve aircraft configuration such as type o f engines, 
maximum take off gross weight, maximum landing weight, maximum 
zero-fuel weight, operator’s empty weight, fuel capacity, containers and 
pallets, bulk volume and total volume.
Roll over policy - a number of airlines are adopting this policy where they always 
attempt to operate new equipment to have an image of having a new fleet, selling 
their older fleet at an early age to make best use of depreciation aUowances and 
to get the optimum price for that age, and finally to avoid all the problems 
associated with elderly aircraft types. Such airlines which have this policy are 
Singapore Airlines and Delta Airlines.
Improve the quality of service (such as frequency or non-stop capability) where 
it is important for two reasons:
■ Attract more passengers especially first and business da.«
■ Position the airline in a better competition status.
Fleet rationalization which it could possibly follow a merger.
Financial hardship that could be facing an airline where they have to sell some 
of their fleet to generate cash and using it for many purposes beside buying 
better replacement aircraft.
External or internal politics. External politics stem from government pressure 
especially in state-owned airlines. This pressure influences the airline to 
purchase specific manufacturer’s aircraft from certain nations regardless o f the
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results of the airline’s evaluation process. Internal politics come from within an 
airline to buy specific brand aircraft.
13. Financial condition of an airline and the availability of investment climate for 
funding new fleets.
14. Possibly realising book profit in an active secondhand market.
9.2 .2 . Pre-Pnrehasiny Considerations
The decision to procure an aircraft is a complex task; however it is beneficial to consider 
the following before attempting that task:5
1. Reviewing forecasts of traffic and the operating environments such as political, 
socio-economic, environmental and bilateral.
2 . The current existing fleet and flow of passengers and freight within the 
operation.
3 . Technological trends and types available and provided from the manufacturers.
4. Manufacturers’ reputation especially in performance, reliability and product 
support.
5 . Preliminary performance data in terms of runway compatibility, block speeds, 
payload - range and noise characteristics.
6. Finally, the study structure such as involving certain departments, using 
consultants, and the possible timescale and deadlines.
9.3 THE GENERAL FLEET PLANNING PROCESS
Fleet planning is an essential part of any airline corporate or strategic planning process, 
and it is the first step towards successful operations. According to the Dictionary of Air 
Transport*, fleet planning process is "a mathematical computer simulation model of an 
airline system which has the obj ective of finding the optimum balance between proj ected 
market demand, fleet size and competition".
An airline’s mqjor assets are its routes and its aircraft, however, a great deal of 
thinking, analysis, consultations and planning should be done before an airline makes
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an investment in either of these items. It is necessary to consider both routes and
aircraft jointly because these two assets are the foundations of profitability.
Because of the wide variety of aircraft types available with theoretically attractive 
economics, fleet planning is a disciplined process rather than listing the characteristics 
of new types of aircraft. Overall, the financial success of an airline follows optimum 
fleet planning th a t matches the supply of seats and cargo capacity provided by the 
aircraft with the pattern of demand generated by customers.
9 3 .1  Fleet Planning Process
The US Airline Deregulation Act of 15178 effected this country’s airlines immediately, 
but it has had a knock-on effect on carriers throughout the world. It has made aircraft 
selection and the fleet planning process more complicated and a critical management 
planning function, not least because of uncertainty.
Historically, the fleet planning process used to be carried out without the aid of 
computer. However, in recent years, it has become very sophisticated where analytical 
computer models have been developed, and they are updated wherever changes occur 
in the internal and external environment.
A fleet planning model is normally a computer-based mathematical simulation of an 
airline system with the obj ect of planning the optimum balance between forecast market 
demand and fieri: size and composition. When inputs are entered such as existing fleet, 
route structure, fare structure and costs, a fleet planning model would determine the 
following over the planning horizon:7
1. Future fleet acquisition requirements
2 . Fleet assignment requirements
3 . Financial requirem ents
4. Operating conditions.
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Figure 9.1 outlines the general framework of fleet planning models. The four mam
inputs are as follows:*
1. Airline resources which are aircraft and route authority.
2 . The forecast of market demand with respect to passengers and cargo.
3 . Financial policies and cost structure.
4 . Corporate strategy with respect to management objectives.
The model itself is ideally one of the linear programming type. A mathematical 
statement of the objectives of carrier management with numerous constraints are 
established in the model.
The fleet planning problem is quite sizeable, however, the following are some of the 
common techniques to reduce the size of the problem:
1. Decomposition technique which divides the constraints into two groups.
2 . Grouping the aircraft and routes into categories.
The output from a fleet planning model is usually the following:
1. Future aircraft requirements.
2 . Fleet assignment. However if  the time period, the schedule, the fleet and the
demand are fixed, then Figure 9.2 shows how to determine the optimum
frequency pattern.
3 . Financial requirements.
4 . System output with respect to financial and operating criteria.
5 . Schedule data.
Fleet planning models are very useful, nevertheless the comments below are related to 
these models:
1. Some of the assumptions in the models are often fairly crude.
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2 . They can be very beneficial in analysing the impact o f various policies, and quite 
profitable for performing sensitivity analysis.
3 . They are restrictive mainly because they have been presented to upper-level 
management.
4 . The availability of these models are restricted because of the confidentiality of 
their developers who are mainly the manufacturers and the more analytically 
oriented carriers.
There are mainly four approaches to fleet planning which are listed below:’
1. Schedule evaluation (simulation).
Simulation can be used to assist the decision-making process at an airline’s 
corporate, functional or operational leveL It is necessary to provide data on 
schedules, traffic, operating and non-operating costs.
2 . Fleet-Assignment M odels.
When the object is to determine the optimum frequency pattern, given that the 
time period, the schedule, the fleet and the demand are known.
3. The Capacity-Gap Approach.
This is a macro approach where forecast traffic growth is converted to required 
capacity, and then current equipment is subtracted to find out capacity to be 
filled by new equipment.
4. Ceh-Theory Fleet Planning M odels.
Requires aggregation and classification of the airline routes into cells to identify 
the long-term mission and composition of fleet.
9.4 THE CORPORATE PLANNING PROCESS
Aircraft selection and fleet planning is closely integrated with many other activities 
within an airline. Nevertheless, to highlight the role of aircraft selection and fleet 
planning, corporate planning needs to be understood.
Corporate planning in an airline requires the identification and analysis of alternative 
corporate strategies and the development of plans or activities which are all integrated.
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H ie most useful definition for corporate planning is1'
"It is a complete way of running a business -  under it, the future 
implications of eveiy decision are evaluated in advance of implementation 
- standards are set for performance beyond the time horizon of the annnal 
budget -  a continual study is made of the environment in which the 
company operates so that the changing patterns are seen in advance and 
incorporated into the company’s decision process and the strategy it 
adopts.”
The timescale for corporate planning is usually five years, however, a longer view would 
be taken for long term plans such as aircraft selection. It is usually to "roll the plan 
forward every successive year, taking into consideration all the new events that have 
occurred”11. Overall, corporate planning results in an on-going process in which the 
objectives are never reached. The following points are the typical five stages in the 
corporate long-range planning cycle:12
1. Establishing objectives.
2 . Establishing the current status through the position audit and environmental 
audit.
3 . Developing a strategy with consideration of all alternatives.
4. Implementing the chosen plan.
5. M onitoring, updating and feedback of the plan.
Historically, corporate planning efforts often tend to fail because of the lack of one or 
more of these ingredients:13
1. Planning was (and normally still is) separate from other perspectives of the
management process.
2 . Top management has been too concerned with short-term problems and not
giving enough time for long-time corporate planning.
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3. Top management and planning groups usually worked with goals that were 
undefined, unrealistic, or inconsistent.
4 . Some airlines treat the plan as a bible without monitoring and feed back 
especially to changes of external and internal variables.
5. Top m anagem ent usually rewards executives for positive short-term results 
despite questionable operating results in the long run.
9.4 .1 . Corporate Planning Audits
The process of corporate planning is illustrated in figure 9 3  The top of the hierarchy 
is corporate strategic planning which develops, formulates and updates the corporate 
objectives and policies. There are many techniques used to develop corporate strategies 
and plans which are as follows:14
1. Position Audit - an assessment of an airline’s internal strength and weakness.
2 . Environmental Audit - an assessment o f the external opportunities and threats.
3 . SWOT - is the combination of A and B above.
The second level in  the hierarchy diagram is the corporate resources planning which 
mainly includes a development of coordinated plans for the use, acquisition and disposal 
of the bask airline resources which include finance, marketing, fleet and route.
The third level is the operational planning M iich contains two types of planning. The 
first is the technical and scheduling which includes the bask airline resources in  addition 
to the operational item s. The second is sales and marketing which involves product, 
price, promotion and distribution. At this kvel, information will be received from the 
resource planning and implementation of the plans would occur as far as final 
operational planning or using, requisitioning and disposing of the required resources in  
a tim ely manner. Monitoring and feedback win happen frequently.
There is a continuous data-exchange process among the planning kvek and strong 
interactions between fleet planning (second kvel) and the foflowing:
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1. Strategic planning (first level).
2 . Operational planning (third level).
3 . H ie other three basic airline resources (finance, marketing and route).
4 . H ie external community M iich includes:
■ H ie airframe and engine manufacturer by influencing them to
compromise the design to satisfy airlines’ requirements.
■ Airports
■ Financial community.
Airline corporate planning is relatively straightforward in an regulated air transport 
environment because routes and fares are mainly controlled by the government, as a 
result, corporate planning would concentrate on cost reduction and selection of optimum 
aircraft. However, in a deregulated environment, corporate planning changed the 
following:
1. Aircraft selection and fleet planning are much more important, and they are an 
integral part of the whole corporate planning.
2 . Regained a sophisticated analysis within the process itself.
3 . Strong interactions among the four dements of resource planning, and among the 
three planning levels.
9.5 AIRCRAFT SELECTION PROCESS IN DETAIL
There are many factors that influence the airline fleet planner to select a particular 
aircraft among all the available alternatives. It is one of the hardest decisions that an 
airline would approach since, as mentioned before, aircraft and routes are the airlines’ 
main assets. Figure 9.4 is a common aircraft selection process that an airline would go 
through, many stages which are corporate objectives, current resources, aircraft 
selection, traffic operation, costs and revenue models, ranking candidates, risk and 
sensitivity test, negotiation and final decision process.
210
9.5.1 Corporate Objectives
Analysis of the corporate objectives should be very carefuQy studied and clearly defined. 
Clarifications of the reasons behind acquiring an aircraft, or several aircraft should be 
made. Some of the corporate objectives for an airline are listed below:-
1. Economic objectives based on profitability.
2 . Financial objectives based upon business and market strategies.
3 . Market objectives based upon forecast traffic and market share.
4. Political objectives which are set by governments for many airlines as their 
national carriers.
9.5.2 Selection Criteria
There are three main aircraft selection criteria which are the following:
1. Operating cost criteria with emphasis on direct operating costs related to aircraft 
including interest factor. DOC should be found par aircraft/sector, per 
seat/sector, per seat-Km, per passenger/sector, per passenger-Km with addition 
of cargo effects.
2 . Basic financial criteria such as cash flow, payback, contribution analysis profits, 
return on investment, net present value and internal rate of return.
3 . Common sense criteria which could include the following:
■ Flexibility.
■ Exposure such as revenue/traffic, resource costs, interest, and forex.
■ Liquidity/cash flow.
■ Self financing ratio.
■ D ebt: Equity gearing.
■ Cash flow ratio.
9 5 3  Current Resources
This stage w ill examine all corporate objectives if  they can be met with the current 
airline resources. If the answer is yes, then no additional aircraft or change o f fleet is
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needed. If the answer is no, then a number of aircraft wiQ be calculated to meet the 
corporate objectives.
9.5.4 Aircraft Selection
There are usually constraints which should be considered at this stage such as runway 
length, noise lim its, if  the airline credit lim its the choice to used or leased aircraft, or 
if  the candidate aircraft are unavailable. Stating the constraints, market data and 
aircraft mission, evaluation of candidates of aircraft and alternative engines should be 
processed. If the evaluation process rejects all the candidates, then a final decision will 
be made. If it succeeds with some candidates, then the analysis should continue on to 
the next step.
9 5 5 . Aircraft Configuration
Aircraft configuration could include the following:
1. Type of engine (fuel burn)
2 . Maximum take off gross weight
3 . Maximum landing weight
4. Maximum zero-fuel weight
5. Fuel capacity
6. Operator’s empty weight
7. Cargo and baggage provisions such as containers and pallets.
8 . Bulk volume and total volume
9. Accommodation in relation to seat pitch for economy, business and first class.
10. Toilet provision
However, it is a hard and complex process to  compare the alternative aircraft 
availability because each one can have multiple configuration options.
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9.5 .6 . Traffic. Operational. Costs. Revenues Models
This stage Is considered to be the longest** with many tests and models which include 
the following:-
1. Traffic Model
The candidate aircraft will be examined according to the forecast traffic growth 
analysis. The aim is to meet this predicted demand with the best candidate. Part 
of the problem is to determine how traffic w ill react to different aircraft types, 
comfort levels or capacity afford, to changes in frequencies or routings or to 
different levels of price.
2 . Operational Model
This model evaluates the aircraft performance which enables the aircraft to 
perform its task - some of than are listed below:
■ Route performance
Before buying an aircraft, the purchaser always needs to know the 
maximum payload of the aircraft, the range and the time in which this 








such as runway length, height above sea level and hot clim ate, or 
mountains, cliffs and water.
■ Noise performance
Airline priorities with respect to equipment decision continue to change 
with aircraft noise regulations.
■ ETOPS (Extended-range twin-engined operation)
**The question of individual routes and their viability is the primary focus of 
Chapter 5 .
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3 . Cost Model
It Is important to consider the financial costs (economic costs) of acquisition of 
an aircraft, which includes mainly the total operating cost (including direct and 
indirect costs). These costs require a knowledge of the capital costs of the 
aircraft. This w ill include:





■ Cost of the money with alternative financial arrangements available.
In addition, evaluation of candidates should be done on the basis of total 
operating costs (direct and indirect).
4 . Revenue Model
Airline revenue is mostly generated from carrying passengers, freight and mail 
which is mostly dependent on traffic flow and composition, existing and forecast 
traffic volumes, seating density, load factor and utilization.
In this model, an evaluation of the candidates win be made on the basis of 
revenue that they could make in terms o f money, given the total costs and 
expected sales.
9 .5 .7  Ranking Candidates
Ranking of all aircraft candidates is made at this stage based upon the analysis and 
evaluation of aU the above stages.
9.5.8 Risk Sensitivity Tests
A problem could occur if  the forecasts of external variables are wrong, such as forecast 
traffic, fuel prices, yields, interest rates, the Dollar value and currency exposure, or 




After management review of the above process o f evaluation, negotiation with the 
manufacturer could serve and help in the following areas:-
1. Price and price-related factors such as training, stage payments, guarantees 
(including deficiency or residual value guarantees).
2 . It could be risk reduction by negotiation o f options rather than firm  orders.
3 . Reaching an agreement on possible firm delivery slots, possible delivery positions, 
defined and deadline.
9.5.10 Final Decision
A committee of senior staff may be established to oversee the evaluation exercise because 
of its complexity and its broad nature. In addition, a common practice is to ask the 
aircraft manufacturer for advice, but remembering that the expertise they give is 
directed to bring up the advantages for their product. In developing countries where 
most of the airlines are governmental owned, a great stress and strain between the 
airline and government can happen. However, in the developed world, the 
manufacturer can use every possible way to win the order especially if  it sensed that the 
deal w ill be a trend setter.
The final decision should actually be taken with discipline, accuracy, faith and honesty 
(illegal commissions which are never written about are often heard of). The evaluation 
process should run effectively and accurately to make the right decision by the end of 
the evaluation.
The final decision may be influenced by barter, counter-trade, off-sets or wider trade 
issues.
9.6 AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRCRAFT PURCHASING PROCESS
The decision to purchase an aircraft is obviously one of the largest, longest term and 
hardest process an airline ever makes. It determines much of the risk, cost structure, 
operational flexibility and related investment for the airline. There is no definite
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method for aircraft selection that all the airlines go through, however, every m^jor 
carrier has its own, and the smaller carriers depend to a large extent, mi the advice of 
private consultants to choose the best aircraft for their network, given all the data 
needed. American Airlines is one of the largest airlines in  the world; their aircraft 
purchasing strategy process is accomplished by three stages which are listed below and 
provides a useful case study:15
PART ONE: IDENTIFYING AIRFRAME AND ENGINE ALTERNATIVES 
This process consists mostly of questions that should be answered such as:
1. How many? Which ones?
■ How big the airline should be?
■ What kind of aircraft should make up the fleet?
2 . The airline growth decision.
■ Was growth competitively necessary?
■ Could it be accomplished profitably?
3. Aircraft Selection.
■ What do we want this aircraft to do?
■ How will we use it?
■ What alternatives do we have?
■ How do we value different aircraft sizes?
■ What is each aircraft’s relative operating efficiency?
■ What other investment must we make beside the aircraft itself?
■ Given the above questions -
How much should we be willing to pay?
Can we construct a deal whose total cost win aHow us to make a 
return on investment?
4. The aircraft mission.
■ How big should this aircraft be?
■ What kind of passengers and cargo loads win need to be accommodated?
■ How far do we want it to fly?
■ Does it need international overwater capability?
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■ Why do we need this aircraft?
5 . What various airframe and engine alternatives are there?
6 . Engine selection and spare parts, the following should be considered:
■ They are more influenced by the engineering assessments than financial
analysis
■ The main engine manufacturers are
GE (General Electric - USA)
Pratt & Whitney (USA)
Rolls-Royce (UK)
■ What is the engine’s price and efficiency sorted by thrust range grouping?
■ Over 15-20 years, the purchaser will spend three to six times an engine’s 
original cost for spare parts.
PART TWO: COMPARING THE CHOICES ON THE BASIS OF REVENUE IMPACT
AND OPERATING COSTS
1. Revenue Analysis
It involves the most guess work and requires the most creativity. The following
questions should be carefully predicted:
■ How fast win traffic grow and how much will capacity grow to meet that 
demand?
■ Win load factors be high or low?
■ Witt an endless succession of new entrants and cash starved carriers keep 
yields permanently depressed?
However, there are four key concepts to estimate revenue impact which are listed
below:
■ Spin analysis - it aUows American Airlines to estimate the number of 
passengers that they can accommodate on a larger aircraft or conversely, 
the number of passengers they win spin off a smaller aircraft order and 
various demand conditions. In addition, it allows than to take observed 




This concept is to regain the passenger who was turned away using the 
spill concept. However, they use the recapture concept to dampen the 
impact of spin.
■ Upline/Downline.
In a hub and spoke system, there is a high probability that a passenger 
gained or lost has come upline from, or win go downline to , another flight 
on American Airlines.
■ Push down/Push up.
This effect is created from dehvery of new aircraft and the redeployment 
of the existing fleet to the best alternative possibilities.
2 . Operating Costs
This process includes calculating the operating cost impact of the candidate 
aircraft.
PART THREE: THE PROCESS OF RANKING ALTERNATIVES, SENSITIVITIES, 
CONSIDERATIONS AND NEGOTIATION
1. R anking the alternatives/setting the price. After having done the following:-
■ Defined the aircraft mission.
■ Established aircraft engine alternatives.
■ Placed a value on the difference in  a number o f seats.
■ Estimated the operating cost differentials.
A comparison on the candidate aircraft can now be done over a defined service 
period. Calculation of the net present value of the future cash flows with each 
candidate aircraft will allow the following:
■ Rank the various alternatives.
■ Establish an acceptable all-in price for each candidate after considering 
costs of spare parts, ground equipment and training.
2 . Sensitivities.
Aircraft selection has obvious risk such as forecasting fuel price, future traffic 
growth, and yields, especially when comparing aircraft with disparity in  seats or
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technology. Therefore, aircraft are compared under different future scenarios 
using a matrix approach and calculating the point at which the decision would 
change.
3 . Structure of the deal.
Further negotiations with the manufacturer over the aircraft price are probably
worthwhile. There are many ways to reduce the all-in cost o f a new aircraft 
without destroying the manufacturer’s price structure.
9.7 MANUFACTURERS’ FROSPECTTVES
The fleet planning process for a manufacturer Is more complex than for an airline, and 
it is more macro in nature. Competition between the airlines required both human and 
equipment efficiency. Forecasting fleet status by the manufacturer such as Airbus 
Industrie is done through predicting the average aircraft size required through two 
parameters which are the following:14
1. Traffic volume (passenger, freight).
Based on a number of global economic and industry parameters which indude-
■ Economic growth (GDP)
■ Fares (influences of liberalisation)
■ International trade (influences long-haul and direct flights)
■ Demographics (world-wide population)
■ Disposable income (air travel is part of leisure activities)
■ Vacation habits
■ Alternative to air travel (such as high-speed trains)
2 . Aircraft movement (schedule, charter).
Depends on frequency growth which includes -
■ Airline fleet (existing fleet operations)
■ legislation  (competition and curfews)
■ Traffic rights (regulated and deregulated environments)
■ Airport/ATC capacity (congestion)
■ Network development (such as direct flights or hub-and-spoke)
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Travel distance (the longer the distance the lower the demand)
Overall, traffic and frequency growth influence each other, for example offering more 
direct flights or opening up new routes w ill increase travel demand.
As an example, manufacturers and other aviation forecasters predict that the airline 
traffic will be more than double between now and 2005, as a result aircraft demand wiD 
be doubled too. Given the constraints of congested airports and airspace then the 
demand for larger sized aircraft win be increased over the next 14 years.
The manufacturer has to go through in-depth thinking, analysis, planning, study and 
research. The manufacturer has to consider the fonowing before producing a new type 
of aircraft:17
1. Consider the trade-offs for airlines of various technical features.
2 . The need and requirements of domestic and international airlines.
3 . The manufacturer’s existing and planned aircraft.
4 . The manufacturer’s competitor and planned aircraft.
5 . Combine the requirements of a sufficient number of airlines to start the 
production run, otherwise, it will be beyond the manufacturer’s investment 
capability. For a new design, it could be even beyond all the manufacturer’s 
financial capability combined.
6. New aircraft programs are effective when -
■ Existing aircraft face technical, economic, or regulatory problems.
■ The improvements required are not economical on the existing aircraft.
■ The new design offers sufficient competitive advantages for both the 
manufacturer and the airlines.
Figure 9.5 illustrates Boeing’s methodology to determine the required aircraft. The 
number of aircraft needed to satisfy air travel demand was forecast by range and size 
category. To determine the new aircraft to order, the current airline fleet was 
subtracted. The world fleet mix and delivery forecast were derived by model type.1*
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Manufacturers have to consider all aspects o f the airline industry and its attitude 
towards selecting a new aircraft before attempting to build any new aircraft type. From 
a manufacturer’s  point of view, success of a certain design is mainly measured by the 
number which can be purchased. For example, the Concorde programme was an 
economic failure, with the reasons being partially political and partially technical. The 
failure to convert options int sales by the American carriers, especially Fan Am and 
TWA, virtually wrecked the programme altogether. The British and French took the 
decision to continue mainly for political reasons, whereas the US Government was 
hostile because it wanted to ensure its indusby retained its world domination. On the 
other hand, the Americans justified their rejection using technical factors, such as the 
point that Concorde’s operating cost was at least 30% higher than the B747’s, it had less 
range and payload, and for the same price, an airline could acquire two and a half 
B747s with 950 seats, or three DC-lOs or L -lO lls with 600-700 seats, versus the 100 
seats in the Concorde.
9.7 .1. Aircraft Production Considerations
There are a number of m^jor points about civil air transport which should be 
considered with regard to aircraft production as follows:
1. Aircraft are veiy expensive and the number produced is relatively sm all.
2 . It is not possible to have an aircraft or even a small number of aircraft 
tailor-made, even for a large carrier. Therefore, each aircraft should serve 
various markets in order to obtain an economically viable level of sales.
3. The break-even for a manufacturer is between 200-500 depending on the 
requirement relative to existing technology and the number of carriers interested 
in  that particular design.
4. The m^jor aircraft manufacturers are few, namely Boring, McDonnell Douglas 
and Airbus. In addition, the mqjor engine manufacturers are General Electric, 
Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce. Therefore, the air transport industry is 
unique because of the oligopolistic number of manufacturers.
5. Politics which certainly exist, often favour one particular manufacturer, country 
or airline.
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6 . American Airlines tried several years ago to convince competitors to acquire a 
pool o f standard aircraft with the same paint colours, interior design, seat 
upholstery, cockpit configuration and other item s. However manufacturers make 
a large margin of profit on customisation and do not encourage a standard 
approach. Secondly it is hard to convince the airlines to settle for one 
specification.
7 . There is considerable governmental regulation with regard to aircraft design, 
production, certification and sales, which concern a wide range of issues from  
safety and a clean environment to foreign policy.19
9.7.2. Political Considerations involving Manufacturers and Airlines 
Unfortunately, politics is more aigumentative than factual. Nevertheless, political 
influences are common practice in aircraft selection where interactions exist among 
airlines, manufacturers, and governments. The following political considerations have 
been taken from various air transport journals:
1. "Aircraft sales are often more about politics than the aircraft themselves" 
(Avmark, June 1986, p6)
2 . "There is a grey area in the aviation business where manufacturers’ selling 
strategies, airlines’ negotiating ploys and governments’ policies interact" 
(Avmark, March 1986,p6)
3. In the war of words between the European and USA aircraft manufacturers, 
some of the accusations are listed below:-
■ Boeing accused Airbus of having a captive market amongst 
state-controlled European carriers. However, this accusation comes from  
Boeing which itself eqjoys dominance over the US airline. Nevertheless, 
when Alitalia purchases MU-8Qs instead of Airbus A320s in  November 
1983, the French Trade M inister accused his Italian counterpart of "not 
keeping his word".
■ Boeing accuses Airbus of using "political muscle or cheap finance to 
achieve sales", ft gives the examples of Kuwait Airways decision to buy 
Airbus aircraft in return for landing rights at Paris, and Thai
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IntemationaTs acquiring A300s after a  threat to its exports.
■ Airbus accuses Boeing of using unfair tactics in its sales. As an example, 
Boring replaced three new A31Qs with B767s at Kuwait Airways.
AH the above accusations may not be 100% true, however, and the truth may lie 
somewhere in the middle. (Avmark, June 15186, pp 5-7).
4. M anufacturers snfffer, to a certain extent, from governmental restrictions on sales 
of their equipment to specific nations, the following are two examples of such 
prohibition trades.
■ Modem Western jets.
Modem Western jets are treated as such high- technology equipment that 
their sales are monitored and controlled by a Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Control of exports (an organisation representing the NATO 
countries minus Spain)* This applies if  they are to be exported to the 
Communist Countries (belonging to the Warsaw Fact military alliance). 
This is to prevent militarily-useful technology falling into the hands of the 
West’s adversaries. That monitoring continued until 15188 Mien Airbus 
sold A310-30Qs to East Germany’s Interflug. (Interavia 2/1989, pl25)
■ France urged the USA in 15184 not to let Airbus Industrie’s A320 aircraft 
"become a political airplane". The director of the civil aviation 
programme in France said that Airbus was not allowed to deliver the 
A300 to some customers because of the US restriction on exports. These 
included the prohibition on sales of components from the US to Airbus for 
later delivery to countries that were considered to be "unfriendly by the 
US".(Aviation Week & Space Technology April 30,15184)
5. It is believed that US m^jor carriers can obtain US manufactured aircraft at the 
lowest unit price. On the other hand, foreign carriers end up paying premium 
prices. (Avmark, February 1989, p6).
9.8 ANALYSIS OF TOTAL AIRCRAFT OPERATING COSTS
Having reviewed in detail the fieri: planning process in the first part of this chapter, the 
next step is to apply this knowledge to the question of aircraft selection on less dense
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routes within the GCC. An analysis of various types of aircraft has therefore been 
made in the following part of the chapter on the basis of total operating costs over a 
range of sector lengths according to the GCC operational environment. These aircraft 
were initially chosen based on the analysis of traffic forecasts which were accomplished 
in previous chapters. The objective in this process is to find the optimum aircraft which 
satisfies the predicted demand on routes not currently served. The following figures are 
the total operating costs of different aircraft*** over a spread of sector distances:
1. ATR-42 (Turboprop) —--------- Table 9.1
2. ATR-72 (Turboprop) —--------  Table 9.2
3. ATP (Turboprop) — --------  Table 9.3
4. F-50 (Turboprop) — --------  Table 9.4
5. Dash-8-300 (Turboprop) — --------  Table 9.5
6. Dash-8-400 (Turboprop) — --------  Table 9.6
7. Saab S-2000 (Turboprop) — --------  Table 9.7
8. DO-328 (Turboprop) — --------  Table 9.8
9. Canadair RJ (Jet) — --------  Table 9.9
10. EMB 145 (Jet) — --------  Table 9.10
11. 146-100 (Jet) — --------  Table 9.11
12. 146-2 00 (Jet) — -------- Table 9.12
13. F100 (Jet) — -------- Table 9.13
14. B-737-300 (Jet) — -------- Table 9.14
15. B-737-500 (Jet) — -------- Table 9.15
It is important to look at the specification of each aircraft in order to understand the 
results behind the variation of total operating costs over a range of sector lengths. 
Aircraft specification such as basic price, number of seats and fuel consumption will be 
explained in this chapter, concentrating on the methods and formulae that were used 
to calculate each figure.
*** After all the data was collected and the calculations made, DHC decided not to 
build the Dash-8-400 and Embraer decided to freeze development of the EMB 145.
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9.8.1. D ata O btaining
Data was obtained for this analysis mainly from different aircraft brochures, aircraft 
journals, ICAO Digest of Statistics Financial Data, papers and theses.
9.8.2. Process of the Analysis
In order to understand the results of the process, every operational cost will be 
explained in detail in three stages. D ie first stage includes basic cost, number of seats, 
maximum take-off weight, block fuel, block time, aircraft hours/year and aircraft 
cycles/year. D ie second stage includes depreciation, interest, insurance, fuel cockpit 
and cabin crew, user charges and maintenance. D ie third stage finds the indirect cost 
per sector.
9.9 FIRST STAGE IN DIRECT OPERATING COSTTS
9.9.1. Basic Price
Aircraft price is considered to be one of the strongest influences on operating costs. In 
this study, the basic aircraft price does not include a provision for spares, extra 
equipment or training. It is based on 1990 figures and expressed in millions of US 
dollars. Diose prices have been obtained from the manufacturers, aviation journals, 
aircraft leasing companies and aircraft traders.
9.9.2. Number of Seats
D ie number of seats in an aircraft could be changed according to the airline’s 
requirements. D ie information has been obtained from manufacturers brochures and 
aircraft journals. However, this number is recorded in standard seat pitch of 31/32". 
D iis is followed by baggage volume which is stated as the standard figure supplied by 
the manufacturer.
9 .9 3 . M aximum Take-O ff W eight (MTOW)
MTOW is given in metric tonnes, and is obtained from the manufacturers. It is 
included in this study because of its use to calculate some direct costs.
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9.9.4. Block Fuel
D ie quantity of fuel consumed per block is measured from the manufacturers’ tables 
given 14 minutes for engine start up and taxi time. A conversion of fuel weight from 
pounds to gallons was made to calculate the cost of block fuel. Fuel costs were taken 
as being US $0.70 per gallon which is the average cost in the GCC states.
9.9.5. Block Time
Estimated flying time over the range of sector lengths was calculated from tables from 
the manufacturers given the same 14 minutes for engine start up and taxi time. Block 
times in the tables are both expressed in minutes and hours.
9.9.6. Animal A ircraft U tilisation***
Operating cost models usually assume uniform levels of utilisation for different sector 
lengths. However, there is a limit to the number of hours an aircraft can work during 
the year in the actual operation environment. D ie general assumption in this study is 
for an annual utilisation of 4,200 hours per year for each aircraft. Given another 
assumption of 40 minutes for a turnaround time.
9.9.6.1 Aircraft Cycles per year
Diese figures are found as shown below:
Cycles per year =  4200/(Block time +  0.67)
* 4200 - is estimated annual utilisation in hours
0.67 - is turnaround time in hours (40 minutes)
9 .9 .6 2  Aircraft hours/year
D ie main importance of both aircraft cycles per year and aircraft hours per year that 
will be used in maintenance cost. Nevertheless, aircraft hours/year were calculated in  
this study as follows:
Hours/year =  cycles per year x block time
***Note a more detailed analysis of utilisation, taking into account a realistic 
schedule, is the main focus of Chapter 11.
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9.9.6.2 Aircraft hours/year
The main Importance of both aircraft cycles per year and aircraft hours per year that 
will be used in maintenance cost. Nevertheless, aircraft hours/year were calculated in 
this study as foUows:
Hours/year =  cycles per year x block time
9.10 SECOND STAGE IN DIRECT OPERATING COST
There are seven elements which contribute in the direct operating costs at this stage 









There are several methods available to calculate aircraft finance and depreciation costs. 
However, in this study depreciation is found according to the formula below:
| (cost value +  10% of cost for spares) /
j (10 years (to be zero at the end of the 10 years /
[number of yearly hours] * [Block time in hours]
9.10.2 Interest
Interest was forecast in this analysis as shown below:
Average Interest =  [ 12% * (book value) ] * [flight time in hours]
[ number of hours per year]
227
where
Average book value =  55% * (cost value +  10% of cost for spares)
9.10.3 Aircraft Insurance
Many airlines calculate their aircraft insurance by different methods, and they usually 
get different insurance policies according to many variables such as an airline network, 
annual utilisation, types of covers and pilot expertise.
However, a common method to calculate aircraft insurance is by adding the following 
items:
1. Hull insurance =  1.3% of basic aircraft price
2. Liability =  flat rate of £7,500 (sterling) per annum  and a further
£100 per seat.
3. Terrorist risk =  10% of the annual figure for liabilities
4. Deductible payments =  flat rate of US$ 15,000
However, a consultant calculated aircraft insurance for a GCC report using the 
following formula:20
[1.5% * (cost price +  spare)] x [Flight time of the]
[number of hours per year ] [sector in hours ]
The consultant’s method was chosen to estimate the aircraft insurance for this study 
because of its simplicity. It is not a large contribution among the operating costs, and 
the value of insurance of this method is higher than the general method which makes 
it more specialised in the GCC environment.
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9.10.4 Fuel Costs
Aircraft fuel accounts for approximately one third of the total operating costs for most 
airlines. Fuel cost in this study was calculated as shown below:
Fuel costs =  BLOCK FUEL in gallons x US$ 0.70
♦ lib  =  0.1472 gallons
9.10.5 Cockpit and Cabin Crew
Flight and cabin crew salaries are grouped into captains, first officers and flight 
attendants. The formulae of their salaries are as follows:
1. Captain’s hourly cost =  $3562 x 1.5 x 12* =  $91.6
700
where
expected basic salary =  $3562/month
allowances =  50% of salary (1.5)
expected yearly working hours == 700 hours
♦ 12 months
2. First officer hourly cost =  $2740 x 1.5 x 12 =  $70.5
700
3. Flight attendant hourly cost =  One third of a first officer cost.
=  1/3 x $70.5 =  $23.5
Total flight and cabin crew cost per sector was found by adding the above three items 
(considering the number of flight attendants needed for each aircraft type) then 
multiplying that figure with flight time required to finish each sector.
9.10.6 User Charges
User charges include both landing and navigation costs. Landing costs were found by 
averaging most of the GCC airports landing fees per one kg of aircraft weight, and then 
multiplying that figure by the MTOW for each aircraft.
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Navigation charges =  $1.05 x number of NM xVMTOW/50 
where 1.05 is an average standard charge
9.10.7 Aircraft Maintenance Costs
There are two main components in aircraft maintenance costs which are hourly and 
cyclical costs. Usually, operating cost formulae for maintenance costs should be in 
proportion to the square root of MTOW divided by 50 tons. The following formulae 
were taken from research carried out by GPA Ltd:
1. Hourly maintenance costs ($) =  $365 xVMTOW/50 - $104
2. Cyclical maintenance cost for =  $44 x VMTOW/50 + $23.50 
turboprops ($)
3. Cyclical maintenance costs =  $510 xV^VfTOW/50 - $195 
for jets ($)
The above formulae should be treated with caution as they are accurate for application 
to a range of aircraft weights. On the other hand, for cyclical turboprop costs, the 
formulae should not be applied to those without pressurisation with significantly lower 
weights.
9.11 INDIRECT COST PER SECTOR
Indirect costs usually include administrative costs, rents, etc. For this analysis, the 
indirect cost per sector was found by the following formulae:
Indirect cost per sector =  [Number of seats x number of]
[ NMs x 0.025 ]
+  [Number of seats x number of]
[ NMs x 0 .5 x 0 .0 5  ]
The 0.5 in the second contribution is a load factor effect and in more accurate 
evaluations would be adjusted (to 0.6, for example, with a 60% passenger load factor). 
In this analysis it was taken as a constant 0.5.
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However, IDOC formula was modified based on a knowledge of Gulf Air’s 1990IDOC 
for its B-737s for average distance of 248 Nm (555 Km). This; choice was based on the 
availability of a Gulf Air budget report.
When adding Gulf Air IDOC, ground handling, ground engineering and catering, they 
came up to be 30.9% of the total operating costs.
The modification was applied to the IDOC of the earlier analysis to include ground 
handling and engineering and catering. It was then found to be 29% of TOC. In the 
calculation an allowance was made because the Gulf Air budget was for 1990 and the 
thesis analysis was for 1987-88. In addition, this modification was corrected for this 
analysis for B-737 at 248 Nm and then the formula obtained is applied for the rest of 
the aircraft at all length sectors. The final formula is:
[number of seats * number of Nm * 0.03] +
[number of seats * number of Nm * 0.5 * 0.0613]
9.10 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
This chapter starts by examining corporate planning and fleet planning and ends with 
a detailed assessment of the operating costs of candidate aircraft. On this basis the 

















However, the final selection decision will be made alter studying and assessing the total 
revenues of these aircraft, operating on some of the forecasted new routes, in the next 
chapter. This will be accomplished through analysis of these aircraft in a realistic 
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FIGURE 9.4 (Continued) General Aircraft Selection Process Model
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C H A P T E R  T E N
ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND REVENUES OF NEW ROUTES
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the level of profitability of new routes 
operated by candidate aircraft. Therefore this chapter has been written to complement 
the theory and results outlined in the preceding chapter and explains in more detail the 
concept of route planning.
Route development should exist within the framework of a corporate or strategic 
business plan. While Chapters 7-9 looked at planning at a macro level, this chapter 
considers planning at a micro, i.e. route by route level. However, route selection depend 
in general on profit motives and service motives. Profit motivated routes are those which 
generate maximum revenue for the lowest costs. On the other hand, routes which are 
motivated by service forces are underserved, inaccessible by other modes of transport, 
have significant trading or cultural links, or provide benefits to other sectors of the 
economy.
For the purposes of this thesis, route planning is defined as "the process of choosing a 
route, or network of routes, which optimises the economic benefit to the airline". The 
definition is very similar to the one given for fleet planning in Chapter 9.
The following are the most important criteria which are used to judge the suitability of 
a proposed new route:
1. Regulatory access to the market.
2. Economic and political stability.
3. Potential for market growth.
4. Acceptable business environment.
5. Ability to utilise existing aircraft types.
6. Synergy with existing operations.
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10.2 ROUTE PLANNING PROCESS
It is important to have the best quality of information for any evaluation of route 
potential. Many world wide markets are well documented and there is no shortage of 
data covering Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and parts of the Far East. On 
the other hand, there is less information available for the Middle East, Africa, South 
America, and parts of Asia. This underlines some of the difficulties facing the study of 
GCC routes.
The following are the main sources of information for new route evaluation:





■  l i b r a r i e s .
■ Academic bodies.
2. Specific information on economic trends and forecasts of GDP, consumer 
expenditure and inflation could be obtained through:
■ Banks and financial institution.
■ Professional forecasting companies.
■ Broader-based organisations such as OECD and IMF.
3. Air traffic data can be obtained through the following:




■ Organizations such as ICAO, IATA and etc.
Figure 10.1 is a general framework of the planning process for new routes, and consists 
of four phases which are first: political, economic and strategic scenarios. Second: 
marketing, forecasting, finance, risk and sensitivity considerations. Third: committee
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meetings and evaluation. Fourth is the final decision.
10.2.1 Political. Economic and Strategic Scenarios
10.2.1.1 Political Scenario
This involves considering the current political stability and future governmental changes 
that could affect economic conditions such as travel patterns, trade, foreign exchange, 
bilaterals and competition.
10.2.1.2 Economic Scenario
This covers studying the structure of the economy, and identifying the main components 
with regard to their future development such as industrial base, the country’s 
commodity trade (such as, oil, gas, and coffee), economic diversification, trade and 
tourism.
10.2.1.3. Strategic Scenario
Company’s strategic objectives should be carefully considered in regard to route 
opportunities. The vision of where an airline wants to be, should be analysed in depth 
with strategic plan. Such considerations should be looked at are the following:
1. Prospects for improving profits.
2. Need to defend against other airlines.
3. Generation of foreign exchange.
4. Feed to current network.
5. Make better use of resources (sucli as aircraft and route rights).
6. Long term views of traffic growth.
10.2.2. Marketing
10.2.2.1 Market Share
Market share is determined by the frequency and capacity that an airline operates 
compared to the competition and by overall competitiveness and attractiveness in the 
market place which is influenced by factors such as price, product range and standards, 
quality of services , market awareness, level of marketing power and size of overall
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network. Overall, frequency is generally the determinant for business markets, and 
capacity and low price are more closely related to the leisure market.
The relationship between capacity or frequency share that can be expected for new route 
is often referred as the Competitive Performance Index (CPI) which relates either to 
capacity share or frequency share. In any market, the CPI for all the carriers combined 
will be equal to 1, being the ratio of 100% of the market to 100% of the frequency of 
capacity.1
10.2.2.2 Market Research
Market research is useful for the following two reasons:
1. Analyse the characteristics of demand for passengers via different methods of 
transportation through travel agents, hotels, tourism facilities, embassies and 
companies.
2. They are very useful especially when past traffic data is inadequate or non­
existent.
10.2.2.3 Traffic Market
Identify the m^jor traffic flows such as city-pair if possible or country-pair. It is then 
desirable to segment the market by area of sale, by reason for travel, and specify ethnic 
flows. In addition, segment the market into origin and destination traffic, inter lining, 
and direct and indirect traffic. Finally, identify revenue passengers (excluding free and 
discounted passengers) only when evaluating route profitability or planning capacity.
10.2.2.4 Integration
This section should analyse the airline’s aircraft availability for the proposed new routes 
or for additional frequencies. Benefits of the new routes to and from the existing routes 
should be considered. Finally, schedule integration of the new routes with the already 
existing routes should be carried out to form an excellent network that would effectively 
use the resources of the airlines, serve in a competitive structure, operate under the 




Forecasting must take Into account the future traffic growth with upper and lower 
limits, taking into consideration that the actual answer could exceed or fall short of
expectations. Traffic demand should also be forecasted under the bases of price
elasticity and different levels of quality of services which determines the sensitivity of 
the demand on a particular market. As a result, attempts could be made to increase 
passenger demand. However, it should be noted that there is no "right answer" in 
forecasting. The successful forecaster is the one who has the ability and experience to 
analyse a complex set of market conditions and make consistent judgements (see Chapter 
7).
10.2.3.2 Economic Forecasting
Bearing in mind the remarks about technological and energy forecasts of Chapter 7, 
economic forecasting involves predicting future levels of inflation, GDP, consumer 
expenditure, exchange rates, interest rates, oil prices, and trade. Most of these factors 
affect the rate of growth and the composition of the markets.
10.2.3.3 Costs and Revenue Forecasts
Costs are usually determined by the efficiency of the airline and their ability to keep 
them low. In a deregulated environment, keeping costs to the minimum is a m^jor 
factor enabling an airline to remain in the air transport business. On the other hand, 
revenues are dependent upon the traffic structure, the market mix and segmentation, 
the inter-relationship of exchange rates and the levels of commission payable .
10.2.4. Finance
When considering new routes, financial analysis should be very carefully plan matters 
such as airline finance status, finance costs, acceptable financial return, and earning 
before tax or operating ratio. These should be defined within the strategic objectives 
of the decision to start a new route. If positive results have been accomplished, then it 
would be important to determine what is acceptable and decide on the level of 
investment for growth.
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10.2.5. Risk and Sensitivity Considerations
There is always a risk that the forecasted dala will change. This is true of the traffic 
demand forecast where they are mostly made by mathematical formulae. In addition, 
the decision to travel is not always taken by mathematical formulae - such as where and 
when to travel. They are made by emotion influenced by many factors, some of which 
are quite unpredictable. Wars, hyacking, terrorism and natural disasters are all 
recently phenomena that could throw the best forecasts off track. Recently, the Gulf war 
which caused many airlines to suffer from financial problems, and caused a sharp 
decrease in passenger demand even with regions thousands of miles away from the Gulf 
area.
The level of risk and exposure to political and economic uncertainty should always be 
considered in planning for new routes. Important issues are exchange rates/remittance 
volatility, and the sensitivity of the results to changes in forecasts assumptions in terms 
of growth potential, market stability, strength of competition.
10.2.6. Committee Meeting. Evaluation and Final Decision
Normally an airline will have many meetings evaluating all the data obtained in the 
previous stages of the new route planning process. Consideration should be given to 
whether the airline can withstand substantial net losses during the start up stage in 
opening a m^jor new route.
Following the committee meetings and evaluation, a final decision will be taken whether 
a new route would be opened or not.
10.3 THE REGULATORY ASPECTS OF AIRLINE ROUTE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The route structure is probably the most essential element in an airline’s formula for 
success because of its importance to normal business operations. In a regulated 
environment route rights are amongst an airlines’ most valuable assets.
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It Is important to consider the separation of domestic routes from the international 
routes, and the trunk line services from the local carrier services. A conflict occurs to 
whether a certain route would be belter served by local carrier or by trunk carrier. 
International routes usually involve politics through the foreign ministry of foreign 
country involved. Principally, international routes involve the following:
1. Bilateral agreements.
2. Pooling agreements (Commercial arrangements to share frequency, capacity and
revenue).
3. The requirement for a national airline to fly a politically desirable route.
Before considering the case of the GCC it Is interesting to note the origin of the USA 
domestic route system. This system goes back to the late 1920s when the Hoover 
administration granted American, TWA and United transcontinental mail contract 
authority.2
By 1958 the system had been much refined and the Federal Aviation Act of that year 
Title IV, Section 401 suggested the granting of certification on new routes to a carrier 
if it "....finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation 
properly, and that transportation is required by the public convenience and necessity 
...." .3 However, when an application was made for new routes or for an extension of 
already established routes, the Board took the following into consideration:
1. Can the applicant usefully serve the public need?
2. Could this need be fulfilled adequately by the existing carriers?
3. Will the proposed service by the applicant damage the operations of the already
existing carriers contraiy to the public interest?
4. Does the costs of the proposed service overshadow the benefits?
5. Does the financial and economic need of the applicant carrier justify the
certification of the new route?
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In addition, before any carrier was selected to offer the service, the Board had to 
establish the public’s need to such a service which will include the following 
considerations:
1. Analysing the past traffic data carried between the points.
2. Studying the operating performance of the already serving carrier if the service 
is not new (such as frequency and load factor).
3. Speculating the potential growth of traffic.
Overall, the following are some of considerations which were taken by the Board in 
route proceedings:4
1. The need for the proposed service.
2. The fitness of the applicant.
3. Diversionary effects.
4. The historical interest of the applicant in the route.
5. The integration of the proposed route in the applicant’s network.
6. The need for carrier strengthening.
7. Finally, the applicant’s route structure.
Although this thesis is concerned with liberalisation in the GCC, and the above rules for 
the US were swept away by deregulation in 1978, rules such as these might be useful on 
some routes within the GCC even after liberalisation.
10.4 IDENTIFYING FEASIBLE NEW ROUTES IN THE GCC
Forecasting passenger demand for new routes is a very long and hard process that 
requires mathematical formulae and judgemental decisions at eveiy phase. Nevertheless, 
the gravity model was chosen in chapters seven and eight to model the GCC domestic 
air services traffic. Previous data and analysis results will be applied in this chapter to 
forecast traffic on new and potential routes in that part of the world.
263
It should be noted that although new routes are not served at the present time as direct 
services, connections are available via one or several flight stops.
10.5 COSTS AND REVENUES OF THE NEW ROUTES
Data from chapter nine were used as the basis of the financial analysis of the new 
routes. Such data included the total costs of different aircraft per N.M . However, the 
objective of this financial analysis was to find the costs and revenues of different aircraft 
on each of the possible new routes. Every route was analysed financially to find whether 
that specific route was commercially operational for other carriers. Revenues on every 
new route were analysed when operated by different aircraft under the following 
conditions:
1. Revenues per sector per maximum number of forecasted passengers or aircraft 
capacity.
Profit of that particular route operated by a specific aircraft.
Percentage of profit with regard to total costs.
2. Revenues at 100% load factor for a specific aircraft.
3. Revenues at 75% load factor for a specific aircraft.
4. Revenues at 65% load factor for a specific aircraft.
5. Revenues at 50% load factor for a specific aircraft.
The following city-pairs are the new routes which were evaluated. For each the daily 
forecast number of passengers is given as well as the table numbers for the detailed 
calculation:
CITY-PAIR THE DAILY FORECAST TABLE
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS NUMBERS
1. ABU DHABI-ABHA 28 Table 10.1
2. ABU DHABI-MEDINAH 28 Table 10.2
3. BAHRAIN-ABHA 47 Table 10.3
4. BAHRAIN-ALQASSAIM 24 Table 10.4
5. BAHRAIN-GIZAN 26 Table 10.5




8. BAHRAIN-TAIF 23 Table 10.8
9. DOHA-ABHA 25 Table 10.9
10. DOHA-MEDINAH 25 Table 10.10
11. DUBAI-ABHA 97 Table 10.11
12. DUBAI-ALQASSAIM 82 Table 10.12
13. DUBAI-GIZAN 53 Table 10.13
14. DUBAI-MEDINAH 96 Table 10.14
15. DUBAI-TABUK 44 Table 10.15
16. DUBAI-TAIF 46 Table 10.16
17. KUWATT-ABHA 63 Table 10.17
18. KUWATT-ALQASSIAM 36 Table 10.18
19. KUWATT-GIZAN 35 Table 10.19
20. KUWATT-MEDINAH 72 Table 10.20
21. KUWATT-TABUK 34 Table 10.21
22. KUWAIT-TAIF 32 Table 10.22
23. MUSCAT-ABHA 21 Table 10.23
24. MUSCAT-MEDINAH 20 Table 10.24
25. SHARJAH-DHARAN 21 Table 10.25
26. SHARJAH-JEDDAH 34 Table 10.26
27. SHARJAH-RIYADH 39 Table 10.27
All routes are from one GCC country member to another one. As a result, both <
member states (origin and destination) will benefit from the services.
The distance between every route was measured as great circle in nautical miles. Some 
of the routes are assumed to support one or two flights per day, as indicated in the top 
of every table. As is noted from the previous tables, revenues vary with aircraft types 
which indicates that certain aircraft would be far better than others with regard to 
profit making on certain routes. It should also be noted that there are no corporate 
income taxes in the GCC countries, and the profit an airline or a company generates 
every year is not subjected to taxation.
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The forecast results which have been used in this analysis are purely dependent on the 
gravity model. However, from the analysis of Chapters seven and eight, the best 
forecast results are a combination of two methods, for example statistical and 
judgemental prediction. In this analysis, a judgemental forecast method has not been 
applied. However, judgement suggests that the quantitative forecasts made using the 
gravity model are conservative.
There are many routes which were really under estimated, such as Medinah and Taif. 
Medinah is a very holy city and Taif is very close to the most holy position for all 
Muslim nations - Mecca. In addition, Taif Is considered to be a nice tourist city. 
However, since these airports are maiidy considered domestic airports, most of the 
traffic they received is via Jeddah airport. The gravity model does not recognise this 
variable. When applying judgemental forecast especially to these two airports, daily 
passenger forecast would probably treble.
10.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
This chapter used the results of the analysis in chapters seven and eight which forecast 
passenger demand, and from chapter nine for aircraft selection and evaluation, to 
predict new routes and to consider certain aircraft operating on them. This estimated 
their level of profitability. As a result, most of the routes were found to be remarkably 
profitable especially with the absence of lax regulation in that part of the world. This 
chapter proved that the feasible routes, which were researched in the previous chapters, 
are attractive and can be operated commercially by new carriers. The following elements 
summarise the research conclusions reached at the end of this chapter.
1. There is an attractive level of passenger demand for the domestic airline services 
within the GCC countries.
2. There are potential new routes that could be operated efficiently and beneficially 
to passengers by providing direct services.
3. Fifteen different aircraft were analysed and evaluated on the feasible new routes. 
Some of aircraft were proven to be very attractive commercially on these new 
routes.
These new routes were proven to lie remarkably attractive and should encourage 
new carriers to enter the markel.
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FIGURE 10.1s General Framework of New Route Planning Process
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FIGURE 10.1 (Continued): General Framework of New Route Planning
Process
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OÔ KIOOWjf̂ - 
•«* **«••*
m i s s s *
•-*r ^ <»




•  >(» 
•  gji
M.JI•







s n  n
} l *
M lK





8«Uk 2 S » E S 3 2 SN *" w“-*




•  *• K
S 8 * ma ra ••
!Q •" •
*.s.siR t  *”
.- K «
3*K








3 * * B 2 « 8
- J 8 S g 2 .8 |g  
s  ~
s i & s s g g i*-* Dl








ma n i •
s s s  * % a v »«
m̂ N*- f4 v














• S t S 5 f  S 8 8N IÂ  «OW
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SCHEDULING ON A POSSIBLE NEW GCC NETWORK
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Using all the data from the previous chapters, the objective of this chapter is to propose 
a possible new network in the GCC. However, an analysis and discussion of airline 
scheduling, such as its concepts, methodology and profitability, are part of the process 
of exploring new opportunities in the GCC.
Scheduling is one of the most critical and complex tasks in the airline industry and is 
directly related to the fleet planning and route planning processes explained in the 
previous Chapters. Its complexity stems from the conflicting objectives of needing to 
satisfy the passengers9 requirements, economic efficiency, airline aims, operational 
feasibility, numerous constraints, and governmental demands (especially for government 
owned airlines). However, airline scheduling is critical because the timetable represents 
one of the primary product features and one of the main factors in the passenger’s 
choice of a particular carrier. As a result, financial leverage and profitability depends 
on it.
A comprehensive definition could be mathematical, but for the purposes of this thesis, 
the essence of the main objective of scheduling in a financially motivated airline "is to 
balance the conflicting demand of maximising attractiveness and revenues gains against 
minimising costs".
Airline scheduling is as important as forecasting, fleet planning, pricing, or financing. 
However, it is processed in coqjunction with market planning and fleet planning 
decisions. Nevertheless, since airline schedules are at the core of the product that is 
being offered to the passenger, they are ideally market driven processes and the 
resources should be provided accordingly.
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Overall, airline scheduling could be defined as " the art of designing system-wide flight 
patterns that provide optimum public service, in both quantity and quality, consistent 
with the financial health of the carrier"1
11.2 DETERMINANTS OF PASSENGERS’ CHOICE TO TRAVEL
Johnston et aP evaluated the choice of air carrier on routes in Canada made by 150 
passengers. The results ranked reasons with order. These are flight schedule, safety, air 
fare, aircraft characteristics, the reservation system, services in the aircraft and at the 
airport.
Overall, the main factors that determine a passenger’s choice of an air carrier appeared 
to be the following:
1. Travel outlays
2. Travel time of different modes of transport
3. Flight frequency
4. Aircraft departure and arrival times
5. Bus and train departure schedules
6. Respecting departure schedules (punctuality)
Although the most important factors are flight frequency and departure times, Simpson3 
notes that the effects of flight frequency and schedules on transportation demand are 
very rarely examined.
Table 11.1 gives the results of a study made by Fletcher4 in a M.Sc. thesis of the basic 
factors that influenced 61 business passengers in their choice of a certain airline on the 
North Atlantic routes. Ranking each service feature with a range of 1-9, punctuality, 
comfort on board, legroom, safety, and schedule scored between 82-90%. However, 
cabin crew, food, and check-in scored between 71-76%. Finally, entertainment, 
immigration, airline image, cheap fare and advertisement scored between 34-63%. 
However, personal benefits were analysed in the same study and listed in the same table, 
resulting in a wider range of views because of the personal benefits gained in each
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factor.
In a monopolistic situation, low or inadequate flight frequency or high load factor will 
result in an increase in the number of passengers refused carriage and a rise in the 
number who turn to other modes of transportation. On the other hand, if there are 
many carriers on the same route, it is even more important to accurately plan flight 
frequency and departure times to maximize the airline’s market share.
11.3 AIRLINE SCHEDULING METHODOLOGY
11.3.1 M ethods of Airline Scheduling
There are two main methods in airline scheduling. These are the following:
1. FIXED AIRLINE SCHEDULING - this is the oldest and most widely used 
method. It is prepared in advance by the airline and valid for a certain period 
of time. Departure and arrival times are known for all the routes on these 
networks, printed in publications and given to the transportation market. 
However, Simpson5 concluded that the main defect of this type of scheduling is 
"static" and not really adjusted sufficiently to passenger needs which vary with 
time.
2. DYNAMIC SCHEDULING - based on a theory introduced towards the end of 
1960’s. The objective is to adjust aircraft departure times as much as possible 
to passenger requests to increase the quality of service. The problem is that 
frequent changes in timetable are confusing and slot limits prevent its application 
in the real world.
11.3.2. Approaches to  Airline Schedule Design
Since scheduling involves complex process and numerous constraints, computer 
techniques are very much involved in scheduling models. Etschmaier and Mathaisel* 
noted the following two approaches to airline schedule design:7
1. THE DIRECT APPROACH - this employs various heuristic procedures. It is
clear particularly in recent years that an optimum airline schedule could not be
accomplished using the classical mathematical programming because of the 
various factors that could not be adequately quantified. As a result, in order to 
produce an optimum airline schedule, an attempt to optimize the carrier’s overall 
activities is definitely not possible.
2. THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH - the process of scheduling in this approach 
is made using the following steps:
■ Determining the flight frequency on individual routes.
■ Determining the possible departure times and having considered the 
following:
Passenger requests 
Convenient times of arrival
Convenient transfer points, planning short transfer waiting times 
for connecting passengers.
■ When departure times are established, the proposed schedule is tested 
with regard to operational constraints.
■ When departure times are adopted, fleet assignment will occur where each 
aircraft is given specific flight schedule over a certain period of time.
■ When aircraft have been routed, an analysis of the schedule’s flexibility 
is made to find the possibility of decreasing the number of aircraft 
needed.
11.3.3. Types of Airline Schedule
The following are the four basic schedule types used for assigning airline equipment:’
1. NONSTOP - this type of scheduling is used more by nnyor and national carriers 
as an alternative to hub and spoke. The main advantage of this type is to provide 
fast service between terminal points, and the disadvantage is that no intermediate 
stations receive service on these flights.
2. SKIP STOP - is providing one service and skipping one or more intermediate 
cities, with service provided by other carriers. For example, if an airline has 
service to points A, B, C, D, and E, skip stop scheduling will provide services A, 
C, and E, however, services to B and D will be provided by other flights. The
301
advantage of this type of scheduling is to provide fast services to intermediate 
cities, but the disadvantage is the service is not provided to consecutive cities.
3. LOCAL SERVICE - a shorter range, small aircraft operates on a segment and 
connects at a larger airport to or from long-range, larger aircraft. The advantage 
of this type of scheduling is to provide fast service between small intermediate 
stations and terminals, however, the disadvantage is the need to change aircraft.
4. CROSS-CONNECTIONS - this type is the most frequently used in airline 
scheduling. It is sim ilar to a hub system, bringing traffic to one city (hub) and 
connecting to other cities. As a result, it provides more daily service between 
points and has the advantage that one flight serves several markets. However, the 
disadvantage is the change of aircraft and traffic congestion.
These four schedule or network types have developed into complex patterns and more 
sophisticated arrangements. The most important of these is the hub and spoke which 
is based on the local service and cross connection arrangement. In the successful hub 
and spoke waves or banks of flights are synchronised to arrive and then depart to 
maximise connection possibilities (see Section 4.8). Other arrangements include the 
’developed line’ (i.e. line with branches) and the multi-hub (i.e. hubs with co-ordinated 
connecting services).
11.4 PRODUCT PLANNING
As regulation decreases (leaving aside the problem of airport and airspace congestion) 
the airlines should have a wider range of product choices. Product planning is " deciding 
what product features to offer in each market segment in which an airline is hoping to 
sell its services or products."1*
Product planning is crucial in the following aspects:
1. It is a linkage to match potential demand with actual supply in the market it 
serves.
2. It has a direct impact on operating costs.
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An airline’s product centres on the schedule which is offered to customers. The 
scheduler has to consider veiy carefully which features are necessary to attract and 
satisfy the potential passengers in different market segments. This means that the 
scheduler has to understand the needs and requirements of the different market 
segments.
The following should be considered by schedulers because they influence an airline’s 
potential customers:11
1. The schedule-based features of services being offered such as the number of 
frequencies operated, departure and arrival times, aircraft type, whether the 
flight is direct, stopping or require transfer connection. The scheduler has to 
understand that different market segments have different schedule requirements 
such as the following:
■ Short-haul business markets normally require a morning flight and an 
early evening flight in each direction in weekdays, so business trips can 
finish in a day.
■ For example, Scandinavian Airlines12 SAS found from their passengers 
that two thirds of them care about departure and arrival time for their 
choice of an airline, and two third claimed that direct non-stop flights are 
also important.
■ Table 11.2 shows the results13 of a survey made in 1987 by the 
International Federation of Airline Passenger Associations of more than 
25,000 passengers, most of whom are likely to be business travellers. It 
identifies the most important features when choosing an airline.
■ North American passengers are more concerned about low fares 
(moderately important elsewhere), and frequent flyer program.
Overall, fares and schedule-based features are the most important product 
components because they can be seen and objectively quantified.
2. The fares and fare conditions charged for different alternative routings.
3. Comfort-based product features. Liberalisation opened the doors for competition 
on comfort which intensified the need for product innovation. However, there are
three main aspects determine passenger perceptions:
■ The layout and configuration of the aircraft which include:
Width and pitch of each seat.
Number of separate classes of cabin and services.
The type of seats installed.
The number of toilets.
Interior design and colours.
■ In-flight service and catering standards which could include the following:
Variety and quality of food and beverages
The number of cabin staff
The range of newspapers and magazines
Give-away gifts for first and business class and children
In-flight films
■ Quality and variety of services on ground which could include the 
following:
Quality of handling staff
The provision of check-in desks to reduce the queuing time 
Special ground facilities for first class such as
•  Special lounges
•  Office services
•  Car parking valets
•  lim ousine service to collect and deliver passenger to and
from their homes or offices
•  The speed of check-in time especially involving baggage 
The convenience of access to an aircraft service which is usually reached through 
the following:
■ Layout and location of the sales offices
■ The availability of telephone lines for reservations
■ The assistance and helpfulness of counter or telephone staff
■ The role of travel agents in airline distribution 
Airline image which could be improved or reduced through:
■ Reputation for consistent on-time performance and product deliveiy
■ Promotion and advertising
■ Airline logo
■ Aircraft’s colour schemes
■ Aircraft’s interior design
■ Airport lounges and sales offices
■ The quality of service from staff both in the air and on the ground.
11.5 PRINCIPLES OF PROFITABILITY BASED ON THE SCHEDULE
An airline schedule determines the profitability and utilization of the airline’s resources. 
It effects efficiency and costs. The following are eleven principles which must be 
addressed to achieve profitability, according to Mort Beyer. He believes that they are 
applicable in almost all situations:14
1. Usually the dominant airline offers the greatest frequency and maximum seats 
and enjoys higher load factor and yields than its competitors.
2. Normally airlines dissipate their resources by spreading them too thinly trying 
to serve too many markets.
3. Frequently airline schedulers chase the load factor and down-size aircraft used 
on routes, which results in losing more passengers than offsetting any gain in 
load factor.
4. Most of the scheduling decisions are made by top executives on an impulse basis 
and end up bringing unpleasant results.
5. If a new route does not mature in two months, the airline should cut It out 
because it will never mature profitably.
6. Few international carriers schedule the same flight number through their hubs. 
A through flight normally flies five times more passengers over the hub than a 
connection.
7. Many airlines utilize all types of aircraft they own on a given route.
8. Many non-USA airlines do not care about establishing self-feed.
9. Many airlines resist changing their schedule. They offer traditional routes at 
specific times regardless of the other benefits in terms of connections, and 
through routing.
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10. Many airlines enjoy blaming the scheduling department first for inefficient 
operations, low load factor and high costs.
11. With many and fast changes in the airline industry, an airline’s scheduling 
should be flexible to meet those competitive changes. These include hubs 
replacing linear routes in the USA, business class dominating long-haul routes, 
frequent flyer programs, CRS systems, and discounted fares.
11.6 THE SCHEDULING PROCESS
The scheduling department is one of the most important in an airline because it is 
responsible for the airline product on offer to the customers. In addition, scheduling 
increases its importance in a liberalised market where competition also exists on fares 
and quality of service. There is no perfect airline scheduling process because of the 
conflicting objectives, complexity and serious constraints involved.
Figure 11.1 is a general framework for the scheduling process. It involves corporate 
strategy, fleet planning, marketing planning, scheduling inputs, computer models, 
committee meetings, scheduling outputs, and finally agreeing the final schedule.
The scheduling department will receive data from inside and outside the airline, and it 
should consider external and internal factors very carefully because they consist of 
constraints, objectives and requirements.
11.6.1. Corporate Strategy
Airline schedulers should be aware and very well informed about corporate strategy 
especially in the four areas which are listed below:
1. Financial objectives including gaining the best return for shareholders.
2. Economic objectives to make the best overall use of resources.
3. Market growth which will define the route expansion strategy of an airline
through for example, the bilateral agreement between countries for international 
flights and expanding in the current market.
4. The competition which is currently effecting an airline’s market. Schedulers
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should be knowledgeable about corporate strategy regarding competition and 
measures and plans to react in the marketplace.
11.6.2. M arketing Planning
Data will be received from marketing planning covering information about the 
marketing strategy that the airline is adopting, its marketing objectives, traffic growth, 
new markets and routes and market shares.
A schedule planner should consider the following marketing factors:
1. The size of a given market and forecasting its future growth.
2. The effect of the planned product changes on the airline’s own share of the total 
market.
3. Planning actions to meet competition.
4. The need to deny opportunities to competitors.
5. Estimating revenues and costs of the alternative plans and deciding which will be 
more profitable.
6. Other factors such as trip length, time zones, and proximity of the airport to the 
market served.
The following are the main external factors with respect to marketing:
1. Hotel check-in and check-out
2 . Travel agents requirements in terms of consistency
3. Freight forwarders need for end of day, end of week departures
4. Rental car availability
Many airline marketing problems are unique for the following reasons:
1. The financial leverage of load factors.
2. The problem of traffic flow between sectors.
3. The operational constraints to accomplish schedule adjustments as desired
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because of problems of time zones, equipment turn-around, station personnel, 
and chain reaction effect.
4. The sensitivity of schedule saleability to even small differences in departure and
arrival times or other factors.
11.6.3. Fleet Planning
Information will be fed to the scheduling department from the fleet planning 
department. Information such as the number of aircraft in the fleet in the present and 
future, their physical performance, maintenance needs and most important operating 
costs.
11.6.4. External Factors
The external factors include mainly airport and ATC controls, marketing and insurance 
policies (i.e. overnighting in high risk areas).
11.6.4.1 Controls
The external controls include the following points:
1. Airport controls - This involves the two factors:
■ Capacity restriction. The important airports of Europe and the USA are 
congested at peak times. Therefore, a bargaining process is necessary 
between the airlines for use of the available runway, apron and terminal 
capacity. Schedules have to be co-ordinated well in advance.
■ Night flying restrictions. Many airports close at certain times at night for 
departures and arrivals.
2. Airspace controls - The imposition of "flow control" has been increasing in recent 
years as a method of making demand match available capacity.
3. Regulatory controls - They effect scheduling freedom for the following reasons:
■ The bilateral agreements may limit the capacity and sometimes the timing 
which can be flown by airlines from each country.
■ Even in domestic flights, airlines may enter into pooling and capacity 
agreements among themselves.
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■ Transit/overflight rights could be difficult to obtain.
4. Time zones - This is an important factor affecting schedule action. The airline 
scheduler should plan departure and arrival times with regard to time zones 
differences and the times passengers prefer to travel.
11.6.4.2. Insurance Policies
Insurance policies usually do not cover night stops in war zones. In addition, political 
or military instability could close vital airspace from time to time which would force 
airlines to re-plan in the short or longer term. Such cases occurred during the Gulf 
crisis when the airlines changed their flight schedules involving that part of the world. 
The new schedules required longer time to travel between stations to avoid the new 
restricted areas, and fares had to rise to cover the increase in insurance.
11.6.5. Internal Factors
The internal factors affecting scheduling usually include maintenance requirements, 
aircraft availability, flight operations, hub connection, ground equipment and facilities 
requirements.
11.6.5.1 Maintenance Requirements
Maintenance requires that certain stations be provided with personnel and facilities for 
periodic checks. The schedule should allow the aircraft to arrive in the correct time and 
location for maintenance, especially under a "progressive" system. However, the main 
maintenance efficiency goals are the following:
1. Minimum aircraft out-of-service time.
2. Utilize maximum time allowable on aircraft and parts between overhauls.
3. Optimum utilization of personnel and workload.
4. Maximum utilization of facilities.
11.6.5.2 Aircraft Availability
Successful airlines utilize their aircraft and personnel efficiently, however, airline 
schedulers are faced with problems with the availability of aircraft due to maintenance,
additional frequencies or more routes.
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11.6.5.3 Flight Operations
Once flight schedules are published, they should be flown within the limits of safe and 
efficient operation. However, the following are the important operational factors in 
schedule planning:15
1. Airport runway lengths
2. Aircraft fleet capacity
3. Adverse weather
4. Routing and air traffic control
5. Crew flight time limits
6. Employee agreements
11.6.5.4 Ground and Facilities Requirements
The objective of ground service is "to accommodate as many flights as possible and as 
efficiently as possible, consistent with physical limitations and prudent utilization of 
personnel and equipment". However, the schedule planner should consider the 
following:15
1. Providing enough gate positions for a large number of aircraft simultaneously.
2. Providing adequate ticket-counter space to handle the passengers speedily, and
efficiently making best use of a number of ticket counter, ramp, and food 
services personnel.
3. Allowing sufficient time for on-line or interline transfer of passengers, baggage, 
cargo and mail.
4. Providing the right ground equipment such as baggage vehicles, aircraft starter 
units, fork-lift trucks, cargo conveyors and tow tractors.
Overall the schedule planner is faced with a variety of challenges in ground operations, 
many of which are conflicting.
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11.6.6. Computer Model
Most airlines except the smallest utilize computer-based techniques which model the 
effects of frequency, routing, capacity, timing and load factor on the overall levels of 
traffic especially on market shares and revenue gains compared with costs and 
investments.
11.6.7. Objective
The objective of the airline computer model is to maximize attractiveness, revenues, and 
minimize costs.
The following objective functions are the most frequent (Simpson):17
1. Maximising the airline’s profit
2. Minimizing the fieri; size
3. Minimizing the operating costs
4. M aximizing the total benefits to the airline and society
11.6.8. Committee Meeting
In many airlines, a committee meeting will be held to consider the outputs of the 
computer model. Senior executives provide comments and consultations before 
proceeding to the final scheduling decisions. Alterations could be made to the scheduling 
inputs and the computer model program.
11.6.9. Scheduling Outputs
The computer model should give numerous outputs, and the listed below are the main 
scheduling outputs:







Particular care must be taken to ensure that the proposed schedule can accept the 
inevitable changes in internal and external factors otherwise poor on-time performance 
will result. This flexibility and ability to recover from problems is often known as 
"robustness".
11.7 A POSSIBLE NEW GCC NETWORK
The new network proposed in this thesis contains 16 possible routes that can be operated 
profitably in the GCC. These routes have been selected according to the forecast given 
in the previous chapters. In addition, this network is only a sample of what could be 
viable financially and operationally. Other new routes were found feasible but the 
sample of 16 was used as an example.
Table 11.3 shows the proposed network together with number of frequencies on each 
route, and forecasted daily passengers.
The Challenger RJ jet aircraft with 50 seats capacity was selected in the previous 
chapter for its speed, capacity, comfort, total costs and profit potential. In addition, 
according to the forecasted demand on each route and the number of frequencies which 
are planned to be provided, six Challenger RJ aircraft were found to be the right figure 
to start the new network. If more than six aircraft were scheduled, it would cost more. 
If the number of aircraft were reduced, the quality of service would decrease and the 
punctuality will suffer.
The main objective of this flight schedule is to provide a high quality of service which 
the GCC market is sensitive to (Chapter 8). A confirmation of the quality of service 
results in Chapter 8 was made during an interview with the executive vice president of 
the corporate planning department of Gulf Air in January, 1991.18
The quality of service of this network will be maximised by:
1. Providing direct flights only.
2. Jet aircraft services only.
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3. The departure and arrival times are those desired by the public with an earliest 
morning flight at 07:00 and latest night flight at 21:00.
4. Business travellers are provided with morning and evening flights on the same 
day on the same routes.
5. The plan would be to supply excellent services on board aircraft and on the 
ground.
This new airline would have a strong probability of offering the best services, most 
competitive fares, most efficient operating costs and one of the highest profits for the 
reasons indicated below:
1. Most of the present airlines are government owned and usually have high 
operating costs.
2. Most of the competitive airlines do not consider the quality of service factors very 
carefully because they enjoy a full monopoly in their markets.
3. There is no income taxes in the GCC countries.
4. There are no labour unions in the GCC market.
Figure 11.2 shows the scheduling plan for the whole network with origin and destination 
stations which are Kuwait, Bahrain, Abha, Taif, Dubai and Medinah. The average 
utilization of each aircraft is 8 block hours per day. Table 11.4 illustrates comparative 
utilization and load factors for a cross section of world carriers.
Table 11.5 is the timetable for the network. It indicates for each route the departure 
and arrival times, flight numbers, and aircraft registration code.
11.8 FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE NEW NETWORK
As a rule, the only factor that will allow a commercially based oiganization to stay in
business in a free enterprise environment is by making profit. Otherwise, such an
oiganization will get into difficulty and may go out of business.
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One of fhe main objectives of this research is to prove that a new carrier in the GCC 
airline industry could operate profitably.
Table 11.6 exhibits the total costs of the new airline. Detailed explanations about the 
total costs (direct and indirect) of the routes were made in the previous chapter.
However, Table 11.7 shows for each route revenues per sector, maximum forecasted 
traffic, aircraft capacity, profit, and percentage of profit (i.e. profitability). These 
revenue figures are calculated separately in the following different cases:
1. Using forecasted sector traffic.
2. Using 100% load factor.
3. Using 75% load factor.
4. Using 65% load factor.
5. Using 50% load factor.
The above cases were analysed so a wider financial view could be projected for better 
planning results. Nevertheless, the average percentage of profit for the whole network 
is 42% for the forecasted sector traffic case, and an average of 2% for 65% load factor. 
The prices which were used in this analysis are similar to the prices of the other airlines. 
It should be noted that the revenues which indicated above are from passengers only. 
Table 11.7 shows some routes which are more profitable than others. On the other 
hand, revenues from freight, excess baggage and mail were disregarded in this study. 
Gulf Air, Saudia and Kuwait Airways generate the following percentages of operating 
revenues:1’
Tvpe of Revenue Gulf Air Kuwait
Airwavs
Saudia Aver
Passengers (%) 86.9 80.7 84.1 83.9
Excess baggage (%) 3.9 4.4 2.8 3.7
Freight (%) 8.4 14.1 11.6 11.4
Mail (%) 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.0
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If the averages of these different revenues of fhe three carriers are applied to the
financial analysis of the proposed network, the following results will be obtained:
Percentage
Profitability
1. Total daily percentage of profitability 
from passengers only:
■ As per forecasted passengers
■ As per 65% load factor
2. Total daily percentage of profitability from 
passengers, excess baggage and mail (Table 11.8):
■ As per forecasted passengers
■ As per 65% load factor
3. Total daily percentage of profitability 
from passengers, freight, excess baggage 
and mail (Table 11.9):
■ As per forecasted passengers
■ As per 65% load factor
11.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
Airline scheduling is crucial to a carrier’s success because it is the key to the product 
that is offered to the passengers. On the other hand, the airline scheduling process is 
complex and critical because of the involvement of conflicting objectives.
As a result, a balancing of those conflicting objectives should be carried out very 
carefully. Such objectives are airline aims, economic efficiency and operational 
feasibility and public service requirements. The main scheduling objective is to balance 
the conflicting demand of maximising attractiveness and revenues gains against 
minimizing costs. It should be considered that there is no schedule that satisfies 







A new pattern of GCC routes which complement the existing network has been analysed 
and presented in this chapter. The network involves Kuwait, Abha, Madinah, Taif,
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Bahrain, and Dnbai with total daily of 24 frequencies between those stations. Six 
Challenger RJ jet aircraft have found to be the right figure, giving an average daily 
utilisation of 8 block hours per aircraft.
This new network has been analysed and proven to be financially feasible. AH the routes 
make an attractive profit for any new carriers operating them. The percentage of profit 
of the whole network is calculated and is commercially attractive for at least one new 
regional airline.
However, if this new network is introduced in real life, changes and alterations to this 
planned schedule would be likely to occur after a certain period of time. This is 
because of the feedback that will be received from each route.
Because these new routes do not exist at the present time in the form of direct services, 
the actual carrier would have to dynamically decide alterations to frequencies and 
departure and arrival times. Mr AT-Maskaiy29 indicated that forecasting new routes 
could produce the unexpected, giving an example of opening a new route by Gulf Air 
from Nairobi. It was not forecasted that it would attract first and business passengers 
flying to and from the Far East. In practice the route was a success.
The previous Chapter noted the merits of judgemental forecasts as a complement to a 
gravity model. Judgement suggests that traffic to certain cities on the proposed 
network, especially Medinah and Taif, could be much higher than the gravity model 
suggests. This is because of their important locations for religious visitors. (Medinah 
is a holy city, and Taif is located close to the holy city of Mecca, in addition, Taif is also 
a tourist city). In practice any new airline would be able to adjust Its schedule 
accordingly.
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TABLE 11.1: Basic Factors Influencing Business Passenger’s Choice of an Airline
on North Atlantic Routes.
SERVICE FEATURES RANK PERCENTAGE |
Punctuality 1 90 |
Comfort on Board 2 89 I
Legroom 3 87 I
Safety 4 86
Schedule 5 82





Airline Image 11 60
Cheapest Fares 12 56
Advertisement 13 34
PERSONAL BENEFITS
Separate Check-In 1 83
Sleeper-Recliner Seat 2 83
Extra Space on Board 3 81
Complimentary Travel 4 79
Priority Boarding and Embarkation 5 73
Lounge Facilities 6 72
Free Standby Ticket 7 69
Menu/Wine Selection 8 64
Frequent Flyer Scheme 9 63
On-Board Communication 10 39
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TABLE 11.3: The New Routes of the Proposed Network.
=..
CITYPAIR NUMBER OF 
FREQUENCIES
DAILY FORECASTED 1 
TRAFFIC |
1 . K u w ait-M ed in ah 2 72
2 . K uw ait-A bha 2 63
3 . K u w a i t -T a if 1 35
4 . M ed in ah -K u w ait 2 72
5 . M e d in a h -B a h ra in 1 49
6 . M ed in ah -D u b a i 2 96
7 . B a h ra in -M e d in a h 1 49
8 . B a h ra in -A b h a 1 47
9 . A bh a-K u w ait 2 63
1 0 . A b h a -B a h ra in 1 47
1 1 . A bh a-D u b ai 2 97
1 2 . T a if - K u w a i t 1 35
1 3 . T a if - D u b a i 1 53
1 4 . Dub ad.-M edinah 2 96
1 5 . D u b ai-A b h a 2 97
1 6 . D u b a i - T a i f 1 53
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TABLE 11.4: Comparative Utilizations and Load Factors
COMPARATIVE UTILISATIONS COMPARATIVE SCHEDULED
A verage daily  No. o f LOAD FACTORS
utilisa tio n  (h rs) a ircra ft Load A verage leng th
UTA 10.6 10 F ac to r o f  haul (km)
Cruzeiro 10.5 14 (%>
Air India 10.3 17 Cubana 77.5 1.135
Lufthansa 10.0 110 Iran Air 76.5 951
Qantas 10.0 26 Icelandair 76.1 1.075
Sabena 9.9 24 LOT 74.9 921
American 9.6 290 Indian Airlines 74.3 566
Aeromexico 9.5 43 Ansett 74.1 800
Pan Am 9.5 109 Philippine 74.0 882
JAL 9.1 82 TAA 73.8 781
TWA 9.0 165 Air New Zealand 71.0 633
Swissair 8.9 50 CP Air 69.8 1.639
CP Air 8.9 37 Aer Lingus 69.3 650
Eastern 8.8 289 TAP 68.8 1.565
Mexicans 8.6 46 UTA 68.7 3.185
KLM 8.5 52 British Airways 68.6 1.279
Vasp 8.3 30 Air Algeria 68.1 1.344
BCal 8.2 29 JAL 68.0 2.436
Iberia 8.2 85 Air France 67.9 1.384
United 8.2 325 KLM 67.5 1.733
Air France 8.2 99 SAS 67.4 687
British Airways 8.0 136 Air Zimbabwe 66.7 887
Alitalia 8.0 86 PIA 66.3 1.023
Air Canada 7.9 121 Iberia 66.2 944
Continental 7.9 131 TWA 66.0 1.531
Air New Zealand 7.8 33 Olympic 66.0 687
Egyptair 7.8 27 Sabena 65.7 1,216
Philippine 7.7 32 Air India 65.5 2.504
TAA 7.7 29 Tunis Air 65.3 1.065
Gulf Air 7.5 20 Air Canada 64.9 1,240
Finnair 7.3 32 Varig 64.9 1.251
Flying Tiger 7.3 34 Continental 64.8 1.336
Alia 7.3 16 Alitalia 64.7 875
PIA 7.3 36 American 64.6 1.337
JAT 7.3 27 Swissair 64.6 1.127
Indian Airlines 7.2 48 Lloyd Aero Boliviano 64.6 732
Icelandair 7.1 11 CSA 64.4 1.079
Austrian 7.1 17 Avianca 64.1 737
Royal Air Maroc 7.1 18 Cruzeiro 64.1 743
Avianca 7.0 25 JAT 63.9 717
Braathens 6.9 16 Trans Brasil 63.9 691
SAS 6.8 95 United 63.3 1.230
Tunis Air 6.7 15 Pan Am 63.0 1.974
Air Algeria 6.7 25 Qantas 62.8 4.149
Saudia 6.6 85 Lufthansa 62.0 1.059
Aer Lingus 6.5 22 Aeromexico 62.0 887
Inex Adria 6.5 11 Kenya 61.9 1.188
Trans Brasil 6.5 21 VASP 61.8 668
An sett 6.4 36 SAA 61.6 1,211
Aviaco 6.4 30 Braathens 61.2 264
Kuwait 6.3 18 BCal 61.0 1.440
Varig 6.2 65 Aviaco 61.0 442
Kenya 5.9 10 Saudia 60.7 1.105
TAP 5.9 28 Eastern 60.3 961
British Midland 5.9 20 THY 59.5 856
AeroPeru 5.7 10 Malev 58.8 1.145
Garuda 5.7 74 Mexicans 58.6 1.005
SAA 6.6 40 Libyan Arab 58.3 990
Iran Air 5.6 27 Royal Air Maroc 58.3 1.951
Air UK 5.5 24 Syrian Arab 57.7 1.642
THY 5.5 31 Alia 57.7 1,713
Olympic 5 3 53 Air Queensland 57.6 248
Lloyd Aero Boliviano 4.8 11 British Midland 57.3 394
Quebecair 4.7 16 Gulf Air 57.1 887
Crossair 4.3 15 Egyptair 56.7 1,200
MEA 4.2 14 Aeroperu 55.1 778
Ethiopian 4.0 28 Kuwait 55.0 1.837
Air Queensland 4.0 16 Air UK 54.8 291
Malev 3.9 22 Garuda 54.6 681
LOT 3.8 40 Air Zaire 53.2 1.254
Air Zimbabwe 3.5 12 Ethiopian 52.7 774
Syrian Arab 3.4 14 Quebecair 51.2 330
Libyan Arab 3.1 31 Inex Adria 49.7 417
Cubana 2.7 41 Austrian 49.3 849
CSA 2.4 42 Crossair 47.7 272
Air Zaire 2.3 10 MEA 46.4 1,487
Source: lata World Air Transport Statistics 1985.
Note: Only carriers with fleets of over 10 aircraft reporting to lata have been included.
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TABLE 11.5: The Timetable of the Proposed Network
CITY PAIR DEP/ARR FLIGHT NUMBER AIRCRAFT 1 
REGISTRATION I 
NUMBER 1
Kuwait-Medinah 0 9 3 0 -1 1 1 0 001 Q01
1 6 1 0 -1 7 5 0 002 Q06
I Kuwait-Abha 0 7 0 0 -0 9 1 0 003 Q03
1 6 2 0 -1 8 3 0 004 Q04 1
Kuwait-Taif 1300 -1 4 4 6 005 Q05 |
Medinah-Kuwait 070 0 -0 8 4 0 006 Q01 |
1 8 3 0 -2 0 1 0 007 Q06
Medinah-Bahrain 1010 -1 2 0 0 008 Q02
Medinah-Dubai 1 1 5 0 -1 4 1 0 009 Q01
1 6 00-1820 010 Q02
Bahrain-Medinah 1 300 -1 5 0 0 Oil Q02
I Bahrain-Abha 0 7 0 0 -0 9 0 0 012 Q05
Abha-Kuwait 0 9 50-1200 013 Q05
1 3 1 0 -1 5 2 0 014 Q06
Abha-Bahrain 1 9 0 0 -2 1 0 0 015 Q03
Abha-Dubai 070 0 -0 9 2 0 016 Q06
095 0 -1 2 1 0 017 Q03
Taif-Kuwait 132 0 -1 5 0 6 018 Q04
I Taif-Dubai 070 0 -0 9 1 9 019 Q04
I Dubai-Medinah 0700 -0 9 2 0 020 Q02
I 1800 -2 0 2 0 021 Q01
yDubai-Abha 10 00-1420 022 Q06
16 00-1820 023 Q03
Dubai-Taif 10 10-1229 024 Q04
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
12.1 CONCLUSIONS
The principal conclusion of this thesis is that limited air transport liberalisation is 
feasible and possible as a first step towards wider reform amongst the GCC group of 
countries. This conclusion is based upon the results obtained from the study of the 
background and experiences of other nations of liberalisation contained in Fart One of 
this research, and from the feasibility model detailed in Fart Two. The answers to each 
of the five questions listed at the start of Fart Two and illustrated in the model were 
found to be positive and to support the concept of liberalisation.
When reviewing the GCC air transport market at the initial stage of this research, it 
was found that there are basic factors which encourage liberalisation in the GCC 
countries which should be considered very carefully. These factors are as follows:
1. One of the ways for the GCC to achieve its goal of confederation is by economic 
integration, which means establishing a Gulf Common Market.
2. The GCC is economically stable.
3. The GCC average GNP per head is relatively high.
4. The existing highly regulated GCC domestic air transport market has resulted 
in monopolistic tendencies which do not have many advantages for consumers. 
In addition, the uncompetitive markets have resulted in some airlines having high 
operating costs, low efficiency and productivity.
5. The GCC countries have very advanced international airports which have a high 
level of unused capacity where some of them, at the present time, could double 
the received annual number of passengers without incurring problems of 
congestion.
6. The GCC airlines own some of the most advanced fleets in the world. However, 
some of the GCC carriers are not utilising their aircraft very efficiently. 
Generally, all the GCC carriers have high operating costs. As a result, some of
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the carriers make high operating net losses and receive high governmental 
subsidies.
7. The GCC air carriers are government-owned, as a result, they are not operated 
with commercial objectives, nor under private and commercial managerial 
principles.
8. There is essentially strong demand for domestic air transport in the GCC. For 
example, the number of domestic passengers carried annually by Saudia Airlines, 
which has the largest domestic market and fieri:, is approximately double the 
number it carries on international flights.
9. Air transport services are the most convenient and best method of travelling 
between the GCC countries. For example, there are no train services between 
the GCC countries.
Economists in 1960 started to question the benefits of governmental regulations. In 
1978, the USA passed the Airline Deregulation Act which freed carriers to establish their 
own fares and rates and to enter and exit routes. The Act was justified for the following 
reasons:
1. Economists had marshalled evidence that regulation was not needed.
2. Federal agencies were believed to increase costs.
3. There was a need to improve economic conditions through lower prices for 
customers and higher profits for the industry.
4. There was a belief that government regulation was interfering with productivity.
After comparing the GCC air transport regulatory environment with that of the USA 
and EC, it was found to be closer to that of the EC than that of the USA because of the 
involvement of several governments and national carriers which are mostly state-owned. 
As a result, the decision to liberalise the GCC or EC air transport requires acceptance 
and approval by all members. This means a long and complicated process is needed to 
establish a liberalisation policy that satisfies all the members with consideration to 
political issues and economic feasibility. At the same time, the policy is likely to contain 
a certain degree of protection for the member’s national carriers to avoid bankruptcy.
3 3 5
In addition, one similarity between the GCC aviation industry and that of the USA is 
that air transport is considered to be by far the most important mode of passenger 
transportation for all but the shortest journeys. By way of contrast, in the EC countries 
ground transportation is relatively competitive with air transport.
However, there were many advantages and disadvantages of the US Airline Deregulation 
Act for air carriers, consumers, shareholders, airline employees, the aviation industry 
and the government. Deregulation in the USA succeeded in improving efficiency and 
productivity, providing lower fares, lower costs, more variety of products, many 
marketing innovations, and higher demand. It resulted in less governmental control and 
a lower Federal budget. On the other hand, the industry moved towards concentration, 
which could lead to a few giant airlines controlling the US market. Other problems 
include airline financial instability, congested skies and airports, and control of slots and 
gates.
Since the GCC has tight and rigid air transport regulation, full deregulation such as 
that of the USA is not feasible nor applicable. The main lesson that can be learned 
from the US experience for the GCC is that competition from new entrants initially 
lowered costs and prices, and improved efficiency throughout the industry. In addition, 
deregulation produced a wider range of products for consumers.
Most of the GCC airlines which serve the domestic market at the present time have high 
fares and rates, high operating costs, low efficiency and provide a very narrow range 
of products for consumers. Therefore, if regulation is relaxed carefully for new private 
and commercial entrants in the domestic GCC market, it could create a certain level of 
competition which would lead to a more efficient industry.
In addition, some airlines in the GCC are faced with financial instability and difficulties, 
but due to their governmental ownership, those airlines are subsidised by the 
governments. An important question asks for how long would these governments 
support, or even can support, their airlines financially, given that some of these airlines 
have low productivity and efficiency and a high level of complaints from consumers.
3 3 6
Western European countries (the EC) adopted a different methodology from that of the 
USA in the application of airline reform. The European liberalisation process has been 
developing as a slow and gradual process rather than over a short time. Nevertheless, 
Europe has serious infrastructural problems such as airport and airspace congestion. 
However, the overall impact of European liberalisation up to 1992 has been less 
dramatic than US deregulation with regard to traffic growth, fare reduction, and new 
airlines. It has however brought benefits to consumers.
The EC aviation industry is similar to that of the GCC in the following areas:
1. More than one government contributes to the establishment of regulation.
2. Most of the large airlines are government owned.
3. The national carriers, to a certain level, have to stay in business to represent 
their countries as "flag carrier".
4. There is a more traditional concept towards the ownership and control of the 
infrastructure, such as airports and air traffic control.
However, lessons can be learned from the development of the European air transport 
liberalisation process by the GCC, given that the GCC does not have any infrastructure 
problems, especially at its m^jor airports. On the other hand, most of the GCC market 
is very regulated and monopolistic markets exist in Saudia Arabia operated by Saudia 
Airways and in four Gulf States operated by Gulf Air. The main lessons from the EC 
experience for the GCC are as follows:
1. The GCC has initially to define the level of freedom it is aiming for, and what 
would be best for the GCC consumers, airlines and governments.
2. liberalisation in the GCC has to be a smooth and gradual process like that of 
EC.
3. The GCC has to establish a Court of Justice such as the European Court of 
Justice which is responsible for implementing Community law.
4. There is a need to establish consumer organisations in the GCC in which 
consumers views and problems related to air transport can be co-ordinated and
can then be sent to those officials who regulate, deregulate and re-regulate the 
market.
5. The GCC governments do protect their national carriers which are mostly 
government-owned airlines.
Bearing all these points in mind, the 15183 EC Inter-Regional Air Services Directive with 
some modification is a very suitable model for the GCC because it does not cause m^jor 
threats to the national carriers.
When studying the impact of the European liberalisation process on the airline industry, 
the following are the main changes:
1. There have been some mergers and transnational alliances.
2. There has been a tendency for charter carriers to move towards scheduled
markets.
3. Increasing concentration among tour operators.
4. listed  below are some of the operational changes:
■ Entry of a few small airlines into scheduled services such as Ryanair and 
Hamburg Airlines. Others have expanded operations such as Crossair and 
British Midland.
■ As a result of the December 15183 package which allowed new fifth 
freedom opportunities, two airlines in particular have taken advantage of 
the freedom (Aer Lingus and Air Portugal).
■ Another result of the 15187 package has been the abandonment of most of 
the revenue pooling agreements. As a consequence, airlines have started 
to "bunch up" at the more popular times where previously schedules on 
pooled routes had been distributed throughout the day.
5. Decreasing yields on some routes.
It appears that real competition in the European airline market can be generated only 
by the existing carriers. Many of these airlines have mutual shareholdings, share swops 
and marketing alliances. Overall, it is veiy hard to observe where the new competitors
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to the incumbent European airlines will come from.
However, the following are the main lessons for the GCC from the impact of the
European liberalisation process:
1. Europe had the opportunity to learn from the USA deregulation experience, and 
the GCC can learn from both the USA and Europe.
2. The key element in the European liberalisation process was that it could succeed 
only by applying it in a gradual and smooth way, starting with inter-regional 
services.
3. Since there is no Infrastructure nor airway congestion in the GCC, then the GCC 
governments will face less problems than the Europeans in planning and applying 
air transport liberalisation. The GCC carriers will not have the troubles of the 
European carriers in dealing with airport and airway congestion.
4. Since the only type of carriers between the GCC domestic market are the 
national scheduled carriers, then the GCC national carriers will have less 
problems than the European carriers when facing competition (i.e. there is no 
charter industry).
5. Since there are no train services between the GCC countries, the airlines do not 
face the threat of intermodal competition.
6. The European and the GCC governments are similar in the traditional way of 
national control of aviation infrastructure, ownership, operation and financing. 
However, this characteristic is one of the reasons for congestion in Europe, 
especially following liberalisation. The GCC governments should draw lessons 
to avoid future congestion.
7. There is less opportunity for the GCC carriers to merge because of their 
government ownership, the consideration of being flag carriers, and they are the 
only type of carriers available However, if such a thing is to occur, the GCC 
should have powers similar to those of the European Commission under Articles 
85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty to apply harder conditions to discourage further 
take overs and mergers.
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8. Since there are no regional carriers and a veiy small number of charter flights 
between the GCC countries, then new entrants in the GCC are more likely to 
come in to the market than in Europe, especially as regionals.
9. Saudia Airlines will have the advantage of being the largest airline in the GCC. 
However, it has a disadvantage in having high operating costs. It can enter the 
Gulf Air domestic market and move freely to/from Kuwait and Dubai.
10. Gulf Air will have the advantage of being able to enter the Saudia domestic 
market and move freely in Kuwait and Dubai.
11. Kuwait will have the advantage of being able to enter the Saudia and Gulf 
domestic markets and move freely to/from Dubai.
12. Emirates will have the advantage of lower costs. It will be able to enter the 
Saudia and Gulf domestic markets and move freely to/from Kuwait.
13. Since there are no income taxes, nor labour unions, in the GCC, commercial 
organisations have good opportunities to generate profits.
At the beginning of Part Two of this thesis (the Feasibility Model), research was carried
out on different types of forecasting methods in order to select the most appropriate
model that could be used to predict passenger demand on domestic GCC routes. A
gravity model was chosen for the following reasons:
1. One of the objectives of the feasibility model is to forecast the demand on new 
routes where a gravity model is considered to be amongst the most appropriate.
2. H ie gravity model is based on a fundamental theoiy, justifiable assumptions and 
is statistically valid.
3. It is simple to use and apply and produces realistic answers.
4. Empirical evidence has shown that the gains in accuracy of more sophisticated 
methods are usually small. Furthermore, complexity or statistical sophistication 
does not seem to improve forecasting accuracy.
The development of the gravity model passed through the following stages:
Fart One: The Bask Model using Traffic and Distance for GCC International







P =  0 0.741
P =  0.5 0.727
P =  1 0.529
P =  1.5 0.421
P =  2 0.331
The Basic Model for GCC International Airports with Distance
Modifications. This part produced the following results:
For less than 400kms
Distance Power Correlation Coefficients
P =  0 0.9998
P =  0.5 0.9998
P =  1 0.9998
P =  1.5 0.9998
P =  2 0.9998
For more than 400kms and less than 790kms.
Distance Power Correlation Coefficients
P =  0 0.950
P =  0.5 0.977
P =  1 0.975
P =  1.5 0.954
P =  2 0.921
For more than 790kms.
Distance Power Correlation Coefficients
P =  0 0.819
P =  0.5 0.854
P =  1 0.879
P =  1.5 0.897
P =  2 0.908
Part Three H ie Replacement of Distance with Fare for GCC
International Airports. This part of the study produced the following 
results.
Fare Power Correlation Coefficients
P =  0 0.741
P =  0.5 0.732
P =  1 0.596
P =  1.5 0.524
P =  2 0.422
Part Four Estimating the Demand with Fare and Quality of Service variables for 
GCC International Airports. This part of the analysis produced relatively 
good results without any modifications or divisions by distance. H ie 
highest correlation coefficient was (0.87). It was produced when fare 
power was raised to (2) and quality of service power to (0.4).
Fart Five H ie Basic Traffic-Distance Model calibrated on Saudia Arabia Domestic 
Traffic and the analysis of 125 routes. H ie results of this part are as 
follows:
Distance Power Correlation Coefficients
P =  0 0.936
P =  0.5 0.960
P =  1 0.926
P =  1.5 0.790
P =  2 0.561
Part Six H ie Basic Traffic-Distance Model calibrated using all GCC Domestic and
International Airports. 166 routes were involved in this part of the 




P = 0 0.785
P = 0.4 0.804
P = 0.5 0.803
P = 1 0.758
P = 1.5 0.631
P = 2 0.443
In addition, the following analyses have been attempted based on all GCC traffic 
(International and Domestic airports):
1. Hie Bask Traffk-Distance Model with distance modifications did not produce 
good results, except for the division of routes with a distance of more than 
500nm.
2. Hie replacement of distance with fare produced poor results.
3. Hie fare and quality of service variables produced reasonably good results, but 
was only based on 63 routes.
Considering the six stages in the development of the gravity model, and the above three 
attempts, the basic traffk-distance (all GCC airports) method was selected to forecast 
traffic on new domestic routes within the GCC. Furthermore, that part of the model 
produced reasonably good results. It was based on 166 routes. Hie formula was simple 
to use.
An analysis of various types of aircraft was then made using total operating costs over 
different ranges of sector lengths with relation to the GCC operational environment. 
This aircraft analysis included ATR-42, ATR-72, ATP, F-50, Dash 8-300, Dash 8-400, 
Saab-2000, DO-328, Challenger RJ, EMB 145,146-100,146-200, F-100, B-737-300 and 
B-737-500. Some of the operating cost results of this aircraft study are illustrated in 
Table 12.1 over a sector length of 500nm.
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Viable new routes were identified from the data and results obtained from the gravity 
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These new routes were analyzed under the operation of different types of aircraft in 
order to find their total costs, revenues, net profits or losses, and profit as a percentage 
of total costs. Hie financial results showed that most of these routes are commercially 
attractive for new carriers. Nevertheless, the percentage profitability differs with 
aircraft type.
Finally, a possible new network was selected which involved the following routes:
Forecasted Number of
Daily Passengers Frequencies
1. Bahrain-Madinah-Bahrain 98 2
2. Bahrain-Abha-Bahrain 94 2
3. Dubai-Abha-Dubai 194 4
4. Dubai-Gizan-Dubai 106 2
5. Dubai-Madinah-Dubai 192 4
6. Kuwait-Abha-Kuwait 126 4
7. Kuwait-Gizan-Kuwait 70 2
8. Kuwait-Madinah-Kuwait 144 4
The Canadair Challenger RJ aircraft was selected for operation on this new possible 
network because of its attractive total operating costs, seating capacity, range and 
quality of service factors. The jet was attractive because some of the distances are 
relatively great and because it was felt that passenger expectations would be high. Six 
RJ aircraft were found to be suitable for meeting both passenger demand and generating 
reasonable profits. Hie average aircraft utilisation on the proposed new possible 
network was 8 hours per day.
The following are the marginal percentage of daily profitability, based on total operating 
revenues divided by total operating expenses, on the proposed network under different 
revenue characteristics:
% profitability
1. With forecasted passengers and 
aircraft capacity.
■ Revenues from passengers only 38%
■ Revenues from passengers,
excess baggage and mail 45%
■ Revenues from passengers, plus 
estimates for freight, excess baggage
and mail. 65%
2. With 65% load factor
■ Revenues from passengers only 1.9%
■ Revenues from passengers, excess
baggage and mail 7.0%
■ Revenues from passengers, freight,
excess baggage and mail 21%
Based on the results of using the model, the following are the mqjor conclusions:
1. There is enough passenger demand for viable operation on intra-GCC markets 
not currently served.
2. There are patterns of new routes that could be used efficiently by new carriers.
3. These new routes are commercially attractive and will be to the benefit of new 
carriers and to consumers by offering direct services to/from these new 
destinations.
4. The possible network as proposed was found to be profitable under the operation 
of six Canadair RJs.
Based on the above conclusions and the lessons from the development and impact of US 
deregulation and the European liberalisation process, liberalisation is feasible in the 
GCC countries.
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However, liberalisation in the GCC should not follow the US style. It should adopt the 
European methodology. It should be slow, gradual and smooth rather than carried out 
over a short time.
Rules similar to those of the European 1983 Inter-Regional Air Services Directive are 
proposed, with modification for the GCC, for the following reasons:
1. It would be the first step towards liberalisation, and could be agreed upon by the 
governments involved.
2. It does not cause mqjor threats to the national carriers, but would encourage 
than to increase efficiency and profitability.
3. It widens the scope for new carriers to develop markets to contribute to 
increasing the intra-GCC network.
4. It aids the development of the regions.
5. It increases the quality of services for consumers by having direct services to and 
from smaller airports.
However, the following restrictions included in the 1983 EC Inter-Regional Directive 
should be considered and modified before application in the GCC:
1. liberalisation should be between any domestic and any international airport in
the GCC instead of only between secondary provincial airports (Category 2) and 
smaller airports with international flight facilities (Category 3). listed  below are 
reasons for such modifications:
■ Most of the mqjor European airports have congestion problems; such 
problems do not exist at GCC international airports.
■ Europe does suffer from airspace congestion problems, which do not exist 
in the GCC.
■ Most of the GCC international airports have the capability to increase 
their annual traffic by at least one third of what they receive at the 
present time.
■ The majority of the GCC domestic airports are located in one country, 
and air services to/from most of them are provided by only one carrier. 
Competition will be more effective if the airport classification rules of the 
EC Directive are omitted.
■ The GCC has only one type of carrier, which is the scheduled national 
airlines. On the other hand, Europe had many types of carriers such as 
msgors, charters and regionals. The freedom to use any airport under 
GCC liberalisation would encourage the entry of new types of carriers 
such as regionals.
The international and domestic airports which are liberalised should not be
located in only one state for the following reasons:
■ This modification will make the liberalisation more acceptable to the GCC 
states and airlines, especially from Saudia Arabia whose national airline 
generates most of its traffic from the domestic market.
■ It would encourage travel and movement of passengers and goods between 
the GCC domestic and international airports.
The maximum stage length restriction of 400kms included in the 1983 EC rules
should be disregarded for the GCC for the following reasons:
■ The average distance between the GCC domestic and international 
airports is l,300kms much longer than in the EC.
■ Ground transportation in Europe is relatively competitive, however, air 
transportation in the GCC is the main method of travelling. So, 
disregarding the distance restriction allows wider scope for providing air 
services to smaller cities without harming other types of transportation.
■ Approximately half of air travel in Europe is by charter services. On the 
other hand, most (if not all) of the GCC air services are provided by 
regular scheduled services only. So, dropping the distance restriction does 
not affect other types of air services in the GCC.
■ Europe is much more populated per square kilometre than the GCC.
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The following are the main rules and principles of the European 1983 Inter-Regional Air
Services Directive with modifications which are proposed for the GCC. A service will
be liberalised under the following conditions:
1. It is performed between any domestic and international airports in the GCC 
states.
2. Hie origin and destination airports which are liberalised need not be located in 
the same state.
3. There is no maximum nor minimum stage length restriction.
4. It is performed by aircraft of 70 seats or less or maximum take-off weight of not 
more than 30 tons.
5. Tariffs on inter-regional services should be approved by both states, and fares 
and rates should be based on a fair cost to price ratio and a fair return on 
capital.
6. The rules and regulations do not affect the relationship between the Home State 
and its national carrier.
7. It applies to scheduled transport of passengers, or in combination with cargo and 
mail.
8. It applies to GCC airlines only.
9. Member states can, if they desire, apply conditions that are less restrictive than 
this proposed modified Directive.
The following are the mqjor grounds for the destination state to refuse an application
for an inter-regional air service:
1. The air route that is applied for is already satisfactorily served with consideration 
to quality, quantity and price by existing direct air services between the two 
airports concerned.
2. Hie destination airport does not have sufficient facilities to accommodate the 
service.




If liberalisation based on the ideas of the European 1983 Inter-Regional Air Services 
Directive with modifications is acceptable for adoption by the GCC countries, the 
following recommendations should be considered. Some of these could be considered 
as institutional or organisational changes. Others involve facilitation and infrastructure 
modifications and improvements. All have to be co-ordinated and planned and it may 
be appropriate to set up a small specialist team within the GCC Department of 
Transportation, Air Transport Section to plan for the first step in the liberalisation 
process. The details of this team’s terms of reference are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, although the points outlined in Section 2.6 and the lessons of Sections 4.10, 5.13 
and 6.10 provide starting points. The timescale for implementation could be relatively 
short and it is recommended that moves to liberalise and the formation of smaller 
carriers should be encouraged even before all the details of institutional and 
infrastructure changes are in place. New services would act as a catalyst for change. 
Detailed recommendations are:
1. Travel visas for foreigners between the GCC states should be very easy to obtain 
to encourage temporary visitors.
2. The major GCC domestic airports should be developed to receive intra-GCC 
flights. Although all the m^jor domestic airports receive jet services, the 
development would be mostly in customer service and immigration facilities.
3. GCC governments should draw up clear rules to identify if certain airline 
operations are not provided on a commercial basis but are provided as a social 
service. If airlines are not operating under commercial principles, airline 
subsidies will probably continue to be paid by governments, but the objective 
should be to phase them out.
4. GCC Governments should consider certain levels of privatisation for their 
airlines.
5. GCC airlines should improve their efficiency and productivity which would have 
direct benefits for total operating costs.
6. There is a strong need to establish consumer organisations in the GCC in which 
consumer views and problems related to air transport could be sent to officials
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who regulate, deregulate and re-regulate the market.
7. The GCC has to establish a Court of Justice such as the European Court of 
Justice which is responsible for implementing the community law.
8. The GCC civil aviation authorities have to establish a firm system for imposing 
airline fines to maintain the standard of airline operations, maintenance and 
consumer services.
9. A better classification of data should be established, (i.e. confidential, restricted 
or general).
10. Regular and adequate data such as airport traffic, on flight O/D and financial 
statistics should be available for effective planning and forecasting.
12. GCC airlines and airports should cooperate in regular exchanges of information 
on traffic trends and forecasts to ensure realistic future assessments.
13. The adoption of more liberal rules, possibly like the "open skies” airport policy 
in operation in Dubai and Sharjah, should be considered for some GCC airports.
14. The strong demand for trained personnel in all areas of air transport needs to 
be recognised now. Trained staff will be required in greater numbers when a 
competitive air transport policy is adopted. Therefore, GCC governments and 
airlines should cooperate and coordinate to determine training requirements and 
appropriate training facilities to ensure not only the most efficient use of existing 
personnel, equipment and facilities, but also to prepare for future expansion.
The Air Transport Section would have to monitor all these changes and build up its own 
expertise. Its objective would be to see that liberalisation was a success and that 
benefits for consumers, governments, the airline industry and individual airlines were 
achieved. The objective would be to keep bureaucracy to a minimum for the reasons 
given in Chapter 3 and it would be hoped that individual GCC states could reduce some 
of their regulatory functions.
12.3 EXPECTATIONS
If the proposed liberalisation within the GCC is allowed to take place, initially restricted 
to aircraft of 70 seats or less, it is not expected that the survival of the existing large 
carriers would be threatened. Saudia, Gulf Air, Emirates and Kuwait Airways would
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retain their identities and independence. It is possible that three or four new regional 
airlines would be established. Rules may have to be laid down to ensure that they 
remained independent of the mqjor airlines so that the competition and innovation that 
they introduced helped to improve the efficiency and profitability of the existing large 
carriers.
Furthermore, many new routes would probably be served by direct services. In general, 
air services in the GCC are expected to be improved especially in the quality of service, 
variety of products, fares and rates. Rules and regulations are necessary to ensure that 
the new originated carriers are owned by the GCC states or nationals. There is 
probably a tendency for foreign carriers to come to the GCC regional market under 
cover of national name and ownership. It is expected that most of the new originated 
regional carriers will be successful in their operations, and they will probably apply to 
extend their services to routes which are already served by national carriers. Mqjor 
domestic airports are expected to develop more. As time passes, some of these airports 
will probably be changed to international airports that receive international flights from 
worldwide airports. The 70 seat limit will have to be reviewed after three to four years 
and increases in the limit considered. Benefits are expected to reach other industries 
such as tourism, hotels and car rental companies.
The role of the GCC Air Transport Section would be to keep all these developments 
under review and to propose adjustments and changes as appropriate.
12.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Future study and research should be considered in the following areas. Some of these 
matters would have to be considered by the GCC Air Transport Section.
1. The feasibility model developed in this Thesis could be extended to research 
routes that are already receiving direct air services and the possibility of 
increased passenger demand through fare and quality of service factors.
2. The feasibility model could be extended to involve airline competition variables 
to forecast passenger demand under various competitive environments with
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consideration to the GCC atmosphere.
3. The research could be continued to propose an ultimate air transport 
liberalisation process model that could be applied in the GCC with consideration 
to time span. For example, if the proposed European 1983 Inter-Regional Air 
Service Directive with modifications is acceptable to the GCC, future work 
should research many models that are applicable to the GCC at various time 
sequences, considering the GCC air transport industry and the experience of 
other nations in liberalisation, especially the European Community. This 
research would allow the planning of changes to the initial liberalisation rules to 
be proposed by the GCC Air Transport Section on the basis of rational analysis 
and might lead to a second or third package of liberalisation measures. Such 
measures would also have to take into account changes in the international 
environment and are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Every stage of the researched air liberalisation process model should be based on 
academic principles as well as practical results from the initial phase of liberalisation. 
It should ask questions such as why, when and how a particular new package of 
liberalisation should be implemented.
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